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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a theoretical analysis of the process by which borders have come 
to be precise, fixed, mappable, and infinitely thin lines traced over the surface of 
the earth. I argue that accounts of global modernity should understand the 
linearization of borders as a process related to, but relatively autonomous from 
processes of state formation and other structures and processes typically 
associated with global modernity. In other words, linear borders have their own 
causes and consequences, which the thesis aims to unpack. The contribution of the 
thesis lies within debates on the historical origins of modern international relations 
which often overlook the history of borders through a focus on sovereignty.  
 
The thesis theorizes modern linear borders as an outcome of ‘survey rationality’, 
drawing on theories of rationalization. Survey rationality is a mode of territorial 
governance which conceives of the location of predefined borders as a technical 
and non-political question, and therefore susceptible to measurement and 
calculation through surveys and other technologies. The central argument of the 
thesis is that survey rationality on its own is not a natural or necessary part of 
territorial rule, but must be articulated with other historically particular 
rationalities in order to be effective in practice. I illustrate this argument historically 
by examining two such historically particular rationalities: first, the logic of agrarian 
capitalism in the English colonies of North America, and secondly, the logic of the 
civilizing mission in the ‘Scramble for Africa’. Finally, I show how international 
politics are different in a world of formally linearized borders. Linear borders 
underpin hierarchies by altering the distribution of geographical knowledge 
resources, for example at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and they contribute to 
a modular pattern of territorial partition, from Mysore and Poland in the 18th 
century to Vietnam and Korea in the 20th. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
In May 1993, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented to the Security 
Council the finished work of a commission charged with demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait boundary 
in the wake of the Gulf War. In line with the UN’s renewed post-Cold War mission to promote 
world peace, Boutros-Ghali remarked, ‘I believe that the work performed by the Commission 
will have a beneficial effect on the restoration of international peace and security in the area 
concerned’.1 The report contained, among other things, a long list of latitudinal and longitudinal 
coordinates. These numerical abstractions designated the exact series of points on the earth’s 
surface which, when connected, officially constituted the border itself.  
 
But doubts remained, as Iraq boycotted the commission when the commission affirmed Kuwaiti 
sovereignty over an area administered by Iraq. That territory included Iraq’s only deep-water 
naval base, about half the Iraqi city of Umm Qasr, and part of the Rumaila oil field, a dispute 
over which had been a trigger for the Gulf War. The commission’s response to Iraq’s criticisms 
was that it was not creating a new border, only a more accurate demarcation of the already 
existing border which had been agreed in 1932 between the British mandate of Iraq and the 
British protectorate of Kuwait, and inherited by the two states upon independence. Determining 
the new demarcation, however, had involved judgements at key points, such as inferring the 
location of a customs post which was nowhere to be found, based on astronomical observations 
from 1942. Another point on the supposed boundary was a noticeboard which had been 
removed in 1939. The commission found evidence of three possible locations A, B, and C where 
the noticeboard might have been, and decided to place the boundary halfway between points 
B and C. In a way, the commission was much more concerned with the locations of objects that 
no longer existed than with those that did. 
 
The UN Security Council insisted that ‘through the demarcation process the Commission is not 
reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but it is simply carrying out the technical task 
necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise coordinates of the boundary’. As the 
                                                             
1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, 21 May, 1993 (http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/51176/S_25811-
EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y). 
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Secretary-General put it, ‘the Commission was called to perform a technical and not a political 
task and as it is stressed in the Final Report, the Commission has made every effort to strictly 
confine itself to this objective’. This separation between the political act of allocating territory 
and the technical act of demarcation made it possible for the Commission to make the boundary 
into any concrete reality. Any acknowledgement that politics were involved at every point in the 
process would presumably have brought it to a grinding halt, and insofar as the UN was 
concerned, the border would have remained a legal, theoretical, and ephemeral entity. 
 
************** 
 
There are many kinds of territory often referred to in political discourse which are never really 
defined with a great deal of precision or technical detail, and a widely accepted lack of precision 
is often what makes the use of these abstractions possible. Where, for example, does any 
particular national ‘homeland’ begin or end? Where does a ‘homeland’ end and a ‘backyard’ 
begin? When does a ‘backyard’ become a ‘sphere of influence’? It would be difficult to answer 
these questions by listing coordinate points of latitude and longitude. But when we are asked to 
imagine an international system which is made up of sovereign territorial states, the territoriality 
referred to is not of that kind. On the contrary, state territories are today almost invariably 
defined by borders more or less similar to the UN-defined Iraq-Kuwait boundary. Unlike other 
kinds of territory, these territories are delineated by a specific kind of border which is thoroughly 
technological, whether we look at it as an idea, an institution, or as a practice. They depend on 
the possibility of a correspondence between a territory and a map, and on a strict separation 
between the political process of defining a border and the technical process of ‘locating’ it and 
marking it. As one boundary surveyor puts it, the practice of demarcating interstate boundaries 
‘is certainly non-political in character, its functions are technological and its decisions limited to 
the transformation of the verbal, graphical and digital definitions to the terrain surface.’2 Yet 
paradoxically, such a statement reveals that technical practices of measuring and determining 
locations, such as GPS and its historical predecessors, are integral to the spatiality of the modern 
state. The absence of boundaries which could conceivably be determined through such 
practices, indeed, would call into question the nature of territoriality. 
 
                                                             
2 Ron Adler, Geographical Information in the Delimitation, Demarcation and Management of International 
Land Boundaries, Boundary and Territory Briefing 3:4, (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit 
2001), 10. 
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These borders are ‘linear’, in the sense that they are made up of points on the earth’s surface, 
as small as can be imagined through applied mathematics, connected by equally thin imaginary 
lines. Where they are not, they are usually defined by some principle such as a watershed 
boundary, or the deepest channel of a river, which would allow someone familiar with certain 
bodies of knowledge such as geology and geometry, to ‘find’ the true, linearly defined border. 
Certain experts are accredited with the knowledge to ensure the unambiguous and precise 
linearity of the border, which today often requires some combination of GPS and satellite or 
aerial photography. In the case of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary the technically precise nature of the 
border was briefly subject to media interest, and was perhaps even problematized. But it is more 
rarely remarked on that this particular kind of territoriality is what makes it possible to imagine 
the physical shape of the state system itself, and it is this technical linearity which distinguishes 
the territoriality of the state system from the vagueness of ‘homelands’ and ‘spheres of 
influence’. 
 
This has not been the case for as long as one might think. As recently as the late twentieth 
century, for example, a considerable number of borders on the Arabian Peninsula were left 
undefined in any document. Going further back to the mid-nineteenth century, virtually all types 
of rule, from European metropolitan and colonial territories to polities beyond colonial rule in 
most regions of the world, manifested varying types of territoriality, including linear borders in 
some places and sometimes not. Before the seventeenth century, it was rare anywhere in the 
world, although not necessarily unheard of, for people to set up a series of boundary markers 
which connected up to form a linear border between one polity and another. Thus, while IR 
theory tends to see borders transhistorically as outcomes of power struggles or of converging 
interests, there is a historically particular kind of border which all states today pursue. 
 
This thesis is a historically informed and theoretically driven analysis of linear borders as a global 
system of managing space. It asks where linear borders historically come from and what they do 
to international politics. Why do borders always seem to require precision and linearity, how did 
such borders become so globally widespread, and what difference does it make?  
 
The historicity of modern territoriality, of course, is not new to IR. Accounts of the history and 
origins of sovereignty and the international system often refer to a particular spatial 
compartmentalization which characterizes the modern international system. Some of these 
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even refer to linear boundaries as international modernity’s defining feature.3 As I will explain 
in more detail later, however, they tend to view the emergence of modern territoriality as a 
place-holder for something else, usually some version of the sovereign state, and in practice, it 
is the latter phenomenon, rather than linear borders themselves, which they focus on. When 
Hendrik Spruyt, for example, refers to ‘external demarcation by borders’ or ‘territorial 
demarcation’, he means that a centralized state organization’s authority is supreme within a 
geographical area, not that the demarcation itself is particularly precise.4 Or when Christian 
Reus-Smit notes that the Peace of ‘Westphalia did not institute a fully formed system of 
territorially demarcated states’, the reason for this is primarily the continuation of dynastic 
sovereignty which was opposed to the confining of sovereign authority within the limits of one 
territory.5 Many would on some level agree with Stuart Elden’s conceptualization of boundaries 
as a ‘second-order problem’ which ‘only become possible in their modern sense’ through a 
notion of territory.6 By contrast, this thesis views the linearization of borders as a process 
relatively autonomous to the sovereign territorial state, and focuses squarely on precise linearity 
as a specific kind of territoriality fashioned out of or imposed on top of other kinds of 
territoriality. 
 
 
The Case for a Global Historical Approach 
 
If IR thus far has not been particularly interested in the linearity of borders, as an idea and 
practice separate from territorial sovereignty, why should it be interested in a global history of 
linear borders? Might the thesis do more harm than good by reinforcing a conception of a 
singular modernity with which social scientists have rightly become dissatisfied?7 Moreover, a 
global history of modern borders would seem at first glance to be an impossible task for one 
thesis, requiring an impossibly complex synthesis of a potentially endless amount of historical 
knowledge. For a long time, it was part of IR’s standard methodology to solve such difficulties of 
historicizing globalized structures such as the sovereign state by limiting the analysis to 
European history alone, although thanks to recent critiques this procedure is no longer tenable, 
                                                             
3  John Ruggie ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations’, 
International Organization 47:1 (Winter 1993), 139-174. 
4 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994), 154. 
5 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality 
in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 112. 
6 Stuart Elden, ‘Land, terrain, territory’, Progress in Human Geography 34:6 (2010), 811. 
7 Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), ch. 3. 
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if it ever was. Why not confine oneself to a local or regional study of the linearization of borders, 
which could be much more grounded in historical specificity? 
 
IR’s lack of explicit engagement with the historical linearization of borders is a problem because, 
as inconvenient as it might be, the global aspect of linear borders is impossible to avoid 
completely. In the absence of such an explicit engagement, IR to a certain extent borrows or 
reproduces other ideas which do so, in particular from late nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century political geographers who will become important in chapters five and six of 
the thesis. In this section I mention two in particular as an indication of what motivates this 
thesis, and then I argue that only with the global in mind can we properly assess and re-evaluate 
them. 
 
The first is that precise borders were historically delineated around political communities as an 
inevitable result of their development into modern nation-states. One prominent articulation of 
this idea was by German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who argued that linear borders were 
integral to socioeconomic development, as societies which learned to use efficiently and value 
land were driven to use every last inch.8 Lord Curzon, between serving as Viceroy of India and 
as UK Foreign Minister, delivered a lecture on Frontiers, which was comparable in its influence 
on political geography. 9  It gave a similar story of the idea of demarcated borders as ‘an 
essentially modern conception’ which is antithetical to ‘the oriental mind’. Curzon thought 
progress in the development of institutions and techniques which would bring about more 
precise and fixed borders ‘is undoubtedly a preventive of misunderstanding, a check to 
territorial cupidity, and an agency of peace’. Thus it is the development of the modern nation-
state which results in the linearization of borders, either through Ratzel’s imperative for the 
state to mobilize all possible resources in a geopolitically competitive world, or in Curzon’s terms 
as the ability to achieve cooperation and a rule of law between states. 
 
Second, as a result, the linearization of borders as a global historical process radiated outwards 
from Europe. For Ratzel, ‘Want of defined frontiers is in the essence of the formation of 
barbarous states. The line is intentionally not drawn, but kept open as a clear space of varying 
                                                             
8 Friedrich Ratzel, Géographie Politique, trans. Pierre Rusch and Charles Hussy (Geneva: Éd. Regionals 
européennes, 1988), 338; Lucien Febvre, ‘Frontière: The Word and the Concept’, in Peter Burke (ed), A 
New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre, trans. K. Folca (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1973), 208-18. 
9 George Curzon, Frontiers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907). 
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breadth’.10 For Curzon, fixed boundaries in Asia could only be arrived at through European 
intervention because of a ‘strong instinctive aversion to the acceptance of fixed boundaries’, 
arising ‘partly from the dislike of precise arrangements that is typical of the oriental mind’.11 The 
origins of non-European borders, according to this line of thought, were understood through 
Lord Salisbury’s after-dinner boast that 
 
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have 
been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small 
impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.12  
 
More recently, the linearity of borders has tended to be taken for granted, but these narratives 
have largely survived the test of time. Ratzel’s and Curzon’s explicit imperialism, as well as their 
interest in linear borders as a global, historically bounded phenomenon, would be unusual 
today. But at the same time, the dominant understanding in the social sciences is that linear 
borders originated in Europe as an outcome of the development of the nation-state, with 
imperialism subsequently remaking the world in Europe’s territorially demarcated image.13 
 
These ideas find resonance in IR. As I. William Zartman put it, borders in most of the world are 
‘the walls and moats of history, natural defence lines whose traces mark the military conflicts 
and diplomatic compromises of the nation’s past’.14 For John Herz, similarly, the modern nation-
state originated out of Europe’s gunpowder revolution, which replaced the individual castle with 
an extended line of fortifications as the safest protection.15 This ‘hard shell’ boundary was what 
made possible the formation of large territorial political communities. While Zartman and Herz 
were not as focused as Ratzel was in the particular ways in which societies understand and utilize 
territory, they shared with him the idea that boundaries originate from an intense competition 
between states for territory. Curzon’s point of view, in parallel, foreshadowed IR’s liberal 
institutionalists, who argue that clearly defined borderlines agreed between states result in joint 
                                                             
10 Quoted in Jens Bartelson, War in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 
124. 
11 Curzon, Frontiers, 49. 
12 Quoted in Adekunle Ajala, ‘The Nature of African Boundaries’, Africa Spectrum 18:2 (1983), 180. 
13 For a more complete demonstration of this observation, see Jordan Branch, ‘”Colonial reflection” and 
territoriality: The peripheral origins of sovereign statehood, European Journal of International Relations 
18:2 (2012), 278-281. 
14 I. William Zartman, ‘The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa’, The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 3:2 (Aug., 1965), 155. 
15 John Herz, ‘Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’, World Politics 9:4 (Jul. 1957), 474. 
12 
 
benefits, from facilitating trade to mitigating conflict.16 David Carter and H. E. Goemans, for 
example, cite Curzon’s Frontiers lecture in making this argument. 17 Moreover, the Frontiers 
lecture is often drawn on and quoted in Border Studies and by border technicians as a rationale 
for the scientific practice of border demarcation rooted in a progression towards international 
peace and cooperation.18 
 
So far, the main challenges to dominant narratives of the origins of modern borders have 
generally been limited by their failure to either analyse critically the linearity of modern borders, 
or to contest the intra-European origins of modern territoriality. Perhaps the most familiar 
counter-narrative to Curzon’s peace and progress through the spread of linear boundaries has 
been the anti-colonial critique of ‘artificial’ border-drawing. The Berlin West Africa Conference 
(1884-5) and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) have long been seen as critical moments in the 
reshaping of Africa and the Middle East, respectively, and have been blamed for many of the 
misfortunes those regions have seen. For example, the 1958 meeting in Accra of the All-African 
People’s Congress adopted a resolution which, among other things, 
 
(a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide the peoples of Africa, 
particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock; 
(b) calls for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date…19 
 
Similarly, many have characterized the Sykes-Picot Agreement as an arbitrary line on a map, a 
narrative which ‘Islamic State’ capitalized on in 2014 when it declared the ‘end of Sykes-Picot’, 
and bulldozed the Iraq-Syria border in an internet video.20  
 
The concept of colonial artificiality as a critique of modern borders has been powerful in gaining 
support from a range of perspectives, whether anti-colonial or not, partly because of its ability 
to transcend local particularities. Colonialism is well known as a global phenomenon, at least in 
historical terms, and the image of a colonial administrator more or less randomly drawing lines 
                                                             
16 Beth Simmons, ‘Rules over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as 
Institution’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49:6 (Dec. 2005), 823-848. 
17 David Carter and H. E. Goemans, ‘The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence 
of Interstate Conflict’, International Organization 65:2 (Spring 2011), 277. 
18 International Boundary Commission, Joint Annual Report 2013 
(http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/uploads/joint%20annual%20reports/jar_2013_en_(
web).pdf), 2. 
19 Ajala, ‘African Boundaries’, 182. 
20  Meghan Tinsley, ‘Whose Colonialism? The Contested Memory of the Sykes-Picot Agreement’, 
Rethinking Nation and Nationalism: POMEPS Studies 14 (2015), 39-43. 
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on maps resonates widely. For our purposes, however, the idea of artificial colonial borders is a 
dead end because it was already integral to the early political geographers’ conceptions of 
borders. It points to the European nation-state as the original, with boundaries determined 
through centuries of competition as Ratzel might have imagined, and extra-European borders 
as a less authentic copy. It can be traced back to statements such as Lord Salisbury’s above, or 
of British frontier surveyor Thomas Holdich, who wrote in 1891 that the worst kind of boundary 
is 
 
that artificial class of boundary which follows no natural feature at all, and which crossing the lines 
of drainage and dividing the main arteries of a country, jumps from ridge to ridge, and requires 
every yard of it to be demarcated artificially.21 
 
The implication of the concept of artificial colonial borders is that the problem of imperialism 
was its failure to reproduce European civilization outside Europe properly, and that it should 
have done so better. Just as it was for Holdich, the artificiality of these borders for some 
contemporary Western commentators seemed an invitation to create new linear borders in 
different places, drawing accusations of simply reproducing the interventionist logic of Sykes-
Picot itself.22 If colonial borders are to be problematized, it cannot be through the concept of 
artificiality. 
 
Many scholars, of course, have noted that the idea of artificial borders is of limited analytical 
value, but there have been few other narratives which explain the origins of borders in such a 
general way. In critiquing the idea of artificial borders, some have emphasized non-Western 
agency in the making of imperial boundaries and the ways in which these borders reflected pre-
colonial geographies.23 One can also point to continuing Western intervention as a reason for 
the weakness of states in the Global South, rather than artificial borders. 24 These moves are 
useful and necessary, but they stop short of calling into question the linear nature of borders 
                                                             
21 Thomas Holdich, ‘African Boundaries, and the Application of Indian Systems of Geographical Survey to 
Africa’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 13:10 (Oct., 
1891), 599 
22 Ralph Peters, ‘Blood Borders: How a better Middle East would look’, Armed Forces Journal, June 1, 
2006 (http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/); Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘After Iraq: A report from the 
new Middle East—and a glimpse of its possible future’, The Atlantic, Jan./Feb., 2008 
(https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/01/after-iraq/306577/); Robin Wright, 
‘Imagining a Remapped Middle East’, The New York Times Sep. 28, 2013 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/opinion/sunday/imagining-a-remapped-middle-east.html). 
23 Pinar Bilgin, ‘What is the point about Sykes-Picot?’, Global Affairs 2:3 (2016), 355-359. 
24 Siba Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International 
Law (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
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worldwide, and the extent to which efforts at systemic transformation have been limited by 
linear borders. 
 
Some critical understanding of the linearization of borders as a global process is indispensable, 
because without it, the political geography of Ratzel and Curzon will remain at least partially 
within unexamined assumptions. Even if we were to escape the characterization of borders as 
either natural or artificial, avoiding global history will obscure key aspects of linear borders. 
There have been many excellent efforts by historians to denaturalize the emergence of linear 
borders in particular places.25 For example, Peter Sahlins’ highly localized, in-depth study of the 
French-Spanish border has enormous potential for countering the narratives of early political 
geography.26 Far from an outcome of Ratzel’s fierce competition for space between organic 
states, the narrative reveals modern European states that are largely indifferent to the minute 
details of their periphery in the Pyrenees. Rather than being imposed by states, the border’s 
demarcation was demanded by inhabitants of the frontier as a solution to their own local 
disputes, and the two states avoided it until the 1860s. Yet, as with the many other histories 
that have been written of the linearization of borders in particular places, the broader 
significance of this border among other borders that might have comparable stories is largely 
left to the reader’s imagination, and the lateness of the French-Spanish border can be explained 
away as an exception to the rule. What this thesis can contribute, then, is not so much a detailed 
explanation of border formation in a particular area, but in bringing together rich historical 
accounts like Sahlins’ in order to make sense of a larger picture. It is by keeping in view borders 
as a subject to a global process of linearization, rather than as unique individual cases, that this 
thesis seeks to re-evaluate old universal narratives regarding the history of territoriality. 
 
The necessity at some level of a global understanding of borders is manifest not only in the social 
sciences but also in international politics itself. To return to the call for abolishing artificial 
colonial frontiers, what the ‘abolition’ of artificial frontiers could have meant at the moment of 
decolonization was open to debate, as was much anti-colonial strategy before the final collapse 
                                                             
25 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of 
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XVIe–XIXe siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 1998). 
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of the European empires.27 But even doing away with all the borders over an entire continent 
would still likely lead to an external border somewhere else. Hedley Bull argued in The 
Anarchical Society that even if European integration led all the way to the creation of a European 
state, ‘the upshot would be to reduce the number of sovereign states but to leave the institution 
of the sovereign state precisely where it was before’.28 The same could be said of borders. Unless 
and until linear borders are reconsidered as a universalized practice, any attempt at a 
fundamental transformation may change little more than the number and location of borders. 
In the next section, then, I outline the thesis and how it responds to these challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image, a map of Africa with borders redrawn, has been removed as the copyright is owned 
by another organisation] 
 
Figure 1: From Makau wa Mutua, 'Why Redraw the Map of Africa?'29 
 
The Thesis and its Outline 
 
This thesis, in broad terms, reconciles two points that emerge from the above discussion. On the 
one hand, the thesis rejects the idea that linear borders represent part of a high, rational form 
of civilization or are logically derivative from the ‘core’ of a singular modernity. Linear borders 
do not exist simply because it would be impossible to imagine some state, understood as a 
centralized bureaucracy which effectively monopolizes legitimate violence over a particular 
                                                             
27 Eg. Robbie Shilliam, ‘What about Marcus Garvey? Race and the transformation of sovereignty debate’, 
Review of International Studies 32:3 (July 2006), 379-400. 
28 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 
255. 
29 Makau wa Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law 16:4 (1995), 1113-1176. 
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space, that could exist otherwise. Contrary to Curzon, fixing precise borders does not always, 
self-evidently create conditions for peace and cooperation rather than war and conflict, and 
against Ratzel, linear borders do not self-evidently entail an efficient use of space. Moreover, 
linear borders, as a regular and taken-for-granted system of dividing up political space, did not 
emerge first in Europe, to be exported to the rest of the world later.30 Those ideas concerning 
borders should be seen within the context of imperial expansion and competition out of which 
they emerged.  
 
On the other hand, I have stressed the need for an approach to the history of borders which 
transcends any particular part of the world. A global perspective, I have argued, best equips us 
to deal with the idea and practice of linear borders themselves because, for better or for worse, 
they, and the narratives about borders we find ourselves embedded in, operate on a global, not 
a regional or local scale. This means we must reopen questions which have long been 
backgrounded in Anglophone scholarship. In a way not dissimilar from Curzon and Ratzel, we 
must inquire into the nature of linear borders, about the timing and whereabouts of their 
appearance on the global stage, and about what the linearization of borders, in the abstract, 
does to international politics. Moreover, it is unavoidable that the border imaginary of global 
modernity is linear. While borders often do not conform to linear expectations, those linear 
expectations are a powerful assumption lurking behind much contemporary international 
politics. John Ruggie was not wrong when he referred to ‘a particular form of territoriality—
disjoint, fixed, and mutually exclusive’ as ‘the most distinct feature of modernity in international 
politics’.31 
 
How, then, does the thesis propose to return to analytical frameworks that appear similar to 
those appearing in colonial geography without simply reproducing the latter? In brief, it does 
this by making strategic use of the theoretical tool known as ‘articulation’. Articulation is a way 
of describing the relationship between two discourses or social forces which become linked to 
each other not by their internal logic but by historical contingency. The argument of the thesis, 
in a nutshell, is that while the global linearization of borders is a process not logically 
necessitated by the state itself, or any other structure normally taken as the political 
manifestation of modernity, but became linked to global modernity through particular, 
identifiable historical processes. Linear borders are part of a certain way of arranging the space 
of political life such that it is legible from a cartographic perspective, which I call ‘survey 
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17 
 
rationality’. Survey rationality, like secularity, development, capitalism, civilization, the nation-
state, popular sovereignty, and any other signifiers associated with modernity, are capable of 
existing in different combinations and arrangements. The thesis demonstrates historically that 
linear borders are not reducible to any of these other aspects of modernity, either in terms of 
their origins or consequences, but nevertheless became entangled with them. 
 
The thesis unfolds in three parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first part provides the 
theoretical, historical, and methodological grounding for the rest of the thesis. Chapter two, the 
first substantive chapter, positions the thesis relative to IR and related literature and outlines 
the object of analysis for the thesis. It first creates an overview of literature on territory, 
organized using Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad of spatial practices, representations of space, and 
lived space, and calls for more sensitivity to the relationships between the three parts of the 
triad. It then reviews the literature on the history of territory in IR, arguing that its very minimal 
discussion or problematization of what territoriality actually is leads to a confusing mix of 
implicit definitions and widely disparate historical narratives. Finally it arrives at defining the 
object of analysis, by differentiating between territoriality more broadly and linear borders as a 
specific kind of territoriality, and giving a historical outline of its trajectory over the period 
examined in the thesis. 
 
Chapter three moves from positioning and setting up the problematic of the thesis to providing 
theoretical concepts which are later historically fleshed out in the remainder of the thesis. It 
begins by presenting linear borders as a kind of rationalization in the Weberian sense. It fashions 
this into a historical theory first by demonstrating the complexity of Weber’s concept of 
rationality and his understanding of the multiplicity of rationality. The rationality of linear 
borders, within this framework, I call ‘survey rationality’. I then introduce the concept of 
articulation, taken from Stuart Hall and others, and show how, even within Weber’s 
understanding, we can understand rationalities as historically emergent through particular 
articulations. This sets up the main argument of the thesis, that survey rationality, or the 
perspective through which linear borders appear as rational, is the product of historical 
articulations with other rationalities, particularly capitalism and ‘civilization’, although I leave 
open the possibility of any number of others. Finally, I outline two patterns in international 
politics which result from the articulation of survey rationality. I argue that survey rationality 
contributes to a proliferation of territorial partition, as well as a politics of expertise in the 
delineation of boundaries which reinforces knowledge hierarchies. 
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The second part of the thesis transitions from theory to history and speaks to the historical 
emergence of the global linearization of borders. Corresponding to the two different 
articulations of survey rationality referred to in chapter three, chapters four and five investigate 
the rationality of agrarian capitalism and ‘civilized’ land-appropriation in the North American 
colonies and nineteenth-century West Africa, respectively. In chapter four, I examine the 
emergence of a systematic usage of linear borders in the North American colonies, particularly 
the Thirteen Colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I argue that the intercolonial 
boundaries which saw frequent contestation, at times violent struggle, in this period, were 
ultimately determined by surveying experts as a scaling up of an already existing practice of 
surveying property boundaries. This practice of property surveying derived from a historically 
particular articulation of agrarian capitalism, where the precise measurement of a property 
increased its value and erased customary and other unmeasurable rights. This normalization of 
this surveying practice made it imaginable for political boundaries also to be surveyed in the 
same way. Moreover, the construction of colonial frontier space as a sum of actual and potential 
improvable and surveyed properties made the surveying of political boundaries a necessity given 
the progress of settlement. 
 
While dynamics of private property capitalism and ‘civilization’ were present in both the 
eighteenth-century Thirteen Colonies and nineteenth-century West Africa, it is the idea of 
‘civilization’ which had a clearer impact on the transition towards linear borders in the latter 
case. This transition is partially related to the dramatic expansion of territory in Africa claimed 
as European colonies beginning in the 1880s, but it is not reducible to it. Along with the reasons 
for overturning the ‘imperialism of free trade’ in favour of formal colonialism, which have been 
well rehearsed in the historical literature, we must also consider how linear borders came to be 
associated with a ‘civilized’ form of international cooperation. The idea of civilization was 
important not just as a moral end in the form of the civilizing mission, but also as a security 
interest, in that civilizing the process of land-appropriation was thought to make it safer. 
International law emerged as a profession and a scientific discipline at this time, as civilization 
brought it a rationale it had lost with the decline of natural law. As social theorists increasingly 
identified formal and abstract territoriality with civilization, and as the demarcation of linear 
borders became increasingly symbolic feats of mastery over nature, it became a requirement in 
international law and thought necessary for the avoidance of great power war. The older system 
of concluding treaties with native peoples was thus no longer considered within the remit of 
international law, nor a secure assurance of avoiding territorial conflict with other colonial 
powers. It is within this context that we must understand why the colonial powers turned 
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towards drawing linear boundaries right across the continent, a possibility they had earlier been 
reluctant to imagine. 
 
In the third part the thesis moves from the emergence and globalization of linear borders to the 
consequences that arise from them. Chapter six explores the politics of expertise made possible 
by the assumption that borders must be linear. It takes the example of the emergence of Border 
Studies, and in particular the concept of the ‘scientific frontier’. This concept originated in British 
policy debates regarding the northwest frontier of India, initially signifying a thinly veiled 
imperial expansionism. Geographers such as Thomas Holdich, however, transformed it into a 
scientific concept, drawing on their practical experience in demarcating boundaries. The 
increasingly scientific nature of boundary demarcation, and cosmopolitan cooperation over it, 
set up a new kind of struggle, not between Western powers competing for colonies, but 
between colonial knowledge and colonized peoples. By the time of the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference, there was a developing subfield of Border Studies dedicated to questions such as 
the nature of a scientific frontier, and scientific modes of geopolitical reasoning were so valued 
that geographers and the concept of the scientific frontier made a clear impact on the decisions 
of the conference. To demonstrate this, I compare the conference’s deliberations over the 
Austro-Italian and Yugoslav-Italian boundaries. 
 
Chapter seven is a brief genealogy of territorial partition, the object of which is to show how the 
globalization of linear borders makes the act of partitioning of territory across a wide range of 
historical contexts comparable in the view of those who work towards them or are otherwise 
involved in them. Linear borders make all territories, regardless of circumstances, appear to be 
different instantiations of the same thing, which makes it possible to imagine partition as a 
phenomenon larger than any particular version of partition. I trace the lineage of partition 
through three different historical versions. First, there is partition as cooperative territorial 
expansion, which is manifest in Poland and Mysore in the late eighteenth century, up through 
the partitions which were either realized or anticipated in Africa, China, and the Ottoman 
Empire. Second, there are the partitions enacted within the British Empire under the framework 
of imperial federalism, namely in Ireland, Palestine, and India, which were conceived by imperial 
officials as divisions necessary to retain some retrenched imperial unity. Finally there are the 
Cold War partitions of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, accepted as a stalemate in the struggle to 
win peoples and states over to the US or Soviet camp. Virtually each case of partition was 
influenced, either in terms of policy or strategies of resistance, by the knowledge and memory 
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of previous partitions, and partition emerges as a phenomenon appearing as one thing, 
abstracted from New Imperialism, imperial federalism, or the Cold War. 
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Chapter Two 
Defining the Problem: The Relative Autonomy of Borders 
 
 
The concept of ‘borders’ is in some sense inherently central to International Relations (IR). 
According to one IR textbook, for example, if there is anything that defines what the discipline 
studies, it might be summed up in the phrase ‘cross-border transactions’.1 Studying IR, then, at 
some level, presupposes some understanding of borders. Yet not only do IR scholars use the 
concept of borders in very different ways, but they also tend not to discuss the way they use it 
explicitly. As Burak Kadercan puts it, ‘The poverty of the dialogue across different literatures is 
striking’. 2  Even within the discipline of IR itself, the concepts of ‘modern territoriality’, or 
‘territorial sovereignty’, for example, have meant very different things for different scholars, 
ranging from the legal definition of sovereignty, to the exercise of exclusive control over an area, 
to the technical precision of linear borders in treaty texts. 3  This means that in order to 
investigate the origins and consequences of linear borders, some conceptual work is required 
first. 
 
Against this backdrop, this chapter sets up a research problem which does not so much attempt 
to unite all these literatures into one agenda, but positions itself among several of the major 
discourses on borders and territory and carves out an area of analysis which they have, for the 
most part, problematically overlooked. First I use spatial concepts from the sociologist Henri 
Lefebvre to arrange these discourses in relation to each other and to argue that they would each 
benefit from closer engagement with each other. Second, I examine the concept of ‘territorial 
sovereignty’, the dominant language within which IR has tended to approach the historical 
emergence of the international system and the particular space of international modernity. I 
argue that much confusion exists behind the usage of the term, and that a focus on the 
linearization of borders is better able to capture the historical particularity of the space of global 
modernity, and in doing so I specify the object of analysis of the thesis. Finally, I briefly outline 
historically the basic object of analysis, the process of the global linearization of borders in order 
to illustrate the conceptual arguments made in the previous section and to familiarize the reader 
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with the processes that the thesis then continues on to theorize in more depth. The overall aim 
is to clarify the object of analysis of the thesis, the process of the global linearization of borders, 
which I argue is a relatively autonomous aspect of international politics. 
 
 
Territory in IR, Seen Through Lefebvre’s Triad 
 
Perhaps the most influential set of categories for theorizing different aspects of space has been 
Henri Lefebvre’s spatial triad.4 Lefebvre’s triad can help clarify the relationship between the 
different literatures on territorial borders. 
 
Lefebvre divides space, for the purposes of social theory, into the following: 
 
1. Spatial practice, which embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and 
spatial sets characteristic of each social formation… 
2. Representations of space, which are tied to the relations of production and to the 'order' which 
those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to 'frontal' relations.  
3. Representational spaces, embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, 
linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art…5 
 
He later clarifies further that spatial practice is space perceived or ‘felt’, representations of space 
are spaces conceived or ‘thought’, and representational space is space as imagined or ‘lived’: 
 
1. Spatial practice: …The specific spatial competence and performance of every society member 
can only be evaluated empirically. 'Modern' spatial practice might thus be defined—to take an 
extreme but significant case—by the daily life of a tenant in a government-subsidized high-rise 
housing project. Which should not be taken to mean that motorways or the politics of air transport 
can be left out of the picture… 
 
2. Representations of space: conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, 
technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent—
all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived. (Arcane speculation 
about Numbers, with its talk of the golden number, moduli and 'canons', tends to perpetuate this 
                                                             
4  Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden, ‘Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory’, International Political 
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view of matters.) This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production). Conceptions 
of space tend…towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs.  
 
3. Representational spaces: space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and 
hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'…This is the dominated—and hence passively 
experienced—space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate…Thus 
representational spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more 
or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.6 
 
As an example, consider the space of the human body.7 Spatial practice in this case would 
include the use of the body, as in the use of the hands to do work. Representations of space 
would typically include scientific knowledge of anatomy or of the body’s relations with nature 
and the environment. Representational space would be the lived or ‘cultural’ space of the body.  
 
If we were to apply the triad to the space of territorial borders, spatial practice would entail not 
only the physical demarcation of borders through markers, walls, and fences, but also any 
practices of infrastructure-building or administration insofar as they physically enact a particular 
space with some discernible limits.8 Representations of space would typically consist of maps, 
with a particular outline of a territory visually represented, but could also include mathematical 
and geometrical systems such as GIS which form a systematic conceptual framework that 
structures the demarcation of borders. Lived space could entail a nation or body politic, as 
Lefebvre mentions ideology in an everyday, common-sense way as a component of lived space, 
but it is always tied directly to the lived experience of people, and is not necessarily made up of 
stable, coherent theoretical concepts. Depending on the context, lived space is sometimes set 
up in contradiction to a dominant representation of space, and so could consist of alternatives 
to territory, fuzzy borders, liminal spaces, and so on. 
 
The key part of Lefebvre’s triad that puts it in motion is the insistence that these three spaces 
are always connected; ‘That the lived, conceived and perceived realms should be 
interconnected, so that the “subject”, the individual member of a given social group, may move 
from one to another without confusion—so much is a logical necessity’.9  The success and 
proliferation of any representation of space depends, Lefebvre suggests, on the extent to which 
                                                             
6 Ibid., 38-39. 
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it is in accord with representational space. Moreover, while architectural visionaries would 
generally be seen in terms of spaces of representation, he uses a comparison of two particular 
examples to demonstrate the difference between spaces of representation and 
representational space: ‘Frank Lloyd Wright endorsed a communitarian representational space 
deriving from a biblical and Protestant tradition, whereas Le Corbusier was working towards a 
technicist, scientific and intellectualized representation of space’.10 
 
Yet in IR, these three aspects of space are rarely all given the same ontological priority, and the 
relations between them are often obscured. I am not arguing that there are no studies which 
satisfactorily include all three kinds of space, but only that the general tendency, in any given 
strand of literature, is to emphasize one of them, or sometimes two, at the expense of an 
approach which would take seriously all three of them, and the relationships between them. 
Perhaps the dominant approach to the history of territoriality has been to concentrate on spatial 
practices. Territoriality is treated here as a physical manifestation of practices of state-making, 
or a geographical way of characterizing them. Neo-Weberian approaches, for example usually 
consider a territorially demarcated area integral to the very definition of the state, regardless of 
historical era. Michael Mann, for instance, argues that what distinguishes states from other 
organizations is that its resources ‘stop at defined territorial boundaries’.11 It is the limiting of an 
organization’s power to a specific area that is characteristic of states. This can be understood 
through the lens of spatial practices because it has little to do with how people or states 
understand territory and its usefulness. Ideology, of course, is important as a kind of power for 
Mann, along with economic or military power. Yet the spatiality of ideology is still seen in terms 
of the geography of its spread by human communication through spaces and across boundaries, 
rather than in terms of spaces imagined by and within ideologies.  
 
Much of IR theory would also fall into this category. For classical realists this is sometimes 
explicitly stated, for example in John Herz’s formulation of the state border as a ‘hard shell’ of 
outer fortifications, but structural realists tend to more implicitly define territory as a 
geographical description of the physical resources a state can draw on. 12  Versions of IR 
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constructivism that rely on Alexander Wendt’s ‘rump materialism’, likewise see territory through 
the lens of spatial practices. For Wendt, a study of the relations between states must in some 
sense take territory as a given, ‘in the same way that sociology must take as given the fact that 
people have spatial extension’.13 Much like Lefebvre’s example of the spatial practice of the 
human body as the movement of hands, territory for Wendtian constructivists is ultimately a 
physical space which is not fundamentally constituted by ideas or discourse. 
 
Others, however, see territory in terms of representations of space, including many scholars of 
critical geopolitics, historians of cartography, and some constructivist IR scholars. According to 
these perspectives, it is not enough to consider the physicality of territory, as materialist 
approaches can easily naturalize representations of space and make them appear universal, 
when they are actually historically contingent. Critical geopolitics has long made the cogent 
argument that geopolitics should be seen as a discourse and a system of historically contingent 
representations rather than an objective analysis of the world.14 Territory, then, is not just a 
natural outcome or a geographical description of a basic kind of space taken up by polities, but 
rather emerges through a certain geopolitical gaze which began to emerge in the European 
Renaissance and Enlightenment. Maps, in a certain sense, have power to ‘write’ the world, and 
thus the emergence of the modern state has to be seen in the context of a historical process of 
the state literally being put ‘on the map’, beginning in the sixteenth century. This argument for 
the central role of representations such as maps is not limited to scholars identified with critical 
geopolitics. Jordan Branch makes a similar argument that the possibility of representing a 
territory ‘accurately’ can be historically shown to be a prerequisite for certain kinds of modern 
sovereignty and for making certain types of political claims. 15  Jeremy Larkins, likewise, 
theoretically and historically fleshes out John Ruggie’s claim that the Renaissance 
representational regime of the single-point perspective redefined subjectivity, and along with it, 
the spatial organization of politics.16  
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Representations of space need not take a primarily visual form, moreover, as Lefebvre included 
in this category all kinds of systematic knowledge, signs, and codes. Stuart Elden’s conceptual 
approach to territory, while centred on analysis of texts rather than cartography, could also be 
seen through the lens of representations of space. Elden’s work, which ‘gets to grips with the 
complexities in the term territory itself’, does not seek to construct a more accurate definition 
of territory but finds the meaning of the concept in the ways it is used in a wide range of texts.17 
In particular, for Elden, the conception of territory as the ultimate referent of political power 
finds its first full expression in the writings of mathematician Gottfried Leibniz, whom Michel 
Foucault considered a ‘general theoretician of force as much from the historical-political point 
of view as from that of physical science’.18 While yielding vast new insights into the history of 
territory, Elden also strengthens the existing emphasis on mathematical and scientific 
conceptions of the world, which Lefebvre considered typical of what he called ‘representations 
of space’. 
 
Yet defining territory as a representation of space rather than as a spatial practice, and viewing 
historical change in territory in this light comes with its own risks. In recent debates over the 
turn to new materialisms, some have argued that in critical geopolitics, along with a range of 
other critical IR approaches, there is a need to re-evaluate the role of material, matter, and the 
non-human. According to Vicki Squire, despite recent efforts to push critical geopolitics to 
engage with materiality, the subfield still ‘over-invests the representational, cultural, and the 
interpretive dimensions of geopolitics’.19 It has primarily seen territory in terms of how it is 
represented, potentially to the detriment of a deep understanding how territory is enacted, 
embodied, performed, or practiced. As John Agnew argues, the history of territory as a concept 
and as an idea is important, but ‘What remains unsecured is the relevance of this textual 
pathway to how ‘territory’ has actually figured in political practice and if and how the textual 
sources have entered into practical politics’.20 
 
Finally, a common feature of most of these literatures is a relative absence of representational 
space. The spaces of the everyday, the marginal, and the less rigidly codified and systematised 
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do not often feature prominently. Recently, however, interdisciplinary work bringing together 
human geography, sociology, international relations, and other disciplines, has increasingly 
sought to tackle this problem. ‘Formalised’ in a special issue of Geopolitics, the approach known 
as critical border studies has made it a priority to develop ‘alternative border imaginaries’, or 
resources for understanding borders beyond the dominant conception of borders as simply lines 
on maps.21 Moving away from the hegemonic representations of space, then, the goal of critical 
border studies can be understood as a shift towards representational, lived space. Rather than 
reproducing the modern fixation with lines, many critical border studies scholars have pointed 
to how real people may experience borders in a more dispersed way than simply at the edges 
of states, and citizens and ordinary people, not just states, play a role in constituting borders22 
Spatial practices, of course, are by no means ignored, and often in fact provide a rationale for 
the move from representations of space to representional space. While critical border studies 
refers to a heterogeneous assemblage of scholarly efforts, what often unites it are ‘common 
complaints’ about  
 
the growing disparity between the diversity and complexity of contemporary bordering practices 
on the one hand, and the perception that more theoretical and conceptual work needed to be 
done in order to keep pace with these developments in academic border studies on the other 
hand.23 
 
Borders, for example, are often off-shored and out-sourced in what is termed the ‘border-work’ 
of the EU.24 Accordingly, critical border studies ‘urges two twinned moves: a shift from the 
concept of the border to the notion of bordering practice; and the adoption of the lens of 
performance through which bordering practices are produced and reproduced.’25 
 
Critical border studies, and more broadly, work connected to its project of shifting from 
dominant representations of space towards representational spaces which accord better with 
current spatial practices, have provided a solid basis from which to understand major 
developments in bordering practices, and demonstrated the utility of seeing borders from many 
                                                             
21 Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines 
in the Sand' Agenda’, Geopolitics 17:4 (2012), 727-733. 
22 Chris Rumford, ‘Towards a Vernacularized Border Studies: The Case of Citizen Borderwork’, Journal of 
Borderlands Studies 28:2 (2013), 169-180. 
23 Parker and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Critical Border Studies’, 727. 
24 Chris Rumford, ‘Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders’, Geopolitics 17:4 (2012), 887-902; Luiza 
Bialasiewicz, ‘Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU Border Work in the 
Mediterranean’, Geopolitics 17:4 (2012), 843-866. 
25 Parker and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Critical Border Studies’, 729. 
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different perspectives. They have also shown that ‘Whilst borders may have become more 
difficult to determine than they have been in the past, they seem certain to survive in some form 
or other’, and that continued attention to representations of space is still necessary.26 While the 
simple image of the line on a map may be misleading in countless ways, this image continues to 
dominate public discourses over borders, and while bordering practices may be diversifying and 
multiplying, walls and fences continue to constitute an important part of contemporary border-
work. What would it mean, then, to examine the ways in which alternative border imaginaries 
not only provide analytical tools for understanding changing spatial practices, but also how these 
constitute and interact with dominant representations of space? Moreover, how does the 
dominance of one particular representation of space, the line on the map, constitute complex 
border landscapes and imaginaries in ways particular to our historical era?  
 
The important work of such literatures as critical border studies, critical geopolitics, and 
historical materialism can be built upon by returning to Lefebvre’s spatial triad. As Lefebvre 
argued, spatial practices, representations of space, and lived space all make each other possible, 
and exist in a three-sided historical dialectic, or trilectic. This thesis does not attempt to pursue 
Lefebvre’s whole agenda from a global historical perspective. It does, however, take Lefebvre’s 
ideas as an inspiration and as a theoretical starting point in two key ways. First is the idea of 
space as a historical mediator of social relations. Social relations always exist in some kind of 
space which is historically and contextually dependent, and that space always shapes societies 
in some way. Any society can be analysed through a spatial lens, and the society’s spatial 
characteristics are important for how it operates. This thesis takes as its object of analysis the 
space-society relations entailed by linear borders, or the kinds of social relations which produce 
and are produced by the global process of the linearization of borders. Second is the idea that a 
society’s spatial characteristics cannot be reduced to spatial practices, representations of space, 
or representational spaces. Each of these is influenced by the other two, and approaches which 
focus on only one of them could stand to benefit by engaging with the others. I do not use this 
idea of the spatial triad so much as a specific theory of space, but more as a series of signposts 
that remind us of the many different aspects of space. The spatial triad is useful for positioning 
relative to each other the different uses of space in IR, and for imagining what a different 
approach might look like which builds on existing work by explicitly taking into account all three 
aspects. 
 
                                                             
26 Noel Parker and Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Picking and Choosing the “Sovereign” Border: A Theory of 
Changing State Bordering Practices’, Geopolitics 17:4 (2012), 774. 
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In this thesis, all three aspects of the triad are important in different ways. Linear borders are in 
part an abstract ideal, or a representation of space, which is constantly worked towards without 
ever being actually achieved, especially as a global system of dividing space. This ideal exists on 
maps, and in all kinds of discourse from treaty texts to everyday speech which refers to borders 
as lines or assumes their linearity. There has never been, and never will be, a time when all 
borders everywhere have been defined perfectly linearly in practice. At the same time, we can 
also speak of linear borders as a spatial practice in terms of the meaningful and material patterns 
of action that make it possible to imagine the ideal of linear borders as accomplished or as a real 
potential. These practices include surveying, calculating distances and areas, constructing 
monuments, the drafting of maps, and many other kinds of practices of geographic knowledge 
production. Lived space, finally, is important for this thesis primarily as that which the ideal and 
practices of linear borders modify, replace, or obscure. Linear borders were never imposed on 
an empty landscape, but were always imagined and created in a pre-existing context, or in other 
words, a space that was lived in. Any account of linear borders, then, must take into account the 
spaces that preceded them. 
 
Thus the thesis takes inspiration from Lefebvre’s multifaceted conception of space, and 
complicates a range of IR perspectives by drawing attention to the ways in which spatial 
practices, representations of space, and lived space are co-constituted. The next section 
continues the task of positioning the thesis relative to other IR approaches, moving from the 
concept of space to that of borders. 
 
 
The Trouble with ‘Territorial Sovereignty’ 
 
This section engages with IR accounts of the origins of ‘territorial sovereignty’, and argues that 
the use of the concept of border in this literature is potentially misleading. This is because it has 
been mostly focused on centres of authority, and references to the way polities are 
geographically differentiated from each other at their borders have not been explained in detail. 
I then argue for a more explicit engagement with borders, which clears the ground for the thesis. 
 
In IR, most discussions of the origins of modern international relations see some version of the 
concept of ‘territorial sovereignty’ as the basic structure to be explained in terms of its origins 
or its spread to the rest of the world. These are broadly divisible into historical materialist 
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explanations of territoriality,27 and constructivist or discursive explanations.28 Differences exist 
as to the precise terminology, including variants such as ‘exclusive sovereignty’ or ‘modern 
territoriality’, but there seems to be broad agreement on what needs explanation: the 
geographical compartmentalization of legitimate political authority which is particular to the 
current historical era. 
 
Yet while explanations of the origins of territorial sovereignty abound, the historical emergence 
of precise borderlines, as a way of attempting to universally specify this compartmentalization 
of authority, has received surprisingly little attention. This thesis, with Robert Sack, understands 
territoriality as consisting of at least three things: classification by area, social communication of 
this area, and an assertion of control over the area.29 While this conception of territoriality is 
widely used, discussions of territoriality have elaborated far more on the last two aspects than 
the first. Many discussions of the history of territorial sovereignty refer to ‘borders’, but 
empirical examination of treaty texts or diplomatic negotiations over borders is not 
                                                             
27 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International 
Relations (London: Verso, 2003); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992). 
28 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jeremy 
Larkins, From Hierarchy to Anarchy: Territory and Politics before Westphalia (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
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problematizing modernity in international relations’, International Organization 47:1 (Winter 1993), 139-
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Elden, ‘Land, terrain, territory’, Progress in Human Geography 34:6 (2010), 799-817. Elden’s philological 
and conceptual-historical approach would perhaps seem a better fit, from the perspective of many 
geographers. Yet historians focusing on non-modern polities, on the contrary, have found the utility of 
Sack’s approach ‘in the flexibility it brings to the explanation of complex historical developments and in 
the rejection of either/or divisions implied in the rigid application of ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’. It allows for 
the influences of kinship to exist in modern capitalist society and those of territoriality to be operative in 
premodern decentralized societies such as those found in equatorial Africa in the mid-nineteenth 
century’. Christopher Gray, Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa: Southern Gabon, C. 1850-1940 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 21. Thongchai Winichakul, similarly, in his classic 
study of the history of the spatiality of Siam, has no problems with classifying each of the pre-colonial 
kingdoms of Cambodia, Mon, and Siam as a ‘spatial organization of the terrestrial earth, a “territoriality” 
in Robert Sack’s word.’ Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 23. Elden’s approach, on the other hand, while 
developing an approach more closely sensitive to the history of Western Europe, has not yet been applied, 
for obvious reasons of feasibility, on the global scale. The claim that Sack’s conception is inapplicable to 
non-modern or non-Western contexts, at the same time, has not primarily been a result of close study of 
those contexts. 
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widespread.30 Still rarer is the use in IR of histories of surveying and demarcating borders, and 
close attention to when and where borders were implemented as lines rather than zones.31 
Territory, it is agreed, is integral to modern conceptions of sovereignty, but variations in the way 
territory is defined or distinguished from other territories have received little attention. Other 
kinds of variations in territorial entities have been considered important, such as the sizes of 
territorial units and the contiguity of territories under one sovereignty, but variations in kinds of 
borders remain mostly unremarked upon. 32  Moreover, studies of the origins of territorial 
sovereignty have mostly remained geographically confined to Europe, and few, if any, have tried 
to understand how and why, or even when attempts were made to linearize borders globally. 
 
According to these literatures, the particular ways in which territories are distinguished from 
one another, whether in terms of treaty texts or the practices of measuring and marking space, 
seem to matter little to the overall constitution of international politics. Yet territories have 
historically possessed many widely varying types of borders, some of which might be too vague 
to be considered ‘borders’ today. Without considering borders, then, it is difficult to know 
precisely what is meant by ‘territorial sovereignty’. What kind of borders or boundaries must 
exist at the edges of a territory for it to be considered an example of ‘modern territoriality’? 
Must there simply be some basically functional or liveable way of knowing which territory one 
is in, or must all parts of every frontier consist of a series of connected lines, with no ambiguity 
or area in-between? Such questions have not generally been considered along with the origins 
of territorial sovereignty. Likewise, the concept of exclusivity is important but often ambiguous 
when it comes to the shape of territorial borders, as it can refer either to the holder of authority 
in a given area, or it can refer to the geography of the area itself. The French monarchy, for 
example, held a certain ‘exclusive authority’ over France in the fourteenth century, in that 
wherever ‘France’ was, the monarch was supreme. 33  Yet even within the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia, some areas were incorporated into France only in a way which was limited and 
shared with the Holy Roman Empire.34 France, at that point, held exclusive sovereignty within 
its territory, but its territory was not quite mutually exclusive with other territories. 
                                                             
30 Except Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional 
Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
31  Except Jordan Branch, The Cartographic State: Maps, Territory, and the Origins of Sovereignty 
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To begin with, there is the Westphalia narrative; at one time the canonical wisdom was that the 
‘rugged individualism of territorial and heterogeneous states’ was ‘among the legacies of the 
Settlement of Westphalia’ of 1648, which ‘represents the majestic portal which leads from the 
old into the new world’.35 Leo Gross’s article from 1948 stating this was primarily on sovereignty 
as a legal concept, but if one (mis)reads it as an inquiry into the origins of the territorial state, it 
suggests that this did not exist fully until the seventeenth century. 
 
For Hendrik Spruyt, by contrast, France had already become territorial the moment that the king 
of France became the unchallenged authority within France, by clearly subjugating the French 
dukes, counts, and other vassals. 36  On this interpretation, the phrase ‘the sovereign state 
confined itself territorially’ means that ‘sovereigns claimed hierarchy within borders and 
recognized no higher authority’.37 This is in contrast to the Holy Roman Emperor, or the Pope, 
whose authorities were not defined in terms of geographical place but instead theoretically 
applied to all of Christendom. Defined in this way, France became territorial around the 
fourteenth century. Philpott uses a similar test, arguing that in the medieval era, ‘Each set of 
obligations between lord and vassal had unique terms, determined by negotiations between 
them, not by a common law that prescribed obligations within a territory’.38 This had changed 
by the early sixteenth century in ‘Britain’, France, and Sweden, where monarchs ‘had established 
supremacy over the Church and other territorial rivals’.39 While appearing to add nuance to the 
received Westphalian narrative of the origins of territory, neither Spruyt nor Philpott engage 
with the international legal debates at the centre of Gross’s 1948 article. Instead, the primary 
distinction they make hinges on whether or not people are subject to a particular authority 
based primarily on where they live, rather than based on some other bond, such as religion or 
nationality, which does not vary with the person’s location. 
 
In another version of the origins of territorial sovereignty, Christian Reus-Smit does not see this 
existing until the 1713 Peace of Utrecht. He argues that the Peace of Westphalia actually 
reinforced some feudal rights, with France and Sweden both being granted fiefs outside their 
‘borders’, in the Holy Roman Empire: ‘dynastic ties and bonds of lineage—more than clearly 
                                                             
35 Leo Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948’, The American Journal of International Law, 42:1 
(1948), 40, 28. 
36 Spruyt, The Sovereign State, 79.  
37 Ibid., 109. 
38 Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 79 
39 Ibid,, 80 
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demarcated territorial boundaries—defined the extension of rule’.40  ‘Territorial boundaries’ 
only appeared in full force later: ‘The Treaties of Utrecht were pivotal in delineating the 
geographical extension of sovereign rights, making a decisive contribution to the consolidation 
of territoriality’.41 Yet if Reus-Smit dates territoriality to a time which is in accord neither with 
the received Westphalian narrative nor with the late-medieval or Renaissance-era territoriality 
of Spruyt or Philpott, it is not because he is reading different history texts but because his 
conception of territoriality is implicitly different. It was by agreeing to establish a boundary 
between France and Spain, he argues, thereby precluding a dynastic link between them, that 
territoriality was reinforced. Neither Gross’s international legal debates, nor Spruyt’s and 
Philpott’s distinction between geographically and non-geographically based authority seem to 
appear here. 
 
In yet another account, Jordan Branch historicizes another aspect of modern territoriality. For 
him, what is left out of previous scholarship is the idea of homogenous territory bounded by 
linear borders, rather than other kinds of frontiers. By this standard, even the Treaties of Utrecht 
reflected the resilience of older notions of authority because, just as was common in medieval 
treaties, territory in Europe was still transferred primarily by listing places and things, rather 
than clearly indicating a line. For example, the cession of Gibraltar to Britain entailed ‘the full 
and entire Propriety of the Town and Castle of Gibraltar, together with the Port, Fortifications, 
and Forts thereunto belonging’, without any further specification.42 Linear divisions of space 
appeared regularly in European treaties only beginning in the early nineteenth century at the 
Congress of Vienna and the Treaties of Paris.43 This would bring us to a generous range of four 
to five centuries between Spruyt’s Capetian consolidation in the fourteenth century to Branch’s 
Congress of Vienna in the nineteenth century.  
 
With the role of borders remaining generally implicit or ambiguous, ‘territorial sovereignty’ is 
too underspecified to carry the conceptual burden that the historical IR literature has placed on 
it. Territory, borders, and sovereignty are not the same thing, and while they seem to coincide 
today, assuming that they evolved simultaneously risks confusion. At issue here is not, as it may 
seem, an empirical disagreement, so much as a clash of differing, mostly implicit definitions of 
territorial sovereignty. These different definitions have to do with historical debates about the 
legal concept of sovereignty, exclusive effective control over some geographic area, the 
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abandoning of dynastic unions tying together distant territories, or precise linear borders at the 
edges of territories. There are, of course, good reasons for adopting different definitions, based 
on different goals of different studies. This multiplicity of definitions of ‘territorial sovereignty’, 
however, has in this case served to obscure important differences between the topics under 
discussion by different theorists. Territorial sovereignty is not one thing, but a bundle of 
different ideas, technologies, and practices. Clarifying what question we are asking, in this case, 
is not a matter of hair-splitting, as it affects the answer we receive by a matter of centuries. This 
chapter, in response, argues for an understanding of the global linearization of borders as a 
historical process relatively autonomous from territorial sovereignty, with distinct conditions of 
possibility and effects. 
 
Of course, the subject of borders more generally has not gone unexplored. Political scientists, 
historians, scholars of critical border studies, and others have consistently challenged the 
assumption that borders are simply lines between states.44 From various perspectives, it has 
been convincingly shown how the idea of linear borders obscures a far more complex reality of 
‘borderlands’, and the co-implication of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.45 Territories and borders are not 
monopolized by sovereign states.46 Borders have fulfilled various different functions in different 
times and places; the military, economic, and law enforcement aspects of borders may have 
changing or contradictory dynamics, and controls over people and migration have always been 
subject to historical variation.47 This thesis aims not so much to examine the complex reality 
obscured by the simple image of the line as to problematize the historical process of coming to 
take for granted this kind of line. This historical process has received attention largely as it relates 
to other processes, such as the emergence of territorial sovereignty or nationalism as ‘the 
principle that holds that the national and the political unit should be congruent’.48 Yet borders 
are often defined in treaties without any reference to military bases, economic resources, 
functional differences between borders, or, perhaps most notably, any people or groups of 
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people. It is this process of abstracting borders from what they are intended to divide, and from 
any intended function they might have, which is the object of analysis here. 
 
Conceiving of the linearization of borders as a relatively autonomous process, however, does 
not mean it is without implications for fields of study interested in territorial sovereignty, 
nationalism, borderlands, migration, and other border-related phenomena. The specification of 
borders as precise lines by no means eliminates the complexity of borderlands, but it does make 
possible a certain kind of borderland, by creating a position from which authorities and ‘experts’ 
can claim a monopoly over the ability to know and manipulate border geographies. The efforts 
that polities put into negotiating, surveying, mapping, and demarcating linear borders makes it 
possible to imagine that borders literally are as linear ‘on the ground’ as they appear on maps. 
This ability to confuse maps with reality has an important role in sustaining what John Agnew 
calls the ‘territorial trap’.49 That politics and social relations take place first and foremost within 
bounded territorial entities, Agnew argues, is an assumption of much of the social sciences 
which rules out the study of the historical emergence of territoriality as well as the possibility of 
future systemic changes. The role of state territoriality or ‘state space’ as a container of power 
and social relations is historically particular. 50  The territorial trap provides a set of spatial 
assumptions at the foundations of both policies and theories which naturalizes states’ control 
over territory and makes non-territorial spaces difficult to imagine.51   
 
The historical process of the linearization of borders is what makes this territorial trap convincing 
and believable. The very idea of ‘juridical sovereignty’ requires a conceptual separation between 
a clearly defined territory and an area of effective control or positive sovereignty, which is made 
possible through technological practices of boundary demarcation.52 Indeed, IR theory’s very 
conception of the international as a finite set of discrete states and their interactions, as 
opposed to a thick space of mutual co-constitution, depends on the assumption that all non-
state forms of political association that may have existed within the frontiers between states 
have been absorbed into one or another state territory. This thesis, then, is situated within the 
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broader project of achieving a ‘historical-geographical consciousness’ in which the spatial 
structures of international politics are problematized and historicized rather than reified and 
given assumed fixity.53 Yet within this broader agenda, it sheds new light on the increasingly 
linearized character of borders, and the consequences of this shift in international politics. 
 
 
The Linearization of Borders as an Autonomous Process: Conceptual Overview and Timeline 
 
Borders are different from territory, both in theory and in history. In contrast to much of the 
literature reviewed in the previous section, this section sets out an outline of the linearization 
of borders as a process conceptually and empirically distinct from more familiar historical 
processes. In theoretical terms, territory can be conceptualized as having frontier zones at the 
edges, possessing some width or ambiguity, or it can be thought to have more precise boundary 
lines. International law, for example, defines territory in the latter sense, as having boundaries 
which are normally ‘defined and delimited in all respects’.54 On this ‘linear’ or ‘coterminous’ 
conception of territorial borders, it is theoretically impossible for a point on land, besides 
Antarctica, to be in more or less than one territory at a given moment. There is no place which 
is on or within the border rather than in one or the other territory. Often these imaginary lines 
are straight, and even borders that appear to be ‘squiggly’ on small-scale maps are often 
officially defined by a series of boundary markers connected by straight lines. Despite the 
technically infinite complexity that can be achieved by a large number of boundary markers 
connected in this way, this conception of borders is inevitably limited by the fact that it is always 
built on lines. Even when a treaty defines a border otherwise, for example, by following a 
watershed boundary, it is still meant to be linear in the sense that the boundary could, in 
principle, be ‘found’ at any point, to any degree of precision required. While this conception was 
not applied in Europe in the seventeenth century, and while it was first attempted in European 
colonies, it has often been misleadingly called ‘Westphalian’ territoriality.55 
 
The concept of territory, however, is also often used in a much broader sense than that defined 
by international law. ‘Territoriality’, used here as an ideal-type, refers to strategies of rule 
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recurring in a wide range of contexts in human experience.56  The key difference between 
territorial and non-territorial strategies of rule is whether authority is applied to people and 
things based on where they are rather than by who or what they are. Territoriality is essentially 
‘rule by geography’ rather than universal rule, or rule by networks or personal relationships. 
While this definition of territoriality is widely used, it is less often realized that territorial 
strategies of rule are not irreconcilable with vague frontiers that fade into each other; 
overlapping territories do not preclude rule by geography.57 An authority can be meaningfully 
considered territorial as long as there is some way of conceptualizing a region where the 
authority applies, and socially communicating its geography. There is no need for a linear border 
to be drawn on a particular kind of map or demarcated physically with a particular kind of sign. 
 
Linear borders in the pure, geometrical sense implied by international law are distinct from 
‘natural borders’ in the sense of the rivers, mountain chains or other large geographical 
referents that can be used to describe a frontier. Rivers have width and change their courses, 
for example. Intergovernmental organizations been founded in response to these unavoidable 
gaps between the simple ideal of fixed linear borders and complex realities such as riverine 
topography. An International Boundary Commission, for example, continually defines and 
redefines the nearly 9,000-kilometer long Canada-US border as a series of straight lines 
connecting specified turning points.58 Including where the boundary follows river courses, it is a 
series of over 8,000 regularly maintained monuments and precisely defined turning points, not 
rivers themselves, which define every minute twist and turn of the boundary. Despite the 
intuitive simplicity of river boundaries, according to the Commission itself, ‘Without the work of 
the IBC, we simply would not know where the border is’. 
 
Mountain chains have also been used as ‘natural borders’, yet merely referring to a mountain 
range has often been deemed insufficiently precise. Despite being a famous example of a 
‘natural frontier’, the Pyrenees mountains between France and Spain are not really as linear as 
they appear on some maps, and the international border was not linearized in some parts until 
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the late nineteenth century. 59  The complexity of ‘natural boundaries’ was famously 
demonstrated by British colonial geographer Thomas Holdich.60 Anyone with actual surveying 
experience, he presumed, would know that the highest chain of a mountain and the watershed 
boundary are usually two very different things, and boundary agreements failing to specify 
which would take precedence risked future conflict. Assigned to a border arbitration between 
Chile and Argentina, Holdich’s final report on the case made it into a textbook example of the 
problem.61 It is important, of course, to recognize that absolutely unambiguous borders, as 
sought by Holdich and others, are never concretely attainable but are only worked towards 
through surveys, cartography, formalized treaty language, engineering, and other practices. It 
may be more useful, then, to refer to linearization as an uneven and never-completed process 
rather than to linear borders as an identifiable idea or a practice that was achieved at some point 
in the past and subsequently spread geographically. 
 
In historical terms, attempts to universally linearize borders are only a very recent episode in 
the broader history of territoriality. As recently as the late nineteenth century, well after the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia, the expectation that borders be linear has been far from globally 
accepted. Many historical polities were territorial, but without indicating borders with the 
scientific kind of precision expected today. As examples of non-linear boundaries, consider the 
heterogeneity of some of the answers given to an 1875 British inquiry into the boundaries of 
some Malay principalities: 
 
“The boundary of our State extends as far as the meeting of the fresh water with the salt water of 
the river;” or, “If you wash your head before starting, it will not be dry before you reach the place;” 
or, “The boundary may be determined on the river, as far as the sound of a gunshot may be heard 
from this particular hill.”62 
 
Many states today make great efforts to indicate the exact locations of their borders, but this 
has not always been the case; there are at least two conceivable reasons why a polity using 
territorial strategies of rule might not pursue precise linear borders. On one hand, it may not 
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have any interest in the first place in giving serious attention to the precise locations of various 
objects and people far from the centre of its territory. For example, this was the case in pre-
colonial Siam, despite it being territorial according to Sack’s definition.63  When pressed by 
British officials, the Siamese court simply declared that ‘no boundaries could ever be established 
between the Siamese and the Burmese’ and urged them to take their enquiry to ‘the old 
inhabitants residing on the frontiers’.64 On the other hand, even if a concept of a linear border 
exists, technological limitations might make it very difficult to render it a continuous line with a 
stable course surrounding the whole territory. In early modern Europe, surveys were considered 
the appropriate method for accurately determining borders, yet they were costly and took 
decades to complete.65 Borders did appear on early modern European maps, but they were 
often intended to indicate geographical regions such as Germany, rather than states, and did 
have any necessary relation to the space controlled by any particular polity. 
 
In the early nineteenth century, linear borders did exist, in some parts of the world more 
consistently than in others. However, it would not be possible to say that at that time most 
people in most places considered linear borders with precise locations to be necessary. On the 
contrary, many, perhaps most, people did not have a concept equivalent to a linear border, and 
those who did have one did not apply it universally. While pre-colonial forms of rule may have 
been more or less territorial, they tended not to have ‘hard’ borders.66 In Siam, for example, 
even the idea of a frontier as a zone completely surrounding the kingdom had limited 
significance.67 The concept of a khetdaen, which was like a frontier, existed, but it was only 
applied to areas where there were passages through thick forests or mountains used by travelers 
to go between kingdoms. Between these discontinuous frontier locales there was simply, as 
Thongchai understands it, ‘a lot of blank space’. 
 
European imperialists and settlers, moreover, who often did have a concept of linear borders, 
were nevertheless, for today’s standards, relatively very tolerant of ambiguous frontiers. In IR it 
is typically suggested that territoriality travelled with European imperialists and settlers as they 
spread into non-European areas of the world.68 Yet in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, 
                                                             
63 Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 24. 
64 Ibid., 64. 
65 Michael Biggs, ‘Putting the state on the map: Cartography, territory, and European state formation’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 41:2 (1999), 374–405. 
66 Kadercan, ‘Territorial design’. 
67 Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 75-76. 
68  Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 256-264; Kalevi Holsti, Taming the 
40 
 
borders were still left vague or nonexistent in most of the world, at the edges even of areas 
controlled by European empires or their settler states. 
  
In the Americas, linear borders had long existed, but often faded into uncertainty far from settler 
populations. In Latin America, especially, linear borders had a very notional existence at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.69 According to one legal scholar, at the time the Spanish-
speaking republics had achieved independence, ‘not a single boundary line had been actually 
agreed upon and defined, much less marked. Even where attempts were made to indicate them, 
the indications were insufficient or defective, owing to the want of precise geographical data’.70 
Likewise in North America, instead of resolving the territorial ambiguity of the Pacific Northwest, 
Britain and the United States agreed in 1818 to joint control of all territory west of the Rocky 
Mountains—which are themselves by no means strictly linear—not claimed by any other power. 
This joint control lasted until 1846.71  
 
In Africa, European imperial officials generally avoided drawing borders, even around the 
predominantly small coastal settlements they established. Borders were seen to restrict the area 
of possible commercial and other operations, which would have contradicted the ‘free trade 
imperialism’ of the time.72 Even in Europe, despite the fact that some Europeans had already 
begun to stigmatise non-Europeans for their imprecise borders, some non-linear, feudal 
frontiers persisted into the late nineteenth century. 73  For example, the Cerdanya region 
between France and Spain was delimited with a linear border for the first time in the Treaties of 
Bayonne (1856-1868), and likewise the Couto Mixto area between Portugal and Spain in the 
1864 Treaty of Lisbon.74 Europeans travelling in Asia attempting to deal with territorial ambiguity 
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sometimes attempted to adopt ‘the test made use of by the Asiatics themselves’.75 But more 
important than any particular conception of space was the fact that uncertainty prevailed 
around even the very nature of frontiers and whether or not they had to be linear. As Martin 
Bayly puts it, ‘Quite apart from the indeterminate geographical location of boundaries, 
particularly in areas in-between imperial interests, there was disagreement among the British 
as to the appropriate measure of political authority at this time’.76 
 
By the late nineteenth century, however, the extent to which it appeared possible for empires 
and states to allow borders to remain vague, inconsistent, or nonexistent had markedly 
diminished. One manifestation of this was what is often called the ‘Scramble for Africa’, or the 
end of the classic period of ‘free trade imperialism’. This consisted of a quick succession of 
boundary agreements made by the imperial powers, which began in full force with an 1889 
Anglo-French agreement. 77  In Latin America the process was more gradual. There, it was 
perhaps the wars which erupted over previously ambiguous and nonexistent borders that 
contributed to a sense that demarcating precise boundaries was necessary at all.78 As a US State 
Department geographer observed in 1940, in South America, ‘Most of the boundaries have been 
defined since 1850 and many of them within the last fifty or sixty years’.79 Moreover, the formal 
arbitration of disputed boundaries came into ‘special vogue during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. In that period a large number of boundary arbitrations were held, the 
awards of which were generally accepted by the parties’.80 Especially the British Empire became 
increasingly concerned with conducting boundary commissions, for example, surveying the 
Persian-Afghanistan and Persia-Baluchistan border (1870-2), the Russian-Afghan border (1884-
6), the Afghan-Indian border (1894-6), the Burmese-Indian (1881), and even the Persian-
Ottoman border (1847-1914).81  
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While it is debatable whether rule in these places had previously been ‘territorial’, these were 
quite often the first attempts to establish linear boundaries and replace relatively 
heterogeneous notions of space. As historian Benjamin Hopkins argues, referring to South and 
Central Asia,  
 
[T]he emergent states of the nineteenth century were initially able to navigate a hybrid political 
universe with considerable success, due to their ability to speak both the old indigenous languages 
of political authority and the new European one…Yet the success these states enjoyed previously 
waned as European ideas of statehood became the only acceptable language of politics after mid-
century.82 
 
Until the late nineteenth century, the delimitation and demarcation of precise borders in much 
of the world was considered at best difficult or unnecessary, and at worst counterproductive, 
among many of both colonizers and colonized. The precise, linear, ideally demarcated border, 
then, was not a globally dominant mode of spatial organization until substantially later than is 
usually implied. 
 
Because the existing literature on territorial sovereignty focuses almost exclusively on the 
progression of Europe from feudalism towards modernity, it runs the risk of overstating the 
historical specificity of territoriality. When Morgenthau refers to the ‘new phenomenon of the 
territorial state’ in the sixteenth century, or others note that ‘systems of rule in the early Middle 
Ages…were nonterritorial’, it is implied that territoriality itself was invented in the process of 
the European transition from the medieval to the modern.83 This fits in with a long tradition in 
Eurocentric historiography which focuses on this progression and the sharp temporal break it 
appears to have created.84 Rule, of course, need not always be defined territorially. But much 
work that has been done on systems of rule outside Western modernity suggest instead that 
forms of territoriality have been expressed in various times and places. 
 
Instead, it is more accurate to say that the global linearization of borders, rather than 
territoriality, is specific to our era, and relies on a host of technologies and practices which are 
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more historically specific than territoriality. As Thomas Holdich wrote after demarcating many 
of the British Empire’s borders, ‘Truly this period in our history has been well defined as the 
boundary-making era’.85 Holdich, like many, confused the historically specific form of precise 
linear borders with territorial boundaries more generally, but he had good reasons to label his 
own era as such, at the end of the nineteenth century, rather than the era of ‘Westphalia’.  
 
At the same time, it would be a mistake to view the globalization of linear borders as a process 
completed in the early twentieth century. The Saudi-Yemeni border, for example, remained 
mostly undefined until 2000, and the linearization of maritime borders in the Arctic and South 
China seas remains contentious.86 Moreover, borders have so far been specified primarily in only 
two dimensions. Despite state territory long being formally recognized as three-dimensional, 
there is no consensus in international law on the nature of boundaries between states and outer 
space.87 A ‘functionalist’ school of thought, contrary to ‘spatialists’, insists that these boundaries 
do not have fixed locations but instead depend on the nature of any particular activity, for 
example, whether a vehicle is jet- or rocket-propelled.  
 
To sum up, the global linearization of borders is a process which, after several centuries, reached 
a climax in the late nineteenth century, but continues today. Existing theories of the origins of 
territorial sovereignty, which tend to see territorial sovereignty effectively consolidated by the 
early nineteenth century or earlier, do not account for this process. In the next chapter, I turn 
towards explaining the global linearization of borders. 
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Chapter Three 
Survey Rationality and its Articulations 
 
 
If the linearization of borders is indeed comprehensible as relatively autonomous from 
territoriality, as argued in the previous chapter, two additional things must be shown 
theoretically: that this process had some conditions of possibility independent from or broader 
than territoriality, and that linear borders had some constitutive effect on international politics 
that cannot be attributed to territoriality alone. The following chapter, then, explores the origins 
and consequences of linearized borders. It lays out the basic theoretical framework through 
which the thesis seeks to understand the co-constitution of international politics and the 
linearization of borders. First, linear borders are conceptualized as a form of rationalization, in 
Max Weber’s sense. Then, beyond Weber, I discuss what it would mean to see the ideas and 
practices of linear borders as a particular kind of rationalization, which I call ‘survey rationality’. 
Survey rationality is introduced as the central episteme, or form of reasoning, within which the 
linearization of borders appears to be rational. Survey rationality on its own, however, explains 
very little, and leaves open the question of why and to what extent survey rationality has 
affected the practices of people and polities. A theory of articulation, then, is needed to describe 
how survey rationality becomes elided with other rationalities which are backed by more readily 
identifiable social forces. The main two such rationalities explored in this thesis are agrarian 
capitalism and ‘civilizational’ rationality, and these rationalities are elaborated on here. Yet the 
precise manner in which this articulation takes place depends on the historical context in which 
it occurs, and therefore is investigated historically in the following chapters. Finally, I outline two 
ways in which the linearization of borders has had constitutive effects on international politics, 
first by enabling borders to be drawn in new places and in new ways, and second, by altering 
the distribution of geographical knowledge resources. 
 
 
The Linearization of Borders as Rationalization 
 
While the linearization of borders is not typically dealt with as such in IR, there are some crucial 
insights from literature on the history of territoriality that are useful for our purposes here. On 
one hand, what might be called ‘epistemic’ explanations point to the influence of increasingly 
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atomistic notions of subjectivity in European society, art, and literature.1 On the other hand, 
‘cartographic’ explanations stress the technology of map-making as enabling certain forms of 
territorial governance to be conceived of, before they could be implemented in practice.2 These 
explanations of territorial sovereignty rely on an implicit concept of rationalization. Whether it 
is cartographic practices and technology or conceptions of subjectivity which are under 
consideration, these studies all allude to a shift or narrowing of what appears ‘rational’. Branch, 
for example, notes that ‘Frontier zones filled with enclaves and overlaps were “rationalized,” or 
made linear,’ as part of the process of ‘territorializing the state actors involved in international 
politics’.3 Richard Ashley, similarly, identifies the ‘Cartesian practice of spatialization’, in which 
‘resides the very possibility of rational political subjectivity’, as a source of modern sovereignty.4 
 
The rationalization of subjectivity and of cartographic practices referred to in such studies are 
particular aspects of one larger bundle of processes. This process by which forms of knowledge 
and order perceived as traditional, mystical, arbitrary, or unclear were delegitimized in favour 
of those which seem rational was termed ‘rationalization’ and first theorized as such by Max 
Weber. Weber believed rationalization to be ‘the fate of our age’, and while his analysis of 
bureaucratic rationality is particularly well-known in IR, he wrote about its effects in a wide 
variety of domains of life, such as theology, law, and even music theory.5 Weber wrote little 
about political geography, despite including a territorial requirement in his definition of the 
state, which offers no reflection on the nature of a territory’s borders.6 Yet the framework of 
rationalization is helpful for understanding the process of the linearization of borders and its 
constitutive effects on international politics. 
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According to Max Weber, all areas of modern Western life have been subject to a process of 
rationalization, from political institutions to the arts.7 Weber understands there to be many 
kinds of rationality not unique to modernity or the West, but he posits the existence of a certain 
methodical way of life he calls ‘formal rationality’, which historically emerged only with 
industrialization. 8  Beyond simple means-end calculation, formal rationality involves a drive 
towards the universal, impersonal application of certain rules and laws and an orientation of 
daily activity towards calculative and regular procedures. Only the most precise and totalizing 
forms of knowledge are to be privileged. Conversely, the process of ‘disenchantment’ entailed 
the rejection of traditional and mystical interpretations of nature, history, and society. Any form 
of order or knowledge perceived as arbitrary or irrational is to be rationalized, and rules are to 
be applied ‘without regard to persons’, a situation embodied in the bureaucratic form of 
administration. In the sphere of law, it is first and foremost the legal process that is to be 
adhered to, by formally trained jurists, rather than instead primarily taking into account a 
particular conception of justice. In the sphere of science, it is the methodical trial of every 
technically possible experiment in the highly controlled environment of the laboratory which 
constitutes formal rationalization. With the more mysterious forces of the world removed from 
sight by such rational institutions as bureaucracy and modern science nearly everything 
appeared, to the world of formal rationalization, subject to measurement, explanation, and 
ultimately control. 
 
Processes of rationalization can be broken down into three components which are of concern 
to linear borders. First, concepts were pushed to the highest levels of abstraction and generality, 
while the particularities of concrete things, people, and places were to be understood only 
through general categories. These abstractions then became rules used to order practical action, 
descending back down to the level of the concrete. Finally, these rules were actively spread 
horizontally to new areas to ensure their conformity. 
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Privileging the Abstract over the Concrete 
 
The first step in processes of rationalization involves the creation of concepts and abstract 
systems of thought, in place of direct action.9 Such systems of thought, which Weber calls 
‘theoretical rationality’, were crucial in disavowing all magical and mysterious forces, and 
comprehensively explaining human suffering and the meaning of existence. In the late sixteenth 
century, for example, the renaissance humanist interest in ethnographic, geographic, and 
historical concreteness and particularity gave way to the generalized laws of the scientific 
revolution.10 With the growth of seventeenth-century physics, the concept of ‘place’ came to be 
defined only by the general characteristics of all places that could be abstracted from any place 
in particular, such as size and distance from other places, and were thus subordinated to a more 
generalized and homogeneous notion of Cartesian space.11 To be clear, the important shift here 
is not towards fuller knowledge of the conditions of human life, but rather towards the belief 
that ‘if one only wanted to one could find out any time’ the answer to any particular question 
about this natural, disenchanted world.12 
 
Three particular systems of abstraction laid the groundwork for the development of linear 
borders. First is the Renaissance adaptation of Ptolemy’s system of latitude and longitude. As 
standardized under the Greenwich Meridian, this powerful system of spatial epistemology relies 
on only two particular objects: the rotational axis of the earth, and the Royal Observatory at 
Greenwich. In theory, it allows one to determine one’s location ‘objectively’, or, given a set of 
any technically possible coordinates, to locate the one spot on the earth’s surface which 
corresponds to it. Any ambiguity or error can be attributed to the instruments used or the 
interpretation of their output, but not to the system itself. Second, alongside this spatial 
epistemology came the ontology of bounded, formally equivalent, self-contained geographic 
entities, as began to be represented in early modern European maps.13 In the same way that 
abstract equations define objective laws of motion, even if never precisely observed in practice, 
the fact that frontiers can only ever tend towards a line is overlooked in the search for 
geometrical abstractions. 
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The connection between these two systems is made necessary by a third one, international law. 
The project of international law has, from its origins, been an application of allegedly universal 
reason on the global scale.14 For Francisco de Vitoria, it was a novel solution to the gap between 
the legal systems of Spain and that of the Indians the Spanish encountered, based not on 
Christian divine law but on the universal reasoning ability of humans. Yet some nations were 
thought to be organized more rationally than others and were therefore more civilized.15 
Refashioning the idea of Christendom into a secular ‘European’ civilization distinguished 
European nations from non-European nations primarily on the basis of their rational civilization. 
It was this international law founded on universal reason which would purportedly entitle 
European powers to draw definitively fixed borders, not only between each other but in all parts 
of the world. 
 
 
Putting Abstractions into Practice 
 
Along with these newly ambitious abstract systems of knowledge came attempts to apply them 
back to the concrete reality from which they were extrapolated and use them to reshape the 
world. Through the disenchantment of theoretical bodies of knowledge it became believable 
that ‘one can, in principle, master everything through calculation’.16 The Cartesian idea of the 
rational mind as an architect planning imaginary structures first, free from the complexity of the 
world, and only then building them in reality, maintained the priority of the abstract over the 
real.17 Weights and measures were standardized, and forests began to be managed and planted 
in rational patterns in the late eighteenth century.18 Even frontiers had to be ‘rationalized’ 
according to military logic.19 
 
Space was one such dimension of life which was subject to rationalization processes. States such 
as France, and cities such as Paris, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, aimed at a 
‘superior political rationality’ by aspiring towards the spatial centralization of ‘wealth, means of 
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action, knowledge, information and “culture”. In short, everything’.20 One exemplary project of 
spatial rationalization was the late nineteenth-century razing of Paris’s slums and construction 
of boulevards under prefect Georges-Eugene Haussmann. 21  This was intended to render 
governable a chaotic city perennially at risk of insurrection, by imposing a logic which was more 
comprehensible from the perspective of the state. Instead of allowing buildings to be 
constructed wherever chosen by individuals with the means to do so, the city would be 
organized under one state-driven logic. Similarly, even the national territory of France itself was 
rationalized by constructing lines of communication radiating outwards from Paris.22 
 
At the level of the international, spatial rationalization achieved its clearest form in the 
emergence of the global dominance of one universal system of marking space: the linear border. 
While small pockets of overlapping feudal jurisdictions in Europe may have long been 
undesirable for state authorities, such as the Couto Mixto between Spain and Portugal, and the 
Cerdanya between France and Spain, these were finally expunged.23 Border commissions, often 
mandated by Western empires, passed more methodically than ever through frontier after 
frontier from the Ottoman Empire to Siam, rationalizing each, according to the latest standards 
of accuracy. Throughout Latin America the legally and bureaucratically objective mechanism of 
the arbitral tribunal made frequent appearances, fixing each contested frontier with precise 
lines. For some, the image of the line may have previously constituted an ideal frontier, but it 
was only the industrial-era process of formal rationalization which made it necessary to take this 
ideal and apply it with an aim towards rigour and universality. 
 
Just as Haussmann’s boulevards made Paris legible to the state, borders make states 
themselves, as well as colonies, dominions, and protectorates, legible to and governable by 
empires, from the bird’s-eye perspective of modern cartography. Instead of having to distinguish 
objects by type, a system of territoriality clearly communicated through boundaries can be an 
extremely efficient as a form of simplified classification. 24  As cartographic simplifications, 
borders cannot tell us what a frontier landscape looks like to someone who lives amidst it, or 
attempts to cross it, nor can it tell us how life in two neighbouring states might be similar or 
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different. They do, however, attempt to tell us where a state begins and ends, and with 
mathematical precision, on a breathtakingly large scale. Rather than having to visit a frontier or 
come in contact with someone who is familiar with it, linear borders make possible knowledge 
of such places instead through reference to an apparently universal, rational framework. 
 
Historically, divine forces have often appeared to assist in the fixing of boundaries.25 In ancient 
Rome, for example, the god Terminus presided over property boundaries, which had to be 
marked, and moving these markers was not only illegal but also sacrilegious. In early modern 
England, villagers accompanied clergy on an annual walk tracing parish boundaries, saying 
prayers and chanting psalms. The politics of locating and relocating boundaries often gave a role 
to divine powers that could never completely be captured by human understanding. But with 
the removal of mysterious forces from the world by rationalization, it was left to human 
imagination and design to fix boundaries. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which was perhaps the 
first attempt to create a large-scale linear border, was originally guaranteed by the spiritual 
authority of the papacy. Yet as international law developed, it increasingly derived its authority 
instead from its self-evident rationality, having been elaborated by ‘rational’ civilizations. Inter-
imperial agreements such as that concluded at the Berlin Conference of 1884 reveal empires 
attempting to set down rules which would rationalize colonial activities and effectively manage 
their projections of power on the continent. It was the calculability of state interests which had 
given rise to the idea of a ‘balance of power’ which guaranteed these boundaries, not religion 
or mystical powers.26 
 
In addition to what was now believed to be institutionally realistic, technological developments 
were applied to make linear ideals a reality on the ground. Using the Ptolemaic system of 
latitude and longitude, by specifying a series of connected coordinate points, called ‘turning 
points’, borders can be reduced to little more than a series of numbers, such as the following 
definition of the Saudi-Jordanian border: 
 
TP No. 1 Jabal 'Anazah; 32° 14' North and 39° 18' East;  
tripoint with Iraq  
TP No. 2 32° North; 39° East  
TP No. 3 31° 30' North; 37° East  
TP No. 4 30° 30' North; 38° East  
                                                             
25 John Stilgoe, ‘Jack-o’-lanterns to surveyors: The secularization of landscape boundaries’, Environmental 
Review 1:1 (Jan. 1976), 14–32. 
26 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 181. 
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TP No. 5 30° 20' North; 37° 40' East  
TP No. 6 30° North; 37° 30' East  
TP No. 7 29° 52' North; 36° 45' East  
TP No. 8 29° 30' North; 36° 30' East  
TP No. 9 29° 11' North; 36° 04' East  
TP No. 10 29° 21' 30" North) indicate as approximate position     
34° 57' 30" East ) of coastal terminal point.27 
 
One element of modern processes of rationalization which drove the linearization of borders is 
quantification. Numbers and the calculative mode of thought enabled by them are essential for 
modern rationalization. Money, for example, enables valuable objects to be ordered by one 
logic, under which they are distinguished not by any uniqueness or incomparability but solely by 
differences in the amounts of currency they are worth. 28  Likewise, linear borders are not 
distinguished from each other by the various cultural or political conceptions that people living 
near them might have, as ambiguous or zonal frontiers might be, but instead they are 
distinguished solely by their locations. 
 
These locations themselves are geographically quantifiable through the Ptolemaic system of 
longitude and latitude. An early method of border-drawing which relied on the quantification of 
space was the use of parallels and meridians, dating to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. North 
America, through colonial claims, was overlain with a series of parallel lines distinguished only 
by their numerical arc length from the equator, as ignorance of the land and its existing societies 
meant that Europeans could say little else about them. Yet these lines did not necessarily have 
precise endpoints in the West, and could hardly have been surveyed fully. Later parallels such 
as the Mason-Dixon Line (39°43’ N) and the Missouri Compromise Line (36°30’ N) began to have 
clearer endpoints. In the westward expansion of the United States, certain places became 
known in public discourse by numbers before many actual particularities of the place were 
known. For example, a famous rallying cry of hard-liners in the American attempt to draw the 
border with British North America as far north as possible was ‘Fifty-Four Forty or Fight’, 
referring to the latitude 54°40’ N, which was the southernmost point of Russian claims in 
Alaska.29 In previous contexts imagination had been a more acceptable source of knowledge on 
                                                             
27 US Department of State, International Boundary Study, No. 60: Jordan-Saudi Arabia Boundary, Office of 
the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 30 December, 1965. 
28 Matthew Deflem, ‘The Sociology of the Sociology of Money: Simmel and the Contemporary Battle of 
the Classics’, Journal of Classical Sociology 3:1 (2003), 67-96. 
29 Edwin Miles, ‘“Fifty-Four Forty or Fight”—An American Political Legend’ Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 44:2 (1957), 291-309. 
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little known places, with maps being filled with animals and fictitious mountain ranges.30 But 
with a universal, scientific system of reference available based on latitude and longitude, it 
became possible to believe that only things which were scientifically verified to exist—and in 
the case of the mid-nineteenth century Pacific Northwest, little but longitude and latitude was 
known to the United States—had to be referred to. 
 
With the proliferation of surveys, however, and the increasing privileging of knowledge gained 
from them, it became clear that not even this numerical system of parallels was accurate 
enough, and instead, the boundary posts laid down by surveyors took precedence. After the first 
survey of the Westernmost extent of the US-British Columbia border along the 49th parallel 
(1857-1862), it was realised that the astronomical observations used for demarcation, done by 
plumb line, had been affected by gravitational anomalies such as mountains.31 It was decided, 
then, to simply connect the markers laid down with many short straight line segments, such that 
the US-British Columbia border actually crosses and re-crosses the geodetic 49th parallel. 
 
This quantification of borders, as Georg Simmel described a money economy, ‘corresponds to 
the ideal of natural science: to transform the world into an arithmetic problem, to fix every part 
of the world by mathematical formulas’, giving an impression of certainty and unambiguity.32 
Yet a border which has been, at the conceptual level, made into a set of numbers is unable to 
capture anything culturally or socially unique, and instead is distinguishable only by the angular 
distance of its constituent points from the equator and the prime meridian. Any other 
distinguishing features of a particular border are obscured by the system’s aspiration towards 
universal accuracy and certainty. 
 
Beginning in the colonial New World, then, European empires began to divide real space with 
theoretical lines. This gave the impression that space had been rationally planned first, and then 
simply implemented according to plan. Contrary to appearances, however, the linearization of 
borders has rarely, if ever, been completed precisely according to any comprehensive plan. 
Instead, linearization is a continuous process often characterized by an oscillation between the 
failure of the world to conform to abstract concepts, and the creation of new abstract concepts 
                                                             
30 Thomas Bassett, ‘Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth-Century West Africa’, Geographical 
Review 84:3 (Jul., 1994), 316-335. 
31  Stephen Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary 
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in order to correct for the previous failure, with first principles never being called into question. 
As an illustrative example, consider the roughly three hundred years of boundary disputes 
between the colonies, and later states, of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware. 33  The 
southern boundary of Pennsylvania was originally set at 40° North, but it was later discovered 
that Philadelphia, the main city of Pennsylvania, was south of this line. Thus an agreement was 
reached between the three colonies whereby the Pennsylvania-Maryland boundary would be 
moved south, and Maryland would receive part of Delaware in exchange. But this agreement 
could not be implemented either, because it required delimiting a radius of twelve miles around 
New Castle, Delaware, a town with no obvious centre point. A further agreement specified the 
centre as the cupola of New Castle’s Court House, but then when a twelve-mile radius was drawn 
from there, it did not quite reach the northeast corner of Maryland, and a thin wedge of territory 
was left outside each of the three colonies. It was not until 1921 that this wedge became part of 
Delaware.  
 
British colonial official Henry McMahon is generally best known for his 1915 promise of an 
independent Arab state to the Sharif of Mecca. But in Border Studies, he is also well known for 
his attempt to conceptualize a solution to the above problem, endemic to all attempts to 
linearize borders, of the inevitable discrepancies between the world in theory and the world in 
practice. The solution is to analytically separate the task of border-drawing into two parts, one 
political and one technical, otherwise known as ‘delimitation’ and ‘demarcation’. 34  This 
distinction is still used in Border Studies today. Agreement on the general course of the 
boundary should be agreed on first by diplomatic negotiators, and only then, once a political 
agreement was reached, geographical technicians should set out to physically mark the 
boundary however possible. The impossibility of total knowledge of the world would be 
incorporated into this system of rationalization by establishing a certain amount of freedom to 
be given to the technicians to demarcate the boundary according to the reality of the world 
rather than confining them to a geographically ill-informed treaty. Yet this could not solve the 
problem completely because it never revisited the first principle of the entire system: the 
essentially linear nature of borders. 
 
  
                                                             
33  William Bayliff, The Maryland–Pennsylvania and Maryland–Delaware Boundaries (Annapolis, MD: 
Maryland Board of Natural Resources, 1959). 
34 Dennis Rushworth, ‘Mapping in support of frontier arbitration’ Boundary and Security Bulletin 5:1 
(Spring 1997), 61–64. 
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Privileging the Universal over the Particular 
 
The first two elements of rationalization entailed the linearization of some borders. Yet linear 
borders coexisted alongside other methods for centuries. Some borders dead-ended in 
continental interiors, and most states in Europe still lacked linear borders in the mid-eighteenth 
century, even when they possessed colonies in the Americas that had them.35 But by the end of 
the nineteenth century, imperialists were making more and more deliberate efforts to linearize 
borders as a universal rule rather than one among many possibilities. Weber’s concept of ‘formal 
rationality’ can help us understand this universalization.36 Under conditions of formal rationality, 
which Weber sees as taking shape most clearly in the industrial era, all action in any particular 
domain has to be oriented according to one objective set of principles. Formal rationality differs 
from ‘theoretical rationality’ and ‘substantive rationality’, in that rules dictate everything, 
‘without regard to persons’, rather than particular worldviews or values. The universalization of 
linear borders, I argue, is part and parcel of this larger historical shift towards uniformly applied 
rules. 
 
In order for this to happen, Western empires had to assert that their ideals were not only 
superior to other ideals but also had to replace them. Forms of colonialism which explicitly 
worked within local knowledge were delegitimated, and European technology and scientific 
expertise was increasingly thought of as a measure of this superiority.37  Many imperialists 
considered it necessary to rid the colonial world, if possible, of the supposedly arbitrary and 
personalized systems of rule which characterized pre-colonial societies—in other words, to 
ensure the rationalization of governance. 38  As the notion of the objective superiority of 
European culture and civilization intensified and became more widely accepted in the 
nineteenth century, so did a notion that technologies and techniques of rule were part and 
parcel of this superior civilization. 39  While European colonialism always relied on local 
knowledge, attempts to understand local knowledge on its own terms and govern within it were 
increasingly abandoned in favour of instead discrediting local knowledge and purging colonial 
governance of non-Western notions.40 This dynamic of constructing non-Western knowledge as 
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‘wrong’, moreover, was not limited to directly colonized areas but indeed affected many 
societies which escaped direct colonization, such as Siam and Japan.41  
 
One of these systems of governance which stood to be rationalized under the ‘civilizing mission’, 
using Western ideas and technology, was the frontier. Linear borders, for imperialists beginning 
in the late nineteenth century, had to replace non-Western conceptions of space because they 
were inherently more rational than other forms of frontiers. According to followers of the 
German geopolitical tradition, linear borders emerged when ‘civilized’ societies neighbouring 
each other exerted mutual pressure that forced them to adopt a rational use of the land, and 
eliminate any unused middle ground.42 Thus linear borders, as opposed to the previously more 
common zonal frontiers, had developed as a way to cut unused peripheral land to a minimum. 
Local notions of space were no longer considered useful or precise enough, and linear borders 
were the solution. 
 
Those who did not abide by this universal standard, on the other hand, were derided. After 
serving as Viceroy of India, George Curzon observed, ‘In Asia, the oldest inhabited continent, 
there has always been a strong instinctive aversion to the acceptance of fixed boundaries…partly 
from the dislike of precise arrangements that is typical of the oriental mind’.43 Likewise, to British 
surveyor Thomas Holdich, the Kirghiz of Central Asia ‘just wanders, adjusting himself to 
conditions of weather, and his life appears to be the ideal of simple contented ease...caring 
nothing for the boundaries which have been drawn about his hills’.44 Curzon congratulated 
European imperialism for addressing this problem, in that ‘primitive forms’ of frontiers ‘have 
nearly everywhere been replaced by boundaries, the more scientific character of which…is 
undoubtedly a preventive of misunderstanding, a check to territorial cupidity, and an agency of 
peace’. 45  It was precisely this effort to rationalize colonial spaces that motivated the 
establishment of an academic science of borders. Curzon’s 1907 lecture, an unapologetic and 
strident defence of imperialism, is widely cited as a classic academic text on the topic of 
borders.46  Holdich, likewise, was a primary instigator of one of the first debates in border 
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studies, over the relative merits of mountain borders and river borders. 47  Another British 
colonial administrator, Henry McMahon, who has been credited with conceptualizing the 
distinction between ‘delimitation’ and ‘demarcation’, has already been mentioned in the 
previous section. 
 
The transformation of British views of Afghan territoriality over the course of the nineteenth 
century is particularly indicative of an increasingly uncompromising application of universal 
rules, disregarding local concepts. Earlier in the century, in describing the ‘limits of the kingdom 
of Caubul’, diplomat Mountstuart Elphinstone had drawn on ‘the test made use of by the Asiatics 
themselves’, and considered ‘the King’s sovereignty as extending over all the countries in which 
the Khootba is read and the money coined in his name’.48 But by the later part of the century, a 
British official could state that in fact ‘there is no such thing’ as an Afghan boundary.49 Where 
did these boundaries go? What changed was not the ability of imperial agents to access 
knowledge, but rather that local knowledge did not correspond to the universal principle of 
linear boundaries. Consider the Pamir mountains in the far northeast of Afghanistan, described 
by Curzon as ‘so lofty in situation, fast bound in the fetters of frost and ice during eight months 
of the year, almost destitute of vegetation, swept by hurricanes…the ownership or boundaries 
of which none are able, and few are anxious, to determine’.50 Yet despite making boundary-
drawing in this region seem an absurdity, Curzon could not entertain the possibility of this 
boundary remaining ‘haphazard’ and ‘irregular’, in the face of Russian expansion through 
Central Asia. 
 
While linear borders emerged in part from an imperialist understanding of the relationship 
between colonizer and colonized, they also come out of understandings of inter-imperial 
relationships which were evolving at the same time, namely the presumed ability of empires to 
dispose of global space in a ‘rational’ and ‘civilized’ way. In particular, the image of the world as 
a space entirely divided up by precise linear borders into distinct political spaces should be 
understood as having emerged within a context at roughly the turn of the twentieth century 
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where narratives of global closure and the elimination of the ‘empty’, ‘unknown’, and ‘frontier’ 
spaces of the world were ascendant within Western discourses.51 Such narratives spanned the 
political spectrum from Left to Right. The conservative scholar of geopolitics Halford Mackinder, 
for example, grounded his influential ‘Heartland Thesis’ by noting that ‘Of late it has been a 
commonplace to speak of geographical exploration as nearly over…the world, in its remoter 
borders, has hardly been revealed before we must chronicle its virtually complete political 
appropriation.’52 At roughly the same time Communist icon Vladimir Lenin declared, ‘for the first 
time the world is completely divided up…in the future only redivision is possible’.53 Yet perhaps 
the most prominent articulation of all was Frederick Turner’s ‘Frontier Thesis’, which lamented 
that the American frontier, as the US Census of 1890 reported, had disappeared.54 
 
This was a world where empires no longer felt safe assuming that there was plenty of empty 
space in the world for them to fill, and were increasingly concerned with the possibility of 
territorial conflict as a result. It was not until this anxiety emerged in the late nineteenth century 
that borders truly came to be perceived as necessary in the colonial world. As J.D. Hargreaves 
argues, it was this concern about empires ‘elbowing’ each other that led to the Europeans’ 
obsession with boundary agreements in Africa from 1889 onwards.55 Similarly, on the northwest 
frontier of India, British imperial officials were concerned about Russian expansionism which led 
to diplomatic crisis. The solution to this anxiety eventually agreed upon was the territorial fixity 
and certainty brought by clearly marked linear borders. As one military officer put it, ‘If the 
frontier were left undefined, then indeed the peace of the world would be at the mercy of any 
ambitious frontier officer’, the assumption being it would be more difficult for such an officer to 
violate a clearly marked boundary.56 A crucial precondition, then, for the idea that all global 
space should be clearly marked with lines was the equally novel idea in the late nineteenth 
century that global space was a scarce resource. 
 
The adoption of fixed boundaries, in global-historical terms, is often associated with the 
proliferation of nationalisms and national states, while many empires are thought to have been 
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antithetical to the fixing of boundaries. 57  Comparing bordering practices and discourses in 
metropoles and colonies complicates this view, however, firstly because border linearization 
was first attempted in colonies, not metropoles.58 Moreover, the linearization of borders in most 
of the world occurred under the auspices of formal or informal empire, whether through inter-
imperial border commissions, or through British or American arbitration. The academic field of 
Border Studies owes its foundation in large part to a group of imperial officials grappling less 
with the problem of attaching a national identity to a particular territory than with the problem 
of rendering unfamiliar spaces intelligible and safe for imperial expansion by fixing inter-imperial 
limits. Regardless of the context, these officials assumed the rationality of linear borders and 
argued that precise borders would help ‘civilize’ spaces which they found difficult to govern. 
 
 
The Core Argument: Multiple Rationalities, Articulation, and Change 
 
Linear borders, then, are a form of rationalization. This provides us with a general idea of what 
they are, but we need a thicker conceptual framework in order to go further with a more 
detailed historical analysis which is more sensitive to the unevenness and complexity of the 
linearization of borders as a global process. This section provides such a framework, divided into 
three steps. First, we must recognize the multiplicity, irony, and contradictions within the 
concept of rationality. Second, I outline ‘survey rationality’ as a specific kind of rationality 
particular to linear borders. Third, I use the idea of articulation as a way to historically link survey 
rationality to more familiar modern historical processes. 
 
 
Multiple Rationalities 
 
Weber, unlike many of his contemporaries, successors, and translators, was quite clear on the 
fundamental ambiguity of the concept of rationality.59 As he wrote of The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism, probably his most famous work, ‘If this essay makes any contribution at 
all, may it be to bring out the complexity [or many-sidedness] of the only superficially simple 
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concept of the “rational”’.60 In the text itself, he wrote, ‘”Rationalism” is a historical concept that 
contains a world of contradictions in itself’.61 As if this point was not clear enough, he then added 
in a revised edition, ‘This simple proposition, which is often forgotten, should be placed at the 
beginning of every study which essays to deal with rationalism’.  
 
One important dimension of complexity in Weber’s understanding of rationality is in the four 
different definitions of rationality that can be found in Weber’s work, some of which have been 
referred to above: instrumental, theoretical, substantive, and formal. While theoretical 
rationality refers to systems of thought, the others refer to actions, with which Weber was most 
concerned. Instrumental, substantive, and formal rationality are each associated with different 
types of ends, which frequently do not align with each other. In short, action is instrumentally 
rational if it is the best means towards a specific and direct end, it is substantively rational if it 
corresponds to an overarching set of values, and it is formally rational if it corresponds to 
abstract rules and fixed procedures. The indeterminacy of rationality is particularly apparent 
with substantive rationality, which has been described as being based in a ‘radical 
perspectivism’, or a ‘Nietzschean departure from Kant’, in that values in themselves cannot be 
described as rational or having any rational basis, in any meaningful sense.62  
 
Irony and paradox in the interactions between different historically constructed rationalities are 
common themes in Weber’s writing, with the classic example of this being his discussion of the 
Puritan origins of capitalism. 63  In Weber’s view, it was precisely the ability of substantive 
rationality to overcome instrumental rationality which made it such a consequential world-
historical force. During the Reformation, some radical Protestant groups had identified earthly 
wealth as the primary evidence of an individual’s divine election to everlasting life, as it was 
thought to be an outcome of the mastering of one’s actions through hard work and self-denial 
which was required for complete religious devotion. As time passed, however, the ‘psychological 
premium’ placed on acquiring wealth eclipsed the other-worldly orientation of the Puritans. This 
led to the emergence of a ‘spirit of capitalism’ in which economic acquisition was pursued as the 
highest possible end in itself. Contrary to accounts of capitalism as the outcome of a unilinear 
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process of increasing means-end rationality through the Reformation and Enlightenment, then, 
Weber argued that the spirit of capitalism had evolved through a complex process in which 
historically constructed rationalities combined and contradicted each other in a double irony. 
On the one hand, the reversal of the usual subordination of wealth to the human needs and 
desires it pays for, in the pursuit of wealth as an absolute good in itself, was absolutely irrational 
from practically any perspective other than capitalism, especially from the perspective of 
spontaneous enjoyment of life. The substantive rationality of the spirit of capitalism, in other 
words, decisively overcame the instrumental rationality of everyday life insofar as it was able to 
rationalize action in certain ways. On the other hand, it also contradicted the substantive 
rationality of Puritan theology which valued the glorification of God above all else, and instead 
became increasingly focused on the accumulation of riches. 
 
 
Survey Rationality 
 
Explaining historical processes of rationalization thus requires first and foremost an 
understanding of the perspective from which something appears rational, in order to then 
proceed to determine the conditions under which that rationality was constructed. The 
substantive rationality which seeks to linearize borders as an end in itself, for the purposes of 
this thesis, can be called ‘survey rationality’, a concept developed here. 
 
Inherent in modern territoriality is a certain set of scientific practices. At the centre of these 
practices is the location of borders through technical and formal means.64 While the allocation 
of territory and the process of selecting a border is a political process, locating an already defined 
border is thought to be a technical question, not a political one, in that some combination of 
official documentary evidence, technological devices, training in survey methods, and access to 
the site are strictly sufficient for resolving it. In border studies, the technical part of the 
boundary-making process is known by the term ‘demarcation’, and it is kept separate from 
‘delimitation’, which is political. 65  According to one experienced boundary surveyor, ‘The 
mission of demarcation is certainly non-political in character, its functions are technological and 
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its decisions limited to the transformation of the verbal, graphical and digital definitions to the 
terrain surface.’66  
 
Modern territoriality is thus characterized by what could be called survey rationality, defined as 
an attribute socially given to a space consisting of legibility from the perspective of a surveyor, 
or in other words, its possession of boundaries susceptible to measurement and calculation.67 
According to the American Congress on Surveying and Mapping, a surveyor is someone who 
makes ‘all essential measurements to determine the relative position of points and/or physical 
and cultural details above, on, or beneath the surface of the Earth, and to depict them in a usable 
form, or to establish the position of points and/or details’. 68  Spaces defined within the 
parameters of survey rationality, then, must be delimited by points capable of being measured, 
fixed in terms of their relative position, and depicted in a form usable to surveyors. Thus while 
modern territoriality consists of survey rationality, the latter works on a broader range of spaces 
than political territory but also can be applied to jurisdictions, private properties, and other 
spaces.69 In fact, as the next chapter argues, survey rationality was first applied to private 
properties, and only after it had become a central element in maintaining the political order of 
the English settler colonies was it then scaled up to the level of the international. The key 
element of survey rationality is the articulation of technical and formal criteria for the precise 
location of boundaries which are kept strictly separate from the authority to create or move 
those boundaries, whether this is political, juridical, or proprietary authority.  
 
According to survey rationality, locations are determined ‘without regard to persons’.70 Because 
a well-defined border can only have one unambiguous location, a person demarcating a border 
matters only in terms of their skill and training in the manipulation of tools and data. 
Determining the location of a border by asking locals where it is, resorting to vague or creative 
descriptions, or renegotiating the border would be examples of going outside the rationality of 
surveys, insofar as they do not depend on technical knowledge. Along with the assumption that 
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technology and mechanically defined formal procedures, not politics, will tell where a border is, 
survey rationality also comes with certain corollaries relating to the social conditions in which it 
is applied. For example, there is the assumption that there exists a profession of surveyors in 
sufficient numbers and skill who can mediate between political decision-makers and the 
objective conditions of the natural world, and make plain the locations of borders to the 
uninitiated masses. Despite the fact that these technicians define their activities as non-political, 
modern territoriality cannot exist without them, not just because boundary treaties can be 
complex but because without formal criteria for identifying who can interpret boundary treaties, 
they would not know who to listen to.  
 
Neither the quantity of boundary monuments constructed around a space nor the degree of 
success of attempts to correctly locate its boundaries is an important part of the survey 
rationality of a space. Boundary monuments are far from unique to modern territoriality, and 
have been observed in various ancient cultures.71 Moreover, in modern territoriality, boundaries 
exist by political definition whether or not they are marked. The important part is that 
boundaries have the potential to be located and marked by technical experts, if states wish for 
them to do so. Neither is actual accuracy or correspondence between a political definition and 
an actual demarcation crucial for survey rationality. When boundary markings are accused of 
being inaccurate and not corresponding with an official definition, this is a clear indication that 
the territory is considered to have a technically correct boundary along a particular measurable 
line, and that, in other words, it is socially attributed with survey rationality. Technological 
developments over the course of centuries have not removed the possibility of demarcation 
errors, which continue to be found, and can inflict substantial costs on states to rectify.72 
 
 
Articulated Rationalities 
 
Survey rationality as a substantive rationality on its own historically possessed a limited capacity 
to impose a geometrical order in practice on what was a world full of various different kinds of 
territorial and geographical modes of distinguishing polities from one another. Envisioning 
political space as even and homogenous, and divided up neatly into discrete territories by lines 
on the ground that corresponded to lines on a map was not, alone, a sufficiently compelling 
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motivation to attempt to create this order in practice. Unlike other substantive rationalities such 
as religions or Marxist doctrine, no grand armies were commanded to fight for survey rationality, 
nor did any revolutions have the linearization of borders as a primary goal in mind in 
overthrowing any government. This does not mean that the linearization of borders was an 
unintended consequence of purely structural changes.73 It does, however, mean that the extent 
to which survey rationality has been achieved at a global level is best explained in combination 
with other substantive rationalities. While many different such rationalities undoubtedly acted 
to amplify the practical effectiveness of survey rationality, the focus here is on two in particular: 
capitalism and ‘civilization’. 
 
Exactly how these secondary rationalities are related to survey rationality itself is ultimately a 
question that has to be answered through historical investigation, which is done in the following 
chapters. Analytically, however, this relation can best be described using the concept of 
articulation. Articulation entered the vocabulary of social theory in the early twentieth century 
in the early phases of the decline of orthodox Marxism.74 Thrown into brief moments of power 
in Western Europe by convulsions following the First World War, Marxists’ refusal to think 
outside narrow, essentialized class interests made it difficult to achieve lasting changes, 
according to retrospective analysis. In this context, theorists such as Antonio Gramsci began to 
argue that in order to achieve hegemony, a class had to articulate a programme in which other 
classes could identify their interests, and thus acquire their consent. The concept of articulation 
thus became a way to think outside the predetermined and inevitable links between mode of 
production, class, and interest, on which orthodox Marxism had insisted. In later work, primarily 
that of Ernesto Laclau and Stuart Hall, articulation became a more general term to describe 
social-theoretical linkages between things without assuming their essential or logical unity.75 For 
Laclau, articulation is a discursive move made to connect concepts, which never have necessary 
or natural links but have to be articulated together in particular contexts. Hall then employed 
the concept of articulation in analyzing practices as well as discourse, arguing that practices may 
be situated in ideology but they are not reducible to ideology. The main point is that articulation 
                                                             
73 For example, Jordan Branch argues that the linearization of borders was an ‘unintended by-product of 
the visual language of maps and the commercial market for them in the early modern period’. Branch, 
Cartographic State, 88. 
74 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (London: Verso, 2001), ch. 2. 
75 Jennifer Slack, ‘The theory and method of articulation in cultural studies’, in Kuan-Hsing Chen and David 
Morley (eds), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1996), 113-129. 
64 
 
is a device for analyzing ‘difference in complex unity, without becoming a hostage to the 
privileging of difference as such’.76 
 
In this thesis, the function of articulation is to characterize the historically constructed linkages 
between different rationalities, or in other words, to put the focus of the analysis on the process 
by which different rationalities come to appear, in context, to be the same, while still 
maintaining that their internal logics do not necessitate any linkage. Discussions in social theory 
of the term ‘articulation’ began after Weber’s time, but theorizing articulation in this way, as the 
historical construction of links between rationalities in particular contexts, is arguably an 
essential aspect of Weber’s work, and certainly forms an indispensable part of the logic of The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In these terms, the final chapter of the essay, 
‘Asceticism and the Spirit of Capitalism’, is about the articulation between two substantive 
rationalities: the glorification of God, and the acquisition of wealth.77 It is quite clear that the 
pursuit of one of these ends is by no means inherently linked to that of the other, ‘For that the 
conception of money-making as an end in itself to which people were bound, as a calling, was 
contrary to the ethical feelings of whole epochs, it is hardly necessary to prove’.78 But through a 
kind of discourse analysis of writings of Puritan theologians, Weber demonstrated the rhetorical 
work that fused them together. For example, as one wrote,  
 
If God show you a way in which you may lawfully get more than in another way (without wrong 
to your soul or to any other), if you refuse this, and choose the less gainful way, you cross one of 
the ends of your calling, and you refuse to be God’s steward, and to accept His gifts and use them 
for Him when he requireth it…79 
 
In other words, God helps those who help themselves. It was only through this particular line of 
reasoning, conceived in a particular context, in which religious piety and shrewd business-
dealing were fashioned into the same thing. In an analogous way, the logics of capitalism and 
‘civilization’ were each articulated in certain contexts with survey rationality, and this process of 
articulation is what helps explain why survey rationality was pursued in practice more seriously 
in only some contexts, contradicting other rationalities.  
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At this point some definitions of capitalism and ‘civilization’ is in order. Both of these concepts 
have had many different possible definitions, and the concern here is neither to find the correct 
or best definitions, nor to undertake a conceptual history of either of them, but simply to outline 
ideal-typical definitions that are useful for the argument. Capitalism could be defined 
expansively, if it had been the primary object of analysis. For example, in writing a non-
Eurocentric account of its origins, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu define it as ‘a set of 
configurations, assemblages, or bundles of social relations and processes oriented around the 
systematic reproduction of the capital relation, but not reducible—either historically or 
logically—to that relation alone’.80 This definition, however, would not fit with the type of 
analysis undertaken here, which is based on the explication of certain rationalities and their 
articulation together, in specific contexts, to form new rationalities. The concern here is with a 
particular set of contexts in which capitalism was tied to survey rationality, and thus the focus is 
necessarily limited to only some kinds of capitalism and not others, although this should not be 
taken to mean that other forms of capital-labor relations do not constitute capitalism or did not 
contribute substantially to modernity.  
 
From the perspective of examining the origins of linear borders, the type of capitalism that is 
most relevant is agrarian capitalism, particularly as it developed in England in the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries, and even more so in England’s American colonies. This particular 
configuration of capitalism that seemed to require plots of land to be accurately surveyed with 
mathematical techniques, and for geometrically precise records to be kept and referred to in 
case of disputes. Even this is not necessarily unique, as evidence exists of highly precise 
mathematical surveying in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica. What is important about the English 
colonies, however, is the way in which these precise property boundaries made it necessary to 
also survey political boundaries in the same way. Many other types of capitalism existed, before 
and after this, but their relationship with linear borders had no necessary meaning. Banking and 
high-volume trade have long existed, but they do not require borders to be specified in any 
particular way. Likewise, the free-trade capitalism which began to displace mercantilism in the 
eighteenth century led to forms of imperialism that were purposefully kept geographically 
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vague. Agrarian capitalism of a certain kind, however, has historically been associated with the 
linearization of boundaries in a way other kinds of capitalism have not. 
 
As for civilization, there are two different meanings that the term could take on. The most 
prevalent meaning is perhaps civilization in the sense of a particular civilization, a whole 
assemblage of valued cultural, economic, political, and other symbols and institutions but with 
some sense of continuity of identity across epochs. 81 The other meaning occurs when one 
particular civilization is identified as the embodiment of all civilization per se. As an objective 
condition, this meaning of the term is no longer commonly used in social science, but as a 
subjectively perceived condition, ‘civilization’ in inverted commas has been an important object 
of analysis in IR at least since Gerrit Gong’s influential 1984 work demonstrated its effects on 
international society.82  
 
Like capitalism, ‘civilization’ could potentially take on a very broad, cross-contextual meaning. 
As Hedley Bull noted, ‘The arrogance of many Europeans, in equating civilization with the 
particular civilization of Europe, was no less than that of the Chinese, nor was the belief of 
Europeans that their religion was the one true faith any less than that of the Muslim peoples 
with whom they came into contact’.83 But similarly, the focus here is on a particular construction 
of ‘civilization’, especially as it was manifest in legal theory, but also articulated within a broad 
range of other discourses. Particularly characteristic of this construction was the influence of 
evolutionary theory, which made it possible to put all societies on the same scale of 
development, with the West at one end, and all others at various other points on the spectrum. 
Tracing the particular trajectory of the universalization of linear borders, in terms of where and 
when it occurred, must be done with reference to particular local conditions, and the focus here 
is on West Africa, where international politics shifted form dramatically in the late nineteenth 
century, for a number of reasons which historians have long debated. But ultimately it was only 
by associating survey rationality with the logic of ‘civilization’ that the ‘New Imperialism’ took 
on linear borders.  
 
Rationality, in the sense that Weber intended, could be ascribed not only to capitalism and 
‘civilization’, but to all manner of different historical processes, which do not necessarily work 
                                                             
81 For very different works both using this meaning, see John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western 
Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
82 Gerrit Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
83 Hedley Bull, ‘Foreword’, in Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’, ix. 
67 
 
together. Capitalism and ‘civilization’ should not be taken to represent all of modernity or 
rationalization, nor are they meant to amount to a total explanation of linear borders. These are 
only two chosen out of many possible rationalities which have historically been articulated with 
survey rationality and have contributed to the linearization of borders. Understood broadly they 
both operate on a global scale, and in some way have been factors of border linearization in 
many parts of the world. When contextualized more narrowly as in the next two chapters, they 
explain in a more direct way certain key moments in the global process of linearization. Agrarian 
capitalism in the English North American colonies was an important part of the beginning of that 
global process. Linear borders had existed beforehand in certain limited ways in various places, 
but took on an element of regularity, systematization, and institutionalization there in a way for 
which it is difficult to find historical precedent. The idea of ‘civilization’ in late nineteenth-
century colonialism in Africa represents a turning point in the universalization of linear borders. 
There is no easily identifiable region which acted as any kind of last hold-out of non-linear 
borders, and as mentioned earlier, the linearization of borders continues in many ways, in many 
parts of the world. But the transformation of imperialism in Africa from an ill-defined political 
geography based on forts and diffuse trading zones to sharply defined boundaries was only the 
most dramatic and sudden manifestation of a global shift that was occurring more gradually. 
Unlike the early modern world of multiple different systems of territoriality depending on the 
region and the empire, territoriality after New Imperialism in Africa very rarely came without 
some kind of linear definition, as a general global rule. 
 
To sum up, this section has presented the main argument that ties together all the threads of 
the thesis. In conceiving of the linearization of borders as a process of rationalization, we must 
consider the complexity and contradictory nature of the concept of rationality. The thesis 
follows Weber’s radical perspectivism and attention to historical context relating to rationality. 
Survey rationality, or the particular rationality of linear borders, whereby the world appears 
rational to the extent that it is legible from a surveyor’s perspective, is one historically 
constructed rationality, as is capitalism and ‘civilization’. Survey rationality cannot be logically 
derived from any abstract definition of capitalism, nor has it always everywhere been considered 
part of civilized modernity. Instead, in order to understand the global linearization of borders, 
we should analyse the historically specific articulations between these rationalities, which the 
thesis proceeds to do in the following two chapters. Moreover, if I am right in arguing that linear 
borders are a distinct, articulated component of modernity, then international politics in a world 
made up entirely of theoretically coterminous, interlocking territories with linear borders must 
be different from politics in a world of multiple acknowledged forms of territoriality, in ways 
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that are not reducible to other aspects of modernity, in particular the sovereign state. Indeed, 
there are certain forms of politics that have been characteristic since around 1900 that were 
impossible without linear borders, even in the relatively well-defined territories of ‘Westphalian-
era’ Europe. In the next section, I give an overview of some examples of these kinds of politics 
in broad analytical form, while in the last two substantive chapters I single out more precise 
mechanisms and go into more historical depth.  
 
 
The Consequences of Spatial Rationalization 
 
Many different patterns in international politics can potentially be seen as distinctly an outcome 
of linear borders. This thesis focuses on two: firstly, the acceleration of territorial partition 
particular to the past century or so, and secondly, the specific form of power derived by some 
states through cartographic technology. 
 
 
Partition 
 
One remarkable pattern in international politics since the early twentieth century that has been 
noted in IR is the increasing number and decreasing size of polities, in contrast to the previous 
decades, which were marked by decreasing numbers and increasing sizes.84 At first glance, there 
is a striking correlation between the time at which linear borders crystallized as a global standard 
of territorial definition, in the late nineteenth century, and the time at which a process of global 
partition began. Linearized borders alone did not cause this global partitioning. They did, 
however, enable and accelerate the process in three ways: by making territory appear more 
readily divisible, by abstracting spatial considerations from other issues, and by creating a 
modular process of partition which could technically be transplanted to any place in the world. 
 
                                                             
84  Ryan Griffiths, Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); David Lake and Angela O’Mahoney, ‘The Incredible 
Shrinking State: Explaining Change in the Territorial Size of Countries’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:5 
(Oct. 2004), 699-722. 
69 
 
First, linearized borders help make space divisible in new ways. A number of IR scholars have 
investigated the conditions under which actors are unable to partition territory.85 But if we 
expand our analysis outside times and places where linear borders are the assumed way of 
defining authority, how territory becomes divisible in the first place is equally in need of 
explanation. Any effort to partition is always limited by the concepts and knowledge possessed 
by decision-makers. Conceptually, space may be made up not of homogenous, infinitely divisible 
space, but rather of a finite number of socially constructed regions, provinces, counties, and so 
on. At some point, divisions and subdivisions of these are likely to reach a small enough sub-
region that dividing it is no longer meaningful to a sizeable social group, and there is no 
guarantee that such a strategy would be useful or available to negotiators. 
 
Linear borders mitigate the obstacles to creating radically new boundaries, or at least they can 
appear to do so from the bird’s-eye perspective of authorities. As long as it can be mapped and 
has area, a territory can be split into smaller areas in a technically infinite number of ways. Linear 
borders make it possible to imagine that an objective and reliable division can be created, even 
if it has very little in common with existing arrangements, or cuts across local habits and 
customs. The 1947 partition of India, for example, divided the provinces of Punjab and Bengal 
in a way which would not likely have made sense before the linearization of borders, using only 
very small administrative divisions and cutting across thick spaces of land ownership.86 It was 
typical for individuals to use and hold various kinds of rights over many disparate plots of land, 
meaning that the partition criminalized the networks and routine transactions which sustained 
much of the countryside. The earlier Mughal administrative divisions, which were not so linear, 
had accommodated these transactions.87 When British administrators arrived, they found it 
difficult to understand the existing divisions, as they found them constantly shifting and filled 
with enclaves.  
 
Over the course of their nearly two centuries of rule in India, they linearized the borders of these 
divisions, but this did not completely eradicate earlier patterns of land usage. The commissioner 
for the partition, Cyril Radcliffe, was chosen not despite but because he had had no experience 
with either India or boundary-drawing, which the government hoped would put him beyond 
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suspicion of partiality. He did, however, have maps and data at his disposal, and by design it was 
largely on this basis that he made his decision, which would likely have been very different if not 
for the assumption that a simple linear border could be, and had to be drawn. 
 
Divisibility is only one precondition of territorial partition that linear borders accentuate. 
Another is what might be called ‘territorialisation’. Territorialisation is the process by which 
issues are transformed from less clearly territorial issues to more clearly territorial, or in other 
words how the issue of how to distribute space between actors becomes distinct from other 
issues. Linearizing borders facilitates this process of territorialisation, as a form of rule which is 
both abstract and concrete. As an inherently abstract system, it helps conceptually separate 
territory and its contents, and thus provides a clear way of differentiating between territorial 
and non-territorial strategies of rule. Nearly any political problem, from a particular perspective, 
can appear to be a problem of defining borders in the right way. The more that borders become 
conceptually tied to a global geometrical system of reference rather than concrete practices of 
rule, the easier it is to imagine territorial politics as a distinct and autonomous sphere of politics. 
It is through the global linearization of borders that the question of division becomes an already 
identifiable and potentially conflict-engendering possibility. 
 
While they are characterized by abstraction from people and objects, linear borders, when 
mapped, appear to give territory a physical substance which can be measured precisely. When 
Thongchai Winichakul refers to the creation of Siam’s ‘geo-body’, it means not simply territory, 
but territory with mappable borders, and it is Thongchai’s contention that these borders gave 
the Thai national space a more tangible existence.88  While Siamese territorial entities had 
existed previously, it was only through this recent process that a Thai nation itself was 
territorialized. Linear borders provide an appearance of precision and measurability to some 
social facts, such as identity, which would often otherwise seem more ambiguous and imprecise. 
In a rationalizing world in which virtually all areas of life demand certainty and clarity, identity 
can prove disconcertingly fluid and vague to be deployed as a basis of political contestation, but 
linear borders seem otherwise, and can thus be used as a proxy. 
 
Finally, because linear borders are theoretically applicable anywhere, experiences gained from 
one partition can affect others, and disparate issues can become linked. Like Benedict 
Anderson’s nationalisms, partition has become a ‘modular’ phenomenon, capable of being 
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reproduced and appropriated for different purposes in different places. 89  When we take 
multiple cases of partition into account, then, we have to consider the effect that they have on 
each other. Partition is, by now, an experience shared by a wide range of peoples, from Korea 
to Ireland, and the more that different partitions resemble each other, the greater the 
possibilities for transnational links to be forged based on these experiences, with issues in 
different places becoming linked, and imperial officials transferring their experiences from one 
partition to the next.  
 
In particular, the partitions sponsored by the British Empire in many places, including Ireland, 
Palestine, and India are connected not only by comparisons that might be drawn in hindsight, 
but also by direct links. India’s close involvement within the UN on arrangements for Palestinian 
independence had everything to do with its own ongoing partition into Hindu and Muslim 
areas.90 According to one historian, many in Ireland, similarly, have viewed Israel as a ‘little 
Jewish Ulster’, taking a term coined by one British colonial governor, and such perceived 
parallels have engendered ‘an emotional connection with Palestine that has inspired Irish 
activism in the region up to the present day’.91 Several British officials such as Reginald Coupland 
and Leo Amery were influential in both the Indian and Palestinian partitions.92 While many 
individual and comparative studies of partition exist, little work has been done to appreciate the 
mutual influences between and transnational links created by partitions, many of which have 
been made possible by the apparent universality of linear borders. 
 
In sum, linearized borders make partition less immediately contingent upon particular socially 
constructed regions, more likely to appear as a solution to the ambiguities of identity politics, 
and allow partitions to feed off of each other and proliferate globally. 
 
 
The Scientific Peace: The Politicization of Geographers 
 
The linearization of borders is inseparable from historically particular, ‘scientific’ types of 
knowledge, and it can empower experts of a certain kind and the states that employ them. At 
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peace negotiations, for example, the impact that one group or state has on the ultimate result 
has to do not just with its military or economic power, but also depends on its power in terms 
of this particular kind of knowledge. While geometrical, mathematical, and statistical knowledge 
appear obviously applicable to linear borders, other geographies such as those of lived 
experience no longer seem necessary. This section sets out the role of the linearization of 
borders within the co-constitution of science and international politics, and argues that scientific 
discourses constitute an important source of power by limiting the kinds of knowledge 
considered valid. 
 
When borders are ‘hereabouts’, no group is necessarily better positioned than any other to 
identify them. Without centralized records of linear borders, polities as widely ranging as France 
and Siam historically depended on local inhabitants to know where exactly boundaries were.93 
Linear borders, however, being conceptually limited and geometric, narrow the kind of 
knowledge that appears useful for this. Knowledge of lived experience or of gods no longer has 
any obvious bearing. Instead, the knowledge resources that are socially constructed as useful 
tend to be survey techniques, demographic cartography, and, more recently, computerized 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS). These techniques provide the geometric ‘footholds’ 
necessary to enable mathematics to be used directly in peace agreements, increasing the 
leverage of states that have access to particular knowledge resources. 
 
In practical terms, when scientific methods are considered a necessary part of a peace 
agreement, certain people and instruments can prove very valuable in effecting a desired 
outcome. For example, in the negotiations over the 1995 Dayton agreement on the partition of 
Bosnia, when both sides of the conflict agreed to a territorial division of 49% to 51% by area, 
they became dependent on a team of US computer technicians to repeatedly carry out complex 
geometrical calculations parallel to the negotiations.94 These calculations became so important 
that negotiations were almost derailed when one party realized some results had been kept 
secret. Moreover, in terms of legitimation, the involvement of scientific methods can serve to 
obscure political interests, making an agreement appear to be objective and fair. In contrast to 
a type of contestation that is perceived as ‘political’, where outcomes seem to be decided by 
the powerful, the more a negotiation appears to be conducted according to a ‘scientific’ logic, 
where outcomes are decided according to what is objectively true. 
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The impact of the privileging of specific kinds of geographical knowledge often becomes clear in 
peace negotiations, such as the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Bringing the First World War 
officially to a close, the Paris Conference was centrally concerned with territorial changes in 
Europe, drawing three thousand miles of new borders. 95  With the collapse of the major 
continental European empires, the victorious Allies sought to balance resurging national 
aspirations against each other, along with their own interests, in a turbulent, revolutionary 
context of scattered continuing warfare. The difficulties of drawing linear borders 
cartographically separating intricately intermixed national groups were well known, but the 
assumption of linear borders was never seriously questioned, resulting in an advantage to those 
who could best manipulate them. 
 
Examples abound of this kind of power at work at the Paris Conference. For example, some 
argue that the conference’s favorable views of Yugoslav territorial claims, at the expense of 
other states of similar size, had much to do with the fact that a Serbian geographer, Jovan Cvijic, 
who was acclaimed for his ‘scientific attitude’, was highly trusted and involved in the decision-
making process. 96  The United States exercised a similar kind of power through scientific 
plausibility, using a specially designed body of experts, called ‘The Inquiry’. 97  President 
Woodrow Wilson set up the Inquiry in 1917, only a few months after the American declaration 
of war, bringing together a large group of mostly academics from various disciplines. It was an 
unprecedented effort, in type and scale, to compile and process scientific knowledge ahead of 
negotiations. As it was unmatched by any of the other delegations, the US had the only 
delegation that was able to assemble a concrete set of proposed borders for the whole of Europe 
in the early stages of the negotiations.  
 
The Inquiry, and other efforts like it, had an important impact on the outcome of the conference. 
Without this supply of carefully presented facts and expertise to counter opposing claims and 
arguments, Wilson’s much-ridiculed project of a just and fair settlement could easily have been 
marginalized by the conference. As a historian of the Inquiry put it,  
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It is virtually inconceivable to think of the peace treaties of 1919 assuming the form they did 
without benefit of the enormous preparatory effort exerted by the Allied governments and the 
United States…Perhaps there is no better measure than the work of the Inquiry to indicate that 
the United States by 1917 had reached the status of a great power.98 
 
In practical terms, the expectation that precise borders would be agreed on at the conference 
created a demand for a particular kind of knowledge, which the US was able to supply. As noted 
by Isaiah Bowman, the head of the Inquiry, ‘Unfortunately, nations cannot be separated 
approximately. A boundary has to be here, not hereabouts’.99 Command over socially privileged 
forms of geographical knowledge were particularly determining in areas of Europe such as the 
Balkans, where the most powerful states were not highly invested in any particular outcome, as 
long as agreement on borders could be reached. These time-consuming tasks were usually 
handed down to territorial commissions—often including Inquiry members—with almost free 
reign to draw borders. According to one observer, ‘most of the articles in the treaties were taken 
bodily without change from the reports of the commissions’.100 
 
In terms of legitimation, moreover, the message of Wilsonian self-determination risked 
perceptions of naïveté at the negotiating table unless it could be backed up with cold, hard 
‘science’. As Wilson and Bowman both understood well, maps always made political choices in 
terms of what to include or exclude, but could be very persuasive by taking on an appearance 
of neutral objectivity. As Bowman put it, ‘A map was as good as a brilliant poster, and just being 
a map made it respectable, authentic. A perverted map was a life-belt to many a foundering 
argument’.101 Despite inexperience and internal divisions, it was perhaps primarily the Inquiry’s 
use of maps, made possible by linear borders, for which the US drew praise from other 
delegations. 
 
Throughout the last 150 years, territorial conflict and contestation have played a major role in 
international politics, and it has mattered greatly that only territory which is specified in linear 
terms can be claimed legitimately. While there may be many reasons for this, I have argued here 
in particular that linear borders enable new patterns of territorial partitions and empower states 
with access to a particular kind of geographical knowledge. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter and the previous chapter have served to lay the conceptual groundwork for the 
thesis. They argued that the linearization of borders, as a global phenomenon, is historically 
recent and constitutive of international politics, in contrast with other accounts of the origins of 
modern international politics, which take borders as simply an expression of territorial 
sovereignty. This conflation of borders and territoriality has obscured an understanding of how 
linear borders originated as a distinct component of global modernity. Instead, I propose a 
framework for historical analysis of this process in terms of articulated rationalities. This, I argue, 
gives us a novel view of the territorial politics of the last century and a half, showing phenomena 
such as peace conferences and territorial partitions in a new light. 
 
Borders thus have a history which is interrelated with but separate from the history of territory. 
Neither sovereignty nor territoriality fully captures the peculiar condition of the modern world 
whereby every coordinate point on land, besides Antarctica, theoretically corresponds to one 
and only one state territory. Nor does it account for the particular way in which struggles over 
maritime regions are currently unfolding over lines such as the meridians of the Arctic and the 
‘Nine-Dash Line’ of the South China Sea. While various opposing claims to sovereignty in these 
areas have been made, what remains less often questioned is why they almost invariably take a 
linear form, rather than referring to particular islands or shipping routes. Whether or not states 
will make more consistent efforts to draw planar boundaries between themselves and outer 
space, moreover, is a fundamental question in the law of outer space.102  
 
Moreover, the recent global dominance of linear borders sheds new light on and raises new 
questions about the future relevance of linear borders as a form of territoriality. On one hand, 
it suggests that, contrary to some versions of globalization theory, we may currently be seeing 
the beginning rather than the end of linear borders. The functions, significance, and particular 
locations of borders have undoubtedly been subject to fluctuation, dispute, and violent 
contestation, and are likely to continue to be. Practical experience of real border regions may 
reveal quite starkly the inadequacy of the idea that borders generally tend to be linear. Yet 
serious efforts to undermine this idea remain limited and marginalized. 
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On the other hand, the origins of linear borders within a very particular rationality suggest that 
the longevity of linear borders as such may be subject to the same limitations as this type of 
rationality. Theories of rationalization remind us that forms of knowledge that appear rational 
in one time and place will not necessarily always do so. The Enlightenment idea of abstracting 
worldly phenomena into pure forms, and attempting to universally apply such forms in practice, 
in other words, may not always serve as a basis for understanding political geography. For 
example, some states have found their purposes better served by allowing local border guards 
to pursue their own policies, rather than applying a top-down idea of frontier policing.103 If this 
were to be extended beyond governing institutions to the fundamental concept of borders 
themselves, borders could conceivably be de-linearized in particular cases where this made 
them easier to govern from a local, rather than a centralizing, cartographic perspective. While 
such an unravelling of linear borders seems far-off from a contemporary standpoint, theories of 
rationalization may hold the key for understanding when and where it could potentially occur. 
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Chapter Four 
Agrarian Capitalism and the Surveyor 
 
 
 
de duro est ultima ferro. 
protinus inrupit venae peioris in aevum 
omne nefas: fugere pudor verumque fidesque… 
communemque prius ceu lumina solis et auras               
cautus humum longo signavit limite mensor. 
And last of all 
the ruthless and hard Age of Iron prevailed, 
from which malignant vein great evil sprung; 
and modesty and faith and truth took flight…. 
Surveyors anxious marked with metes and bounds 
the lands, created free as light and air: 
 
—Ovid, Metamorphoses, I.127-1361 
 
Any grand search for beginnings comes with unavoidable risks, as the Roman poet Ovid knew 
well.2 A search for the absolute origins of something called ‘modern territoriality’ which could 
function as a Westphalian ‘majestic portal which leads from the old world into the new world’ 
runs the risk of innumerable definitional, empirical, and political problems.3 It is important to 
recognize at the outset of the historical portion of the thesis that there never was an invention 
of the linear border. In one way or another, people have virtually always used lines to order 
landscapes. While ancient evidence is often scarce and sketchy, it may not have been 
uncommon for empires such as Rome or China to have defined administrative units using linear 
boundaries, famously in the case of Julius Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon.4 What is more 
historically specific to the political geography of our era than linear borders themselves is the 
linearization of borders as a manifestly global process, and survey rationality as a way of thinking 
which places a premium on performing practices which attempt to implement precise linear 
borders in reality. 
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This thesis dispenses with the idea of a ‘majestic portal’, but nonetheless it does try to explain 
in this chapter how the global process of linearizing borders got underway. In order to do this, 
it does not start by cataloguing all the different uses of linear borders throughout human history, 
and then searching for a moment of transformation. Instead, it elaborates a logic or mechanism 
which gives insight into the global reach of linear borders, and shows historically how it began 
to affect political boundaries. In particular, this chapter details the articulation of survey 
rationality with a capitalist rationality of private property. In its simplest form, the logic here is 
that wherever private property has to be surveyed, political boundaries must also be surveyed 
in order to ensure the protection of private property.   
 
Colonialism, as it took shape in North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
turns out to have been a crucial part of the process. An important implication of this chapter, 
then, has to do with discussions about what the English School called the ‘expansion of 
international society’, and recent attempts to displace this narrative with one that takes colonial 
co-constitution seriously. New perspectives on the colonial origins of modern territoriality, in 
particular, have challenged long unquestioned assumptions about processes of state formation 
within Europe. The Renaissance ‘discoveries’ of abstract space, the mathematical measurement 
of the globe, and rules of linear perspective, many have argued in different ways, could not 
displace the traditional political geography of European feudalism as easily as they could be used 
to divide up the vast unknown spaces of the New World.5 The territoriality of colonialism, with 
its conceptions of homogenous space and explicit reference to linear division, rather than that 
predominating in the metropoles of contemporary Europe, consisting of lists of places and 
overlapping, differentiated feudal rights, more closely resembles modern territoriality. 
 
This chapter builds on recent scholarship putting colonialism at the centre of analysis of global 
modernity by asking why it was these particular understandings of space that eventually 
constituted a presumed basis for territorial claims. Demarcated lines of specific and fixed 
location did not predominate among either inter-imperial or inter-colonial frontiers until a long 
period of colonial interactions had already taken place. The Americas were indeed often 
constructed by imperial authorities as a clean slate or terra nullius open for the taking, but they 
                                                             
5 Jordan Branch, ‘”Colonial reflection” and territoriality: The peripheral origins of sovereign statehood’, 
European Journal of International Relations 18:2 (2012), 277-297; Gerry Kearns, ‘The Territory of 
Colonialism’, Territory, Politics, Governance 5:2 (2017), 222-238; Jeremy Larkins, From Hierarchy to 
Anarchy: Territory and Politics before Westphalia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), ch. 9; Jeppe 
Strandsbjerg, Territory, Globalization and International Relations: The Cartographic Reality of Space 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), ch. 5. 
79 
 
were not forced to conceive of them in the abstract and geometrical terms of cartography and 
navigation simply by their own geographical ignorance. The emergence of linear borders in the 
Americas has to be explained, then, with reference to long processes of colonial interactions. 
 
First, I discuss approaches to the colonial origins of modern territoriality in more detail and how 
my argument builds on them. Second, I discuss some of the precedents of survey rationality, and 
make a case for differentiating survey rationality from abstract or homogenous space more 
generally. Third, I show how an articulation of survey rationality and capitalist rationality arose 
in the context of the eradication of customary peasant land use in the English enclosure 
movement. Fourth, I examine the construction of surveying practices as a particularly powerful 
underpinning of the frontier settler society of the Thirteen Colonies. Finally, I show how the 
colonial manifestation of property boundary surveys resulted in the scaling up of survey 
rationality from property boundaries to inter-colonial boundaries, and ultimately inter-imperial 
boundaries. Mathematical boundary surveying of this kind emerged in Europe, but it was only 
through colonial encounters that it first came to be used to delineate the boundaries of 
international politics. 
 
 
The Origins of Modern Territoriality: Metropolitan or Colonial? 
 
One of the main questions recently raised in the literature on territoriality in the history of 
international relations is whether territoriality emerged in Europe, as a result of European 
dynamics, or whether it arose through European empires’ expansion to places outside Europe. 
According to many scholars, in IR and beyond, modern territoriality originated in Europe and 
afterwards spread to the rest of the world via imperialism and decolonization.  Many different 
variations on this theme exist, from a focus on French consolidation of territorial authority6 to a 
focus on British transition from feudalism to capitalism.7 Later, nationalisms tended to accept 
boundaries given to them by European empires, even as they rejected imperial control.8 Recent 
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scholarship has tended to reinforce this consensus that intra-European dynamics were central 
to the evolution of territory and territoriality. Saskia Sassen, for example, contends that 
‘territorial state sovereignty is invented’ by the French monarchy in the thirteenth century, and 
that ‘in addition it was at this time that the notion itself of boundaries was established’.9 Stuart 
Elden, looking instead for the meaning of territory in the historical emergence of the concept, 
finds its origins in the writings of scholars from Baldus de Ubaldis to Gottfried Leibniz, 
intervening in European political issues.10 As Elden has remarked, ‘it is a Eurocentric history 
because it is a study of a European question’.11 
 
Historians of cartography have provided a strong basis for challenging this European focus. 
Modern practices of mapping, and the growth in social importance of modern maps, argue 
historians of cartography, were a precondition for the very idea of territory as a homogenous 
and discretely bounded space and have played a crucial role in the naturalization of this 
particular kind of territory.12 For some, this view of territorial space as constructed through 
cartography meant that the origins of modern territoriality could not be separated from the 
imperial expansions that coincided with the transformation of European cartography beginning 
in the fifteenth century.13 In particular, the spatial system that Carl Schmitt had called ‘global 
linear thinking’ was brought back into view.14 The prime example of global linear thinking was 
the demarcation line of the Papal Bull Inter Caetera (1493) and subsequent treaties, which 
divided the non-Christian world in half, into a Spanish and a Portuguese sphere of influence, 
along specified lines of longitude. It was the abstract cartographical system of latitude and 
longitude which made possible these extra-European lines that prefigured modern territoriality.  
 
But Schmitt also included in the same category the ‘amity lines’ separating a European zone of 
international law from the New World, which would be left in perpetual war and piracy. The 
removal of the Americas from the zone of international law provided a justification for European 
powers to ignore territorial sovereignty whenever convenient, and no precise, linear territorial 
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boundaries were demarcated between European empires in the Americas for roughly two 
centuries. As Sir Francis Drake allegedly said, there would be ‘no peace beyond the line’.15 This 
chapter, then, attempts to address the questions that remain: how did the notionally infinite 
and abstract space of cosmographers and mathematicians lead eventually to modern 
territoriality? And if the fundamentally necessary spatial technologies first arose in Europe, then 
how could modern territoriality first emerge in the Americas ‘beyond the line’, rather than 
within the zone of international law?  
 
The greater importance which cartographic theories of territoriality place on global linear 
thinking, and the observation that it occurred long before linear borders were established in 
major European treaties, pose a substantial challenge to the view that modern territory 
originated within purely intra-European dynamics. The use of abstract lines drawn on a map to 
divide space was a major break with established practices of territoriality, and is now taken for 
granted in international politics. Yet cartographic theories of territoriality have not argued that 
the long period of interaction over centuries of imperialism in the Americas fundamentally 
affected this innovation, except to strengthen the already existing need for it. Instead, the news 
of and the Iberian response to Columbus’s first voyage, which created the need for a way to 
comprehend and quickly divide up vast, unfamiliar space from afar, was the main form of 
colonial co-constitution that altered notions of territoriality. After the late fifteenth century, the 
usage of maps in European attempts to govern the Americas only became more extensive, 
continuing to structure space, and thus claims to authority, according to Ptolemy’s lines of 
longitude and latitude. 
 
While not denying the importance of the cartographic revolution for the emergence of modern 
territoriality, the remainder of this chapter argues that in order to understand the shift from 
abstract global linear thinking towards the actual practice of precisely bounded territoriality, 
and to understand why this happened first in European settler colonies, we must understand 
property surveys. Survey practices are an integral part of modern territoriality, but they were 
used for surveying properties long before they were used to demarcate territorial boundaries. 
It was in the colonial context that these practices were scaled up and used to demarcate 
international politics. In the next section, I develop in more detail the distinction between global 
linear thinking and precise boundaries, and show how looking at the history of property 
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surveying practices provides the link between them. In the following sections, I then explain how 
these practices came to be applied to territorial claims.  
 
 
From Geometric Cosmology to Survey Rationality 
 
In the wake of Christendom’s Columbian encounter with America, increasingly quantified 
understandings of political geography emerged, but the way in which they were used in practice 
remained limited for the time being. Schmitt argues that new geographical concepts were used 
in this era to reapportion the globe and establish some spatial order in the context of a rapidly 
changing distribution of territory in the New World.16 He notes two types of the new global lines 
used by European empires, rayas and ‘amity lines’. Rayas were lines of longitude intended to 
partition all the non-Christian areas of the world between the Spanish and Portuguese empires, 
first under the Papal Bull Inter Caetera (1493), and then under the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), 
as well as subsequent treaties. Other empires resisted this Iberian partition of the globe, and a 
system of verbally agreed ‘amity lines’ developed, which separated a European zone of 
international law from the New World, which would be left in perpetual war and piracy.17 
Treaties would be respected within Europe, but as Sir Francis Drake supposedly put it, there 
would be ‘no peace beyond the line’.18 To these two might be added a third category of global 
lines, or at least continental lines, the first few French and English land grants of the early 
seventeenth century. Unilaterally declared by a monarch, the early land grants were typically 
given to a person or company for all land lying between two lines of latitude, from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific.19 
 
The repeated usage of lines of latitude and longitude within this global linear thinking has been 
used to support theories arguing that modern territoriality is in large part a result of cartographic 
ideas and practices. Jordan Branch argues that it was ‘the hegemony of modern mapping and 
the resulting understanding of the world as a geometrically divisible surface’ that gave states 
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their exclusively territorial shape.20 The key development here was the rediscovery of Ptolemy’s 
system of coordinates of latitude and longitude, or ‘graticule’, and the resulting geometrically 
proportional maps which drove cartographers to depict states territorially. Linear borders 
according to cartographic theories were an outcome of the technologies that shaped 
authorities’ understandings of space. 
 
Maps were undoubtedly instrumental in the onset of Schmitt’s ‘global linear thinking’. Yet the 
development of quantitative, geometric, and proportional cartography in itself explains little 
about the precision expected of borders today, as these elements of cartographic technology 
that were necessary for global linear thinking were by no means unique to post-Renaissance 
Western Europe. Western maps were not the only maps that used latitude and longitude, nor 
were they the only maps that enabled linear boundary-drawing. Indian scholars of the second 
century, for example, established a Prime Meridian in Ujjain, long before the Greenwich or Paris 
meridians.21 Islamic astronomers, building on the works of both the Greeks and the Indians, kept 
extensive records of the global coordinates of far-flung locations, and to some extent used this 
geometrical knowledge to create world maps.22 Lines of latitude were even used to delineate 
boundaries, albeit not political borders but boundaries of climate zones. For Chinese scholars, 
such as the third-century cartographer Pei Xiu, correspondence between map and reality was 
crucial, and led to developments in survey technology such as a plane tables and sighting 
instruments.23 Beginning in the twelfth century, some Chinese maps of large regions achieved 
remarkable accuracy by using a scaled grid, where each side of a square represents one hundred 
li, or two hundred kilometres. During the Ming Dynasty, ‘fish-scale’ cadastral maps represented 
landholdings with linear boundaries.24 Linear borders, therefore, were no inevitable outcome of 
cartographic practices striving for geometrically accurate representations of the world. 
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The production of homogeneous, Euclidian space through the new geometrically proportional 
cartography and the revival of Ptolemy’s graticule may have been an important step, but it was 
not a novel one. Not to mention Ptolemy himself, Chinese and South Asian cartographers had 
already made maps that were, in geometric terms, more or less as ‘accurate’ as European maps 
circa 1500. Islamic scholars, while less frequently making maps using the graticule, compiled 
many long lists of places with their global coordinates. While ‘empty’ Euclidian space is often 
associated with the Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution, and Descartes, it long predates 
these scholars and phenomena. Ancient geography of any part of the world, of course, should 
not be abstracted unduly from the historical context of its authorship, but to a certain degree 
‘Cartesian’ space existed long before Descartes. Something else is needed to explain the 
emergence of the particular space of the ‘international’, which is compartmentalized and 
measured according to obsessively precise borders, and the dominance of this idea not only in 
the contemplations of scholars but among the everyday practices of larger societal groups. 
 
The global linear thinking enabled by Renaissance cartography certainly had a role to play in the 
emergence of precise linear borders, but the divergence between these global lines and the 
linear borders of today is quite stark. For one thing, the system of ‘no peace beyond the line’ 
meant that in fact no linear borders existed between the French, English, and Spanish 
settlements for most of the seventeenth century. The linear borders that were established were 
not in bilateral treaties but in unilateral charters given by a sovereign to a particular individual 
or company, and did not establish any limits on the sovereignty of the empire more generally. 
Even when Spain recognized its sharing of the island of Hispaniola with France’s colony of Saint-
Domingue in the 1697 treaty of Ryswick, it did so implicitly and without mentioning a specific 
boundary.25 More importantly, the global lines were not generally taken as literally or precisely 
as borders are today. They were rarely, if ever, surveyed or marked, and as they moved from 
the single Spanish-Portuguese line to the multiple lines of land grants, they often quite obviously 
overlapped, without much pretence of the tightly interlocking territories of today. This was true 
of the Tordesillas line, which after centuries was finally rejected in favour of recognizing existing 
occupation and settlement.26 It was also true of many of the early seventeenth-century French 
and English land grant lines, which tended to mark of large bands of latitude all the way through 
                                                             
25 Fred Israel (ed), Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967, vol. I (Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 
1967), 145. 
26  Alison Sandman, ‘Spanish Nautical Cartography in the Renaissance’, in David Woodward (ed), 
Cartography in the European Renaissance: Part I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); L.A. 
Vigneras, ‘The Cartographer Diogo Ribeiro’, Imago Mundi 16 (1962) 76-83; Max Savelle, Empires to 
Nations: Expansion in America, 1713-1824 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 132. 
85 
 
to the Pacific Ocean. The French claim of Acadia of 1603 was more or less the same as the New 
England of 1620, and both overlapped with Virginia’s claim, which, if taken literally, would have 
included Alaska. The Treaty of Tordesillas was no doubt used as a justification for Portuguese 
settlement in Brazil, but as for the precise limits of Brazil, the treaty could only be said to have 
had a marginal influence on the borders that were eventually codified later. 
 
One could argue that this was simply because actually surveying and demarcating these lines 
was technologically not possible. The difficulty with this argument is that no such thing had ever 
been done before. Tordesillas did stipulate that if the line was found to intersect any land, ‘some 
kind of mark or tower shall be erected, and a succession of similar marks shall be erected in a 
straight line from such mark or tower, in a line identical with the above-mentioned bound’.27 
But since this never occurred, it is unclear what precise form this would have taken if it had later 
become possible, unless we accept some form of technological determinism. It would entail 
another substantial change to actually insist on taking these lines as seriously as borders are 
today. At most it could be said that these global and continental lines were an important 
intermediary step between medieval practices and precise linear borders.  
 
Survey rationality, however, provides a link between ‘empty’, quantitative, and geometric space 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the particular space of the international, which is 
compartmentalized and measured according to formally precise borders. With this particular 
relationship established between abstract, theoretical space and borders as they are practiced 
‘on the ground’, cartographic representations of the world are not simply exercises for university 
scholars or tools for navigators but can also become politicized in new ways and can determine 
what kind of territorial agreements are possible. Quantitative and homogenous conceptions of 
global space, and techniques of representation were well established in various contexts by the 
sixteenth century, and were used extensively in the creation of European empires in the 
Americas. Survey rationality, however, in terms of the ordering of political geography through 
particular kinds of technical means, was not. Neither Native Americans nor European settlers 
were generally concerned with survey rationality, either on the level of property boundaries or 
of inter-colonial boundaries.28 
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In New Spain, mathematical survey methods were mostly unused before the eighteenth century, 
while various other traditions developed. 29  Spanish settlers resisted the use of maps for 
depicting the land, according to one account, because they associated the visual arts with Native 
American cultures whose writing systems were based on pictograms. A typical land grant 
described the place and extent of the land to be granted but specified little in the way of 
boundaries, for example, by mentioning settlements the land was near or in between, and giving 
distances ‘more or less’.30 With property rights defined, in the early colonial period, in terms 
that combined earlier Spanish traditions with indigenous practices, the administrative 
boundaries of the Spanish Empire were defined similarly in royal decrees, describing a list of 
places and jurisdictions included within the boundaries rather than the boundaries 
themselves.31 
 
Professional surveying was practiced in New France, but French settlement was concentrated 
into groups, such as Canada, Acadia, and Louisiana, such that the delineated properties of 
different colonies were not in close proximity, with Native American territories in between. 
Administrative boundaries there were no clearer than in the Spanish Empire, as demonstrated 
multiple times when officials later attempted to make sense of them in order to form new inter-
imperial boundaries. In the eighteenth century, for example, France ceded the colony of Acadia 
to Britain ‘in its entirety, conformable to its ancient limits’, but it was unclear what exactly that 
entailed. A joint commission was created in 1749 to investigate the question, but it was unable 
to come to an agreement, based on a variety of conflicting information from various maps, 
documents, and local officials.32 Similarly, at the end of the Seven Years’ War, with France’s 
decisive defeat, Canada would become a British colony, but the lack of officially defined 
administrative boundaries meant that it was unclear what ‘Canada’ was. 33  France initially 
maintained that the Ohio Valley was part of Louisiana, not Canada, but after an official captured 
in the war told the opposite to the British, it was ceded to Britain as part of Canada. 
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The way in which Native Americans and Europeans adapted to each other’s presence meant that 
in many cases the methods of dividing territory that were called for were closer to traditional 
Native American practices than any linear division. In particular, French officials relied heavily 
on alliances with Native Americans, based on the fur trade, to maintain its claims over vast 
expanses of territory beyond the St Lawrence River Valley, and recognized that their Native 
American allies were much more effective than the French military in opposing the expanding 
British colonies.34 As a result, to a large extent French suzerainty coincided with boundaries that 
Native Americans understood better than the French, who had little reason, or capacity, to 
interfere with such boundary conceptions. 
 
 
Survey Rationality in the English Enclosure Movement 
 
One context in which survey rationality took on a particular socially constituted importance was 
within the English enclosure movement. This section shows the historical origins of survey 
rationality in this particular context, as an outcome of its articulation with agrarian capitalism. 
In a narrow sense, ‘enclosure’ refers to the building of fences and walls by landowners, 
surrounding what were previously lands held in common through customary rights or actual 
usage by peasants, usually between the late medieval and industrial periods. More generally, it 
refers to the dispossession of peasants’ access to various kinds of manorial and common lands 
and the commodification and marketization of land. The following section will then show how 
survey rationality came to be implemented in the North American property surveys, and the 
section afterwards will show how this led to the linearization of political borders. 
 
As the price of wool was rapidly increasing in the early sixteenth century, powerful landowners 
particularly in England began to eject peasants from common lands, in order to use that land for 
raising sheep, in a process known as enclosure.35 This had been underway to some extent for 
centuries, but picked up intensity in the first decades of the sixteenth century. This was initially 
illegal, with a series of laws passed against enclosures, although there was little that England’s 
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small army could do about it.36 Moreover, peasants had always had rights to use common lands, 
but these were often customary rather than formal, and could easily be ignored by landlords. By 
the eighteenth century, however, a substantial shift in social understandings of land had 
occurred, towards the preoccupation with capitalistic improvement associated with John Locke, 
and Parliament began to pass laws accelerating the enclosure of the commons. These lands had 
always been tended to by stewards called ‘surveyors’, who were sometimes accompanied by 
land measurers. In the early sixteenth century, however, word spread that profits could be 
multiplied many times by enclosing as much land as possible. In the face of rioting dispossessed 
peasants and laws enacted against enclosure, landowners tended to look to surveyors to extend 
their rights on the land to the maximum through geometrically accurate maps. Surveyors, as a 
consequence, were reduced to land measurers, as simply measuring the land did not involve 
enumerating the customary rights of peasants. There arose an ever greater demand for more 
accurate methods, skilled measurers, and useful instruments. Enclosure was central to the 
process which translated—literally, from Latin to English—the abstract and cosmographical 
theories of astronomers into a profession of measuring land. 
 
Part of this process was the radical narrowing of the surveyor’s duties, or the replacement of 
the surveyor by the ‘land-meter’.37 The medieval surveyor’s duties originally included many that 
would later be taken up by an estate agent or a farm manager. The surveyor not only 
investigated boundaries by interviewing tenants and reviewing whatever written records might 
exist but also provided advice on farming, manuring, draining, irrigating, and the like. Classically 
educated and well-versed in law and agricultural techniques, surveyors measured the extent of 
the land often by estimation, and sometimes without even visiting all the premises. Quantitative 
measures were only required by statute for ‘improved’ areas, and even then were often done 
simply by counting strips of land.  
 
Beginning in the sixteenth century, however, practical guides aimed at surveyors, which included 
applied geometry proliferated and were frequently reprinted. ‘Qualitie and quantitie be 
unseparable companions’, declared one text which established mathematics on an equal footing 
with legal and agricultural knowledge.38 Over the course of the seventeenth century, the non-
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mathematical elements dropped out, and the manor itself began to disappear from texts, 
replaced by the generalized space of geometry. Suddenly angles and distances had to be precise, 
and surveyors had to be familiar with multiplications and trigonometric functions, as well as a 
whole host of newly invented instruments. Surveyors advertised their services on the streets of 
London, claiming that ‘No Man may arrogate to himselfe the name and title of a perfect and 
absolute Surveior of Castles, Manners, Lands and Tenements unlesse he be able in true forme, 
measure, quantitie, and proportion; to plat the same in their particulars ad infinitum’.39 As one 
of the new survey texts quipped in its preface, 
 
Both simple, gentle; Barons, Lords, and Knights,  
Will take thee for their chiefest of delights.  
Thou teachest them to measure all ther grounde;  
Which, certainly,, will save them many a pound.40 
 
Immediately the attack on the traditional agrarian order was felt. In general, of course, 
dispossessed peasants rioted throughout England and tore down the gates and fences that 
manifested physically the enclosures.41 At first, the figure of the surveyor was perceived as an 
agent of this newly rapacious landlord, and ‘goes like a Beare with a Chaine at his side’.42 One 
Elizabethan satirical illustration, for example, pictured a pair of monks measuring a plot of land, 
with a Latin title, ‘Of the avaricious monk’ and caption, ‘For the iniquity of his covetousness was 
I wroth, and smote him: I hid me, and was wroth, and he went on frowardly in the way of his 
heart. Isaiah 57’.43 
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Figure 2: William Boyer, Heroica Eulogia, England, 156744 
 
The vision that the proponents of estate surveys projected was one of rationalization. On one 
hand, the new applied geometry claimed merely to be revealing universal truths which had 
previously been ‘locked up in strange tongues’.45 The direct target was often the inaccuracies of 
traditional methods. Ralph Agas complained that among most land-meters of the time ‘infinite 
errours are therein dailie committed, and the rare and excellente skill in measure almost utterlie 
condempned’, and that ‘almoste as manie errours are comitted as there are operations 
undertaken’.46 In stark contrast to the common sense of the fifteenth century, Edward Worsop 
maintained that no one could be a true surveyor ‘except he can also prove his instruments and 
measurements, by true Geometricall Demonstration’.47 Yet on the other hand, it was no secret 
that this ‘universal’ justice was only meant to benefit some people. Suspicions grew that 
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peasants were ‘concealing’ land from landowners. Commoners and the commons alike were 
branded as irrational and disorderly. Moreover, peasants, and to some extent perhaps more 
broadly literary culture, also seemed to regard surveyors with suspicion and sometimes 
hostility.48 
 
The process of disenchantment, or the disavowal of magic and ritual, was also an important 
factor.49 In medieval England, the ceremony of perambulations was central to the preservation 
of boundaries through memory. 50  This ritual evolved out of what was originally a pagan 
procession intended to protect crops from disease, and during the Christian era priests began to 
use them to walk parish boundaries and remind villagers who owed tithes to whom. Under 
pressure from Puritans, most such festivals were banned in the sixteenth century, but due to 
the civic importance of boundary walks, this particular one could be kept by calling it a 
‘perambulation’ rather than a ‘procession’. While Puritans disapproved of the merry-making and 
the use of banners, handbells, and such accessories, they had to admit there were ‘four manifest 
advantages’ of the perambulations: ‘it procured God’s blessing on the fields, preserved 
boundaries, brought neighbours together in good fellowship, and provided an opportunity for 
assisting the poor’.51 Thus rationalized, they could continue. 
 
Transplanted into the Puritans’ utopian societies in New England, however, perambulations 
were stripped of all their religious significance, leaving only the ‘useful’ elements behind.52 The 
calendar of Saints’ Days and local rituals was officially abolished along with ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction over property and even moral offences. Instead of parish boundaries, New 
Englanders perambulated town or property boundaries with civic leaders, and they focused on 
the practical legal utility of stabilizing the colonial geography. While distance from England 
limited settlers’ access to experienced surveyors, they tended increasingly to find certainty and 
security in quantitative measures rather than in traditional rituals. 
 
Roger Williams, the founder of Providence Plantations, observed that ‘The Natives are very exact 
and punctuall in the bounds of their Lands, belonging to this or that Prince or People, (even to a 
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River, Brooke) &c. And I have knowne them make bargain and sale amongst themselves for a 
small piece, or quantity of Ground’.53 Yet for the most part the English colonists considered 
Indian land usage irrational and disregarded it; even Roger Williams classified them as either 
‘Rude and Clownish’ or fit to be ‘civilized’.54 This gave boundaries of settler communities a whole 
new function of creating new spaces rather than simply maintaining the existing order. 
 
As late as 1618 the new mathematics still required justification, such that cartographer John 
Norden published the Surveyor’s Dialogue, an extensive defence of the practice, which is highly 
revealing of its politics. A discontented tenant farmer denounces a surveyor: ‘you looke into the 
values of mens Lands, whereby the Lords of Mannors doe racke their Tennants to a higher rent 
and rate then ever before’, and ‘by your meanes rents are raysed, and Lands knowne to the 
utter-most Acre’.55 The surveyor replies:  
 
I perceive that the force of your strongest arguments is…your feare and unwillingnesse that the 
Lord of the Mannor, under whom, & in whose Land you dwell, should know his owne: and that 
you thinke it better for you, that he should continue still ignorant of what he hath, and that your 
estates should bee alwaies hidden. 
 
By the end of the seventeenth century, it was the surveyor’s argument that had largely won, at 
least by achieving Parliamentary support. The image of the stingy monks greedily measuring 
their land had been replaced by the hard-working improver. In the eighteenth century, the state-
sponsored cadastral map, which had existed in a few places, now spread across Europe, as part 
of a growing mentality of calculation. 
 
 
Survey Rationality and Market Rationality 
 
Why did this concern for geometrical precision arise? A common answer to this question in the 
literature on the history of enclosure is simply the desire for financial gain. In other words, survey 
rationality was an outcome of market rationality. Due to economic changes, and the rapid 
increase in the marginal value of land, it mattered increasingly for landowners to know exactly 
how much land they possessed. The timing of surveys indeed seems to have often been 
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associated with land sales. For thinkers such as Friedrich Ratzel, who believed societies 
modernized by using land more efficiently, and thus reduced peripheral wastelands into linear 
boundaries, this would likely have been the explanation. 
 
The difficulty with this rationalist explanation, however, is that it is impossible to know 
beforehand whether surveying a plot of land more accurately than it was surveyed before will 
result in an increase or decrease of the known area of the plot. If it was known in advance that 
a new survey using more accurate methods would find a greater area than a previous survey, 
then something more than an increase in accuracy is at work; there must be a source of 
knowledge other than the surveys themselves. In other words, it does not follow that because 
something is more precisely measured, it must be bigger. Any explanation for why many English 
landowners chose to have their lands resurveyed must address the question of why the old-
fashioned methods always seemed to have underestimated the value of land, and never to have 
overestimated it. The connection between the new forms of market rationality engendered by 
agrarian capitalism, on the one hand, and the survey rationality of precisely measured, 
geometrical space, on the other, is not altogether straightforward.  
 
Rather than necessarily belonging together as a result of their internal logic, the link between 
these two rationalities was articulated by the propagandistic literature of the time which made 
the case that surveys would increase land values.56 It is important not to take the surveyors’ 
propaganda at face value, and to view it in a broader social context, in which value is increasingly 
accorded to the accurate measurement of the world as an end in itself, independently of any 
other end it might be a means towards. The equation of precision with prosperity makes sense 
if we view survey rationality not as a discovery of its objective utility or as an organizational 
principle that has spread through a kind of natural selection, but as a historically particular 
rationality emerging within particular power configurations. 
 
While complex capitalist markets had long been in operation in the Mediterranean, Italian 
merchants of the thirteenth century were served quite well by Roman numerals, and carried out 
calculations on an abacus rather than with the numerals themselves.57 The ‘basic function of 
written numbers in medieval and early modern commerce was to record transactions, not to 
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create manipulable bodies of data’.58 Even through the late seventeenth century, economic 
writers tended not to use quantitative terms to discuss economies. Only in the sixteenth century 
did English books of Arabic arithmetic emerge. These books began to assert that arithmetic was 
the foundation of knowledge as well as a tool to sharpen the mind.  
 
In the seventeenth century the activity of ‘pantometry’, or ‘the measuring of all things’ emerged 
as almost a distinct pastime of the mathematically minded, who congregated in mathematical 
clubs such as the Royal Society of London. They wrote books on arithmetic, navigation, 
bookkeeping, interest rates, and so on, not from any particular interest in any these subjects but 
as part of a general ethic of quantification. While their numbers remained small at this stage, 
they were convinced that a wider audience should adopt the practice and techniques of 
numeracy in order to provide a foundation of knowledge and to sharpen the mind. 
 
Arguments erupted over the true heights of mountains and the exact number of years since God’s 
creation of the world. Dozens of men acquired thermometers and barometers and consulted them 
thrice daily to measure the weather…The mathematical similarity in all these endeavours was 
precisely what attracted them. Prefaces to gauging and arithmetical books often specified 
ingenious persons of mathematical bent as part of the intended audience…That was how they saw 
themselves: as men disposed to delight in numbers.59 
 
While the functional utility of scientific successes, such as the circumnavigation of the earth, 
certainly contributed to interest in further scientific investigations, it cannot explain this self-
sustaining obsession with calculation in general as an end in itself rather than with regard to any 
specific purpose. 
 
Nevertheless, the specific, immediate reason for enacting surveys, at least in the mind of the 
landowners having them done, was probably for financial gain. In spite of any inherent logical 
contradiction that might be spotted, the increase in accuracy claimed by the surveying manuals 
was seamlessly attached to an absolute increase in land value. Moreover, the timing of surveys 
seems to suggest that they were often carried out right before a property sale.60 Landowners 
needed enclosed space to raise sheep, and surveying had become part of the set of practices 
that would create that result. We can therefore somewhat modify the question: How did the 
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surveys contribute to the increased property values, or how were they perceived to increase 
them? 
 
If precision alone cannot explain the overall increase, what would explain it, according to the 
surveyors, was in the revelation that the peasants were somehow hiding land, presumably by 
living on it. In other words, the customary rights of peasants were illegible to the new geometric 
surveyor. This was not, of course, because it would have been impossible to find some way to 
represent customary rights using Euclidian geometry, but because surveyors served those who 
could pay to employ them, and so had little reason to be creatively inclusive of the 
underprivileged. Landlords needed a new way to articulate space in a way that did not include 
peasants, and this was provided by mathematical surveys.  
 
In a strictly functional sense this could have been accomplished by a re-articulation of the formal, 
explicit rights that landowners had on the land, to the exclusion of customary rights. The surveys, 
according to their advertisements, were no more than a technical application of these already 
existing formal rights. If the surveys really were just that and no more, however, they would 
hardly have been worth the effort of innovation. Mathematical surveys tended to increase 
property values and areas not because they more accurately reflected reality but because they 
were articulated with a change in the interpretation of legal rights. The surveys were necessary 
because they made what was actually an arbitrary negation of customary rights seem to be no 
more than a reflection of what already existed. 
 
The real explanation, then, comes from the affective and valorised nature of the new 
quantitative practices and modes of thought which made surveys seem, in the minds of an 
initially small but growing number of people, to be good insofar as they revealed true knowledge 
of the world. This then allowed the class interests of the landowners, in expelling commoners 
from the commons, to be pursued in a way which was otherwise thought immoral. The 
enclosure of the commons preceded the proliferation of surveys, and could have accelerated 
without it. But what the surveyors contributed to the enclosures was, first of all, a conception 
of empty space which could render unintelligible the complex customary rights of peasants. 
Empty space in itself is, as suggested above, hardly a unique invention of sixteenth-century 
England. Yet the surveyors went further, developing a routinized technique which would 
demonstrate to the literate public that what they were doing was simply re-enacting the owned 
space in a way that better reflected the rights already possessed by the landowner.  
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The mathematical surveyor, then, did originate out of financial gains associated with surveys, 
but not because of a general functional utility of surveys. The articulation of survey rationality 
along with market rationality instead hinged crucially on the particular circumstances of the time 
and place, namely the landowning class’s interest in enclosed space to raise sheep, as well as 
the growing value placed in true and mathematically accurate descriptions of the world as an 
end in itself. 
 
Survey rationality was not a logical corollary of market rationality but had to be articulated as 
such within the particular conditions of the enclosure movement. The proliferation of property 
surveys manifested a kind of political alliance between a class interest in repurposing the English 
countryside and a movement to achieve a perfect knowledge of the world through precision. 
The service performed by surveyors was not simply to measure the shape and size of a manor 
but also, at least as importantly, to deploy the growing legitimacy of numeracy and precise 
counting as a way of understanding the world, on behalf of landowners seeking to increase the 
size of their holdings. Mathematical surveys could be expected to increase property values and 
areas not because they more accurately reflected reality but because they helped to alter the 
interpretation of legal rights in favour of those that could be measured, and made what was 
seen from one perspective as an arbitrary negation of customary rights into no more than a 
reflection of what already existed. 
 
 
Survey Rationality and Anglo-American Settler Society 
 
As a result of its articulation with market rationality, survey rationality proved to be a powerful 
weapon of the landowning class in England and helped to accomplish a redistribution of 
property rights in favour of the wealthy. English settlers in North America implemented surveys 
partially for different reasons. In particular, in contrast to the surveys of the English enclosures 
in the Tudor period, property surveys in Anglo-America were part of a process of alienating land 
supposedly owned by the Crown rather than simply rationalizing private titles that supposedly 
already existed. This meant they were part of a self-conscious movement of settler expansion 
into the interior of the North American continent. In some areas surveys were done prior to 
settlement, while in other areas, surveys formalized a recent but already accomplished 
settlement, but there was no sense that those enacting surveys were simply measuring ancient 
properties. Unlike the English landowners who feared that commoners were ‘concealing’ lands 
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they had long owned, English settlers just arriving on the North American continent had to justify 
their claims differently. 
 
The property relations that emerged in the English colonies turned on a particular interpretation 
of American Indian civilizations. This was not a result of simple lack of familiarity with Indians 
and inability to navigate their patterns of land usage. Instead, based on specific impressions 
which held after extensive contact, English observers ruled out recognition of Indian ownership 
of the land equivalent to what they understood as private property. In particular, constructions 
of the American Indians were central to John Locke’s labour-mixing theory of property, which is 
often seen as typical of the eighteenth century and beyond in Anglo-American discussion of 
property rights. According to Locke, who could claim some familiarity with the politics of land 
usage in North America, as Secretary to the Lords Proprietor of the colony of Carolina, ‘the wild 
Indian, who knows no enclosure…is still a tenant in common’.61 But unlike the commons of 
England, which were particular to specific local communities, America was wide open and 
available to all, and represented the antithesis of property. Unlike previous theories of property 
which traced ownership from owner to owner back to ‘time immemorial’, Locke’s theory began 
with a state of nature. This was not simply a theoretical abstraction, but, for Locke, actually 
existed in America, as suggested by his claim ‘All the world was America’.  
 
This particular understanding of settler land appropriation removed the necessity for any 
concerted effort to establish the antiquity of native boundaries in order to acquire them. 
Instead, unlike England, North America had to be established as a tabula rasa in which no 
boundaries existed. The existence of indigenous agriculture and techniques of bounding space, 
some of which are now well documented, had to be ignored. America was constructed as a land 
held entirely in common, but it was a different sort of commons than land which was ‘common 
by compact’, or in other words, land which was not common ‘to all mankind, but is the joint 
property of this country or that parish’.62 Enclosure in England and in America were mutually co-
constitutive but not the same. 
 
Yet at the same time, from the point of view of those being dispossessed, this may not have 
been an important distinction. The creation of surveyed boundaries in North America 
underpinned Native dispossession similarly to the way in which in England it had underpinned 
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the dispossession of commoners. Just as in England, surveys were central to ensuring the 
legitimacy of the new and aggressively expansive system. Historian Allan Greer has argued that 
the use of a seemingly fair market system of property exchange marks an important distinction 
between the Protestant empires in North America, including not only the English but also the 
Dutch and Swedish empires, and the other Euro-American empires.63 The French, Portuguese, 
and Spanish attempted as best they could to include within an imperial hierarchy indigenous 
peoples, along with their lands, without making a fine distinction between the two. Settlers in 
those empires were not prevented from appropriating Indian lands, but doing so was not a 
primary imperial goal. The Spanish, for example, were on the whole more interested in the 
labour than the land of the Indians they encountered. When New Mexico was annexed to the 
Spanish empire in 1598, the act of possession on behalf of the king laid claim to not only ‘the 
mountains, rivers, valleys, meadows, pastures, and waters’, but also ‘the native Indians in each 
and every one of the provinces’.64 English rule in America, by contrast, was based on the fiction 
that settlers had fairly negotiated the transferral of land, achieving consent through 
compensation within some kind of free market. Benjamin West’s 1771 painting ‘William Penn’s 
Treaty’, for example, depicted Indians being offered textiles and other goods in a spirit of peace 
and mutual respect, and later became ‘an allegory of Colonial America’. The English told 
themselves that they were unlike the French in Canada and Louisiana, who ‘have scarce any 
other title to the country than what they obtained by usurpation, very seldom asking leave of 
the natives’.65 
 
Replicating all the formalities of English private property included the requirement that property 
be validated through mathematical surveys. Doing so in the New World, however, created new 
challenges which led ultimately to new dynamics reinforcing a concern for survey rationality to 
the point where many of the landowning class were familiar with the techniques of surveying. 
These challenges centred around the tensions between the high volume of land which had to be 
properly alienated and the scarcity, at least, initially, of expert practitioners. The immediate 
result was the accumulation of a great deal of power in the hands of surveyors. The continued 
availability of the surveying profession as a means of influencing the settlement of land, then, 
contributed to its attainment of a certain role in settler society and habitus. By the late 
eighteenth century, survey rationality and the importance of governing space through scientific 
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and mathematical methods had only expanded from its sixteenth-century roots, to the point 
where it was arguably an integral part of the American Empire at the moment of its separation 
from the British Empire. Survey rationality pervaded both the episteme of the elite class of land-
owners who set out and negotiated the terms of American independence and the expansionist 
policies undertaken by Congress which received their first major expression in the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787. 
 
In New Spain, settlement had begun before it was common to mathematically survey properties 
in Europe, and patterns of settlement that had developed over the course of the sixteenth 
century largely remained in place during the beginning of English settlements. In Portuguese 
Brazil, similarly, large landholdings went without any specified boundaries and could be marked 
with only a single stone.66 But as historian Patricia Seed concludes in a comparative study of 
European territorial claims in the Americas, besides the English colonies, ‘No other European 
colony employed surveyors so extensively; no other European colonists considered establishing 
private property or boundaries in the New World as central to legitimate possession’.67 This 
section describes and explains the extent to which a concern for survey rationality became 
widespread in Anglo-American settler society. In short, the focus here is on the insistence on a 
state-guaranteed private property regime despite many challenges unique to the colonial 
context: amateurism among surveyors, combined with high volumes of settlement, including 
squatters and speculators, which created a confusion of claims, which became particularly 
violent towards Native Americans, who resisted settlers’ claims. In a context combining all these 
factors, many settlers became familiar with surveying practices, and for the many settlers who 
owned land it was vital to secure these claims using surveys. 
 
The scarcity of skilled, professional surveyors in the colonies, and the widespread parallel usage 
of improvised techniques resulted in a cacophony of boundary disputes, but did not diminish 
colonial reliance on surveys.68 On the contrary, it encouraged some settlers to learn survey 
techniques on their own, and most colonial surveyors were self-taught. English surveying 
manuals were extremely popular, such as John Love’s Geodaesia, published in six editions from 
1688 to 1753, and written explicitly for American readers.69 More traditional techniques such as 
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perambulations, or the practice of walking around the boundaries and committing them to 
memory, lived on in New England, but these were increasingly rationalized and stripped of their 
previously religious meaning by Puritans. 70  While by no means perfect or universal, 
mathematical surveying knowledge became widely dispersed enough that it could be referred 
to as ‘a new form of popular literacy’.71 
 
Yet the Crown and the colonial governments retained responsibility for making this private 
property regime workable despite amateurism in the surveying practice. This led to the 
emergence of a productive relationship between survey rationality and political power on the 
frontier of settlement which strengthened over a long period of time. Early Virginia provides a 
good example of this productive relationship, where surveying was seen as necessary for 
maintaining an orderly process of settlement, with no overlapping or fraudulent claims, and thus 
surveyors held the power to complete settler’s claims to land.72 Virginia had a surveyor general 
by 1621, and by the late seventeenth century, the office of the surveyor general had become 
one of the most powerful in the colony because it appointed surveyors who controlled the 
parcelling out of crown lands into privately owned titles. While surveyors were not necessarily 
the highest-paid officials, their privileged access to land gave them important political and 
economic advantages. Because being granted one of these appointments as a surveyor was such 
a significant political favour, the surveyor general was able to gather a sizeable faction within 
the Virginia Assembly. Perceptions of cronyism among surveyors were one of the major political 
issues of the time, and it contributed to general outrage at government corruption and threats 
of rebellion. 
 
The main solution to the problem of favouritism in the distribution of crown land envisioned by 
the colonial elite was a technical one, not a political one, through an intensification of survey 
rationality. Whereas this problem in other contexts might have been a reason to find some other 
means of legitimating land titles besides through surveys, in Virginia the demand was for surveys 
to become more accurate and correct, in order to avoid fraudulent surveys. Amidst a period of 
contentious boundary disputes in Virginia, a law was passed in 1642 requiring that all surveyors 
‘should deliver an exact plott to each parcel surveyed and measured’.73 Maryland, likewise, in 
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1674 doubled fees for surveyors who used a chain and circumferentor, the best technology 
available. These laws were justified by the amount of litigation that was required in cases of 
overlapping claims, whether these were a result of genuine mistakes or fraud on the part of the 
surveyors. A 1659 Virginia law, for example, began, ‘whereas many contentious suites do arise 
about titles to land, occasioned much through the fraudulent and underhand dealing of 
surveighors who frequently make sale of the surveighs by them made, in the behalfe of one 
person to another, whereby often times he that had the first and justest right is unjustly 
deprived of his due...’74 As the pace of settlement increased, the problem of speculators also 
arose. With surveyors willing to turn a blind eye in order to make extra fees, speculators could 
end up claiming land many times over. For example, in Franklin County, Georgia, 5 million acres 
of claims were approved, more than ten times the county acreage.75 
 
The role of surveys in controlling settlement contributed to a colonial environment where 
surveyors were associated with a certain social rank, and the distinctions between politicians, 
landowners, and surveyors were often blurred. Similar in its requirements of technical 
knowledge and the possibility of formal certification, surveying was socially analogous to the 
medical or legal professions. ‘Their satin waistcoats, brocaded vests, patent slippers, and 
powdered wigs were of the latest English fashions’.76 Many owned slaves. Surveying manuals 
such as John Wing’s The Art of Surveying and John Love’s Geodaesia could be found in the 
libraries of gentlemen planters, especially those who were not even surveyors themselves. Even 
when many of the old surveying families gave up the profession in the late eighteenth century 
as settlement moved westward, they continued to occasionally fill the Virginia governorship into 
the mid-nineteenth century. While surveyors’ status, income, and level of professionalization 
varied with the particular time and place, the ability to demarcate boundaries convincingly was 
in all Thirteen Colonies a desirable skill which conferred important advantages. 
 
George Washington provides a good example of the ways in which the early American elite, the 
burgeoning real estate market, and the surveying practice implicated each other. At age 11 in 
1743, Washington’s schooling covered mathematics, including geometry, trigonometry, and 
surveying, along with writing and ‘Rules of Civility’, all important practical preparation for 
becoming a planter and land speculator, and for entering Virginia’s ruling class.77 When he was 
seventeen he secured an appointment as a county surveyor for Culpeper County, probably 
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through family connections. It was through this surveyorship that he made his start in the 
lucrative business of acquiring, planting, and selling land, which helped propel him to wealth 
and prominence. Washington’s direct experience in surveying was something he had in common 
with six of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence and two others of the four 
men depicted on Mount Rushmore.78 
 
As settlers transitioned from the precarious establishment of coastal colonies in the seventeenth 
century towards the domination of the North American continent in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the importance of establishing accurate and reliable boundaries as a 
political issue deepened. This is especially apparent, directly following US independence, in the 
way in which Congress explicitly used surveys to entrench its sovereignty where it was still weak, 
in the vast lands ceded to the US by Britain which were not integrated into any state.79 The semi-
constitutional Land Ordinance of 1785 specified in detail the technical procedures to be used in 
these surveys, the integrity of which was crucial: 
 
A surveyor from each state shall be appointed by Congress, or a committee of the States, who 
shall take an Oath for the faithful discharge of his duty, before the Geographer of the United 
States…The lines shall be measured with a chain; shall be plainly marked by chaps on the trees, 
and exactly described with a plat…’80 
 
Dividing up this territory into small plots of land as accurately and precisely surveyed as possible, 
it was thought, would help do this for three reasons. First, there were frequent wars with Native 
Americans who rejected settlers’ claims. US leaders were confident that settlement would 
progress despite this, but they did aim to make sure settlement was organized in order to 
contain the violence involved in rapidly redistributing land. Many settlers proceeded west on 
their own terms, swayed by narratives of abundant land beyond the Ohio River. These squatters 
were construed as barely more ‘civilized’ than the Native Americans, and they took much of the 
blame for the violence of settlement. In addition, selling this land was one way Congress could 
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gain badly needed revenue, which squatters threatened to take away. Second, some settlers, 
such as in Vermont, organized themselves into their own states, initially independent of 
Congress’s sovereignty. ‘In the course of a few years the [Ohio] country will be peopled like 
Vermont’, as some Congressional delegates reported in 1783. 81  ‘It will be independent, and the 
whole property of the soil will be lost forever to the United States’. Third, jurisdictional conflicts 
between states continued and proliferated as they had between British colonies, but with the 
added problems of a relatively weak central authority and a new and untested constitutional 
framework at the foundation of the legal system. In a few cases, these conflicts became violent, 
and it was seen as essential that a legal framework for resolving them was established, which 
inevitably relied on the accuracy of surveys. 
 
 
Linear Boundaries: The Colonial Inflection of Enclosure 
 
The transformation of property boundaries through the rise of survey rationality in the sixteenth 
century did not immediately result in a similar transformation of borders between states and 
principalities in Europe. As Jordan Branch has shown, until the 1815 Congress of Vienna, treaty 
texts indicate that European territory continued to be typically defined and understood as a 
series of listed places and feudal rights rather than as one homogenous space, with everything 
on one side of a line belonging to one territory, and everything on the other side belonging to 
another.82  Because of the particular significance of survey rationality in settler colonial society 
outside Europe, however, the absolute geometrical precision expected of property boundaries 
also came to be expected of larger-scale borders, in a process which is the focus of this section. 
 
In the context of the English colonies in North America, private property surveying was a major 
factor in the emergence of precise international boundaries. There were two main reasons for 
this upscaling of survey rationality. First, as explained in the previous section, many settlers were 
familiar with the practice of surveying, either by first-hand experience, or simply by participating 
in their society. This made referring to surveys seem a natural response to disputes over how to 
translate a line which was described in a legal document into an actual demarcated boundary. 
Second, in many cases, because of the multiplicity of government bodies within the empire able 
to grant land, local private property disputes could quickly become linked directly to inter-
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colonial disputes. As private properties could only be in one colony at a time, colonial 
governments usually shared boundaries with private properties, and if these properties were to 
be surveyed, this would have a direct impact on the colonial territory. Moreover, obtaining a 
title from a colony was of limited value if that colony’s control over the area was uncertain. 
Violent territorial disputes between Pennsylvania, Maryland, and indigenous inhabitants 
deterred settlement for decades and prompted government officials to hire surveyors Charles 
Mason and Jeremiah Dixon from England to demarcate the intercolonial boundary, known as 
the Mason-Dixon line.83 After decades of disputes, then, colonial governments began to survey 
territorial boundaries more often, in order to clear the way for settlers’ titles to be legitimated 
by surveys. 
 
It is important to remember that in the seventeenth century, in the absence of a nation-state 
system, borders could not be ‘international’ in the sense we understand today. For that reason, 
some caution is due in drawing too clear a distinction between ‘internal’ administrative borders 
and ‘external’ inter-imperial borders. In some empires, such as the English empire, provincial 
governors could act with much autonomy, even to the point of going to war against each other. 
In that sense, the surveyed inter-colonial borders of the English North American colonies were 
already ‘international’ in the mid-seventeenth century. Yet at the same time, the distinction 
between inter-colonial and inter-imperial borders was historically important not least because 
there was an intervening period of about a century between the time at which mutually 
recognized borders of considerable precision were common between the English colonies and 
the time at which they were common between European empires in the Americas. It is worth 
considering, then, the process by which the precision expected early on of inter-colonial borders 
later came to be applied to inter-imperial borders. 
 
 
Intra-Imperial Boundaries 
 
Before widespread attempts to specify precise boundaries with other empires, and long before 
European borders were linearized by treaty, it became commonplace to refer to survey 
techniques in cases of lower-level border disputes in the English colonies. Inter-colonial 
boundary surveys were then often seen as a direct result of local property disputes, especially 
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those which arose when different land-granting authorities encroached on each other. In the 
Puritan settlements of the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay colonies, where towns allocated 
property to colonists, local town boundaries were constantly disputed and represented 
significant political issues for the early colonists. 84  The boundary between the towns of 
Barnstable and Sandwich, for example, had to be surveyed four times between 1637 and 1660 
due to bitter controversy. While amateurism was certainly rife among surveyors, as the 
profession was in its infancy, and skilled practitioners were difficult to come by west of the 
Atlantic, the value placed in the calculative science of land measuring was perhaps higher here 
than anywhere else at that time. 
 
William Bradford, the governor of Plymouth Colony, reports how an early boundary dispute 
arose between the towns of Hingham and Scituate over a tract of land they each aimed to divide 
up and distribute for private ownership. The dispute was not only over town lines but also over 
inter-colonial lines, as Scituate was in Plymouth Colony and Hingham was in Massachusetts Bay 
Colony: 85 
 
Those of this plantation having at sundrie times granted lands for severall townships, and amongst 
the rest to the inhabitants of Sityate…this tracte of land extended to their utmost limets that way, 
and bordered on their neigbours of the Massachusets, who had some years after seated a towne 
(called Hingam) on their lands next to these parts. So as now ther grue great difference betweene 
these 2 townships, about their bounds, and some meadow grownds that lay between them. They 
of Hingam presumed to alotte parte of them to their people, and measure and stack them out. 
The other pulled up their stacks, and threw them. So it grew to a controversie betweene the 2 
goverments, and many letters and passages were betweene them aboute it; and it hunge some 2 
years in suspense…In the end boath Courts agreed to chose 2 comissioners of each side, and to 
give them full and absolute power to agree and setle the bounds betwene them; and what they 
should doe in the case should stand irrevocably. 
 
The two colonies then agreed to determine their boundary by appointing a ‘mathematician and 
surveyor’, Nathaniel Woodward, who later went on to survey the Connecticut-Massachusetts 
border in 1642, along with Solomon Saffery.86 The border between New York and Connecticut 
was also partially surveyed first in 1684. Here geometrical analysis was particularly important 
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for achieving an agreement, as New York was only persuaded to give up what is now the 
‘Connecticut Panhandle’ by receiving in exchange a strip of territory equal in area which is less 
than two miles wide and stretches along most of the length of Connecticut’s western border. 
 
In the southern colonies, land was granted through the colonial government itself rather than 
through townships, as in New England. Yet this did not remove the problem of multiple land-
granting authorities. Due to uncertainty and potential overlap between the Crown Colony of 
Virginia and the proprietary colony of Carolina, would-be settlers could apply for land on the 
frontier from either authority. According to one of the survey officers who later ran the official 
borderline, ‘the Crown was like to be the loser by this Incertainty, because the Terms of both 
taking up and seating Land were easier much in Carolina’.87 Many of these surveys had to be 
repeated multiple times due to inaccuracies and disagreements, and often were not settled until 
the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. It is clear, however, that boundaries were already 
considered by political officials to be subject to the authority of mathematical and geometric 
knowledge by the seventeenth century.  
 
While many histories emphasize the inaccuracies of the English colonies’ early surveys, they still 
differed significantly from other settler communities simply by making such a concerted effort 
to scientifically rationalize space. In New Spain, for example, mathematical survey methods were 
mostly unused before the eighteenth century, while various other traditions developed.88 While 
the ambitions of Philip II to have a survey of New Spain never materialized, the collection of 
cartographic information by questionnaires sent to colonial officials was one common method 
used. Early Spanish colonists were generally uninterested in maps, associating the visual arts 
with Indian cultures whose writing systems were based on pictograms. The maps that were 
returned with the questionnaires, then, tended to be made by Indians, contrary to the wishes 
of the Peninsular geographers, and generally did not correspond to their geometrically 
rationalized ideas of space. Mathematical textbooks on geometric surveying were hardly 
anywhere to be found in New Spain, and even the copy of Ptolemy’s Geography held by a 
Franciscan monastery near Mexico City was sold away in 1584 on account of being ‘useless’. A 
typical land grant, or merced, described the place and extent of the land to be granted but 
specified little in the way of boundaries, for example: 
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I give a merced to Francisco Lopez of a sitio de estancia para ganado mayor and two caballerias 
of land in the vicinity of the pueblo of Tepequacuylco in a plain and flat savanna a short league 
more or less from the aforementioned pueblo, between two ancient and abandoned 
settlements…the center of the aforementioned sitio is to be in between the said two ancient 
settlements, and it shall run from north to south toward the road that goes to Acapulco. 
 
Distances were often maintained by law between properties and settlements, but this did not 
necessarily translate into a continuous boundary. The common method of survey that was used 
was a vista de ojos, or ‘eye’s view’, in which a common unit of measurement was ‘more or less 
a musket shot’. 
 
With property rights defined, in the early colonial period, in terms that combined earlier Spanish 
practices with indigenous techniques, rather than according to the kind of survey rationality 
implemented in the English colonies, the administrative boundaries of the Spanish Empire 
similarly followed a different trajectory, which can be illustrated with reference to the 
boundaries of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. The Viceroyalty was created via the Real Cedula 
del 27 de mayo de 1717, which read as follows: 
 
And I have also resolved that the territory and jurisdiction that the said Viceroy, Audiencia, and 
court of accounts of the city of Santa Fe must have, is the entire province of Santa Fe, the new 
kingdom of Granada, those of Cartagena, Santamarta, Maracaibo, that of Caracas, Antioquia, 
Guayana, Popayan, and that of San Francisco de Quito, with all the rest that is included in their 
boundaries.89 
 
This level of generality was common in the Spanish dominions, and from the perspective of 
lawyers of the nineteenth century and later attempting to determine the limits of administrative 
divisions in order to make or evaluate territorial claims on behalf of Latin American republics, 
these boundaries were generally of a very unsatisfactory level of precision. To take another 
example, El Salvador and Honduras agreed in a 1992 boundary dispute that in principle the basis 
for their land frontier would be whatever administrative division was in force at the moment of 
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independence in 1821, but ‘neither party was able to produce any evidence indicating, with the 
authority of the Spanish Crown, the location of the boundaries in the disputed areas’.90 
 
In New France, administrative divisions were even less clear than the cedulas promulgated 
before the mid-18th century. In a similar fashion to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
debates over post-revolutionary Latin American boundaries, the particular kind of ambiguity 
surrounding French administrative divisions can be seen in disputes which arose in trying to 
retrospectively make sense of internal boundaries in order to use them as inter-imperial 
boundaries. For example, in the 1713 Peace of Utrecht, England received ‘Nova Scotia also, 
otherwise Acadia, in its entirety, conformable to its ancient limits; as also the town of Port Royal, 
now called Annapolis Royal, and generally all the dependences of the said land…’.91 But what 
were these ‘ancient limits’? A boundary commission appointed in 1749 was unable to find any. 
Despite being critical of using maps as a source of geographical knowledge, the commissioners 
generally based their claims on maps. The French commissioners, for example, pointed to 
English maps that placed the name Acadia over less territory that the English claimed, and the 
English pointed to French maps that indicated a larger Acadia. They do not seem to have 
considered any opinions of inhabitants of the disputed area on whether it counted as Acadia. 
The commission did not come to a conclusion before it was ended by the outbreak of war 
between the two empires in the Ohio Valley. 
 
Similarly, at the end of the Seven Years’ War, with France’s decisive defeat by England and its 
Aboriginal allies in Canada, how much territory would go to the English? France’s initial position 
was that since the whole Ohio Valley was part of the French Louisiana territory rather than 
Canada, it should remain French.92 But the French were then made aware that their captured 
governor-general, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, had informed the English that the boundaries of 
Louisiana in fact excluded most of the Ohio Valley, following a line from the source of the 
Mississippi River to the source of the Wabash River, then down that river to the Ohio River and 
the Mississippi. The French government then claimed that Vaudreuil was basing his line not on 
any formal demarcation but on an internal administrative debate, and that being based in 
Canada, he would naturally exaggerate his own side’s territorial extent. 
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Episodes such as these suggest that clarifying administrative boundaries had not been a priority 
for the French Empire before the mid-eighteenth century in anywhere near the way it was for 
the English colonies in North America. The limited reach of French administration into areas it 
considered part of New France with sparse or no settler population may partially explain the low 
importance of the precise locations of boundaries. 
 
 
Inter-Imperial Boundaries 
 
Before the mid-eighteenth century inter-imperial treaties specifying precise boundaries were 
very limited. The idea of agreeing with neighbouring empires on a border which could 
theoretically be demarcated surfaced in particular contexts, but proved, for the time being, 
impossible to follow through with. This can be seen as early as the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, 
which called for a joint commission including geographers to agree on and survey the line of 
demarcation. That commission never met, but when subsequent treaties in 1524 and 1529 
called for commissions, they managed to meet but could not come to an agreement. The same 
dynamic repeated itself in the seventeenth century when the Governor of New Haven proposed 
a border agreement with the neighbouring Dutch colony of New Netherlands. The resulting 1650 
Treaty of Hartford called for a temporary line to be drawn ‘upon Long Iland...from the 
westernmost part of the Oyster Bay soe and in a straight and direct lyne to the sea’, and on the 
mainland, 'to begine at the west side of Greenwidge Bay, being about 4 miles from Stanford, 
and soe to runne a northerly lyne twenty miles up into the cuntry, and after as it shalbee agreed 
by the two goverments of the Duch and of Newhaven...’ The two governments never further 
specified, however, because they went to war in 1652-4, after which England refused to ratify 
the treaty, and instead granted Connecticut a charter in 1662 which indicated the Pacific Ocean 
as the colony’s western border. 
 
Of the major pairs of European empires in North America during this period, the British and 
French perhaps came closest to a boundary agreement, yet repeated efforts failed. As early as 
the negotiations leading to the 1667 Treaty of Breda, the territorial definition of Acadia came 
into question, as British and French colonial charters had long overlapped, but the treaty 
specified no boundaries.93 In the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick, Britain and France committed to 
returning to each other any territory captured in King William’s War and to establish a joint 
                                                             
93  Paul Demers, ‘The French Colonial Legacy of the Canada-United States Border in Eastern North 
America,1650-1783’, French Colonial History, 10 (2009), 38. 
110 
 
commission ‘invested with sufficient Authority for settling the Limits and Confines of the Lands 
to be restor’d’, but the commission never took place, and both sides kept the captured posts.94 
In the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht a commission was again called for in order to establish the inter-
imperial boundary, part of which would conform to the ‘ancient limits’ of Acadia. Yet again the 
commission clause was ignored. A 1737 report to the lieutenant-governor of New York noted, ‘I 
know of no Regulations for Determining the Boundaries between New York & Canada’. 95 Finally, 
following the 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle, the commission was appointed and met in 1750-
1755, but they were unable to find any ‘ancient limits’ of Acadia amidst a mass of conflicting 
evidence, and did not produce any results before the 1754 outbreak of the French and Indian 
War, and the resulting collapse of New France.  
 
In the area of contact between Spanish Texas and French Louisiana, boundary arrangements 
remained informal into the early eighteenth century. 96 Spain never recognized France’s right to 
Louisiana at all, but stopped just short of invading it in 1721, when a Spanish presidio was built 
twelve miles away from the outlying French post of Natchitoches. After the Spanish officials 
declared their intent to stay, the French official responded that he had no ‘specific orders to 
agree to this or to prevent it’, and they agreed between them to uphold in America the ‘truce 
which existed in Europe between the two crowns’.97 A similar frontier zone with Spanish Florida 
was opened up by the British settlement of Carolina in the late seventeenth century. A main 
point of reference here was the 1670 Treaty of Madrid, which did not mention any borders, or 
even any specific places, only acknowledging and legalizing whatever actual settlement existed, 
but the colony of Georgia was later founded in defiance of this.98 Several attempts were made 
to negotiate a border in the early eighteenth century, but none ever materialized, amidst 
recurring frontier skirmishes.99  
 
The absence of precise agreed inter-imperial boundaries for much of the period of European 
empires in the Americas cannot be reduced to simply an outcome of a lack of close contact 
between settlements. Rather, the lack of such borders was part of a geopolitical system of amity 
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lines, which was maintained as legitimate at different times by different empires. The amity 
lines, usually drawn along the Prime Meridian through the Canary Islands, meant that ‘beyond 
the line’ there was no peace, and therefore no need for specifying any boundaries. In particular, 
Spain long insisted on upholding the Treaty of Tordesillas, as this meant that most of the 
American continents would remain Spanish, regardless of any non-Christian powers or any 
Christian settlements founded west of the line of demarcation after 1494. While the line of 
demarcation was only heeded by the Spanish and Portuguese, in only the vaguest way, and no 
attempt to find it on the ground ever took place, it was the only line that had any legitimacy, 
according to Spain and Portugal. During the period of clear Spanish military superiority over 
other European empires, the system of amity lines enabled Spain to enforce this vast claim 
without provoking a legitimate response in Europe. In the seventeenth century, the notion of 
‘no peace beyond the line’ was invoked repeatedly but inconsistently by different powers, 
depending on the context. Thus, while the line of demarcation can in one sense be read as a 
linear border, which could theoretically have been surveyed and implemented, the geopolitical 
order legitimated by the Treaty of Tordesillas, at the same time, precluded any other borders 
from legitimately being drawn. As Lauren Benton has insisted, territoriality in these contexts did 
not correspond to simple coloured areas on maps.100 
 
Moreover, the way in which Native Americans and Europeans adapted to each other’s presence 
meant that in many cases the methods of dividing territory that were called for were closer to 
traditional Indian practices than any linear division. In particular, France relied heavily on 
alliances with Indians, based on the fur trade, to maintain its claims over vast expanses of 
territory beyond its power base in the St Lawrence River Valley. As a result, to a large extent 
French suzerainty coincided with boundaries that Indians understood better than the French, 
who had little reason, or capacity, to interfere with such boundary conceptions. 
 
The first major inter-imperial border in North America fixed as a specific, explicitly described 
geographical line in a European treaty, without passing on the entire process to a commission, 
was the British-French boundary in the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which, ‘In order to re-establish 
peace on solid and durable foundations, and to remove for ever all subject of dispute with regard 
to the limits of the British and French territories on the continent of America’, drew the border 
along the middle of the River Mississippi.101 Following the conclusion of the treaty, the British 
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government immediately set bounds to its new Province of Quebec in the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763. Much of the boundary between Quebec and the Thirteen Colonies consisted of the 45th 
North Parallel, which was surveyed in the early 1770s.102 The Royal Proclamation thus paved the 
way for the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which described the boundaries of the entirety of the newly 
independent United States in what was, for the time, an extraordinary level of detail. In the late 
1790s the boundary between the United States and Spanish Florida was surveyed by Andrew 
Ellicott, who had worked on continuing the Mason-Dixon Line, as well as the Ohio-Pennsylvania 
Line, and on laying out the city of Washington, DC along with Benjamin Banneker.103 
 
In addition to boundaries between European empires, the second half of the eighteenth century 
also witnessed multiple treaties establishing linear borders between settlers and Native 
Americans. Most famously, the 1763 Royal Proclamation reserved for the Native Americans ‘all 
the Lands and Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the 
Sea from the West and North West as aforesaid’.104 While a somewhat vague definition at first, 
the line was, in some significant parts, surveyed and demarcated by a team of British technicians, 
with Native American observers accompanying them and making their own demarcations.105 
Individual colonies also concluded linear boundary agreements with Native American polities 
which were often almost immediately transgressed and renegotiated, but nonetheless surveyed 
and demarcated in much the same way intercolonial boundaries were, despite their frequent 
absence from both contemporary and current maps.106 
 
The territorial practices of European empires in North America, then, were characterized at first 
by vague frontiers, and attempts to agree on boundaries either failed or did not take place. Then, 
around the mid-eighteenth century, there was a rapid shift towards demarcation. The need for 
fixed boundaries was not simply an outcome of settlement in general, but of the particular kind 
of settlement characterizing especially the British colonies, which, as a result of the colonial 
inflection of the enclosure movement, systemically depended on survey rationality. The settlers 
of the Thirteen Colonies, many of whom were quite familiar with the politics of settling 
boundaries by technical means, either because they had direct experience in surveying, or 
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simply because they were landowners in a rapidly expanding settler society, were taking an 
increasingly larger role in negotiations. In particular, with the independence of the Thirteen 
Colonies, negotiations between British settlers and the Crown, which would previously have 
counted as intra-colonial affairs, were now affairs between two sovereign nations. These settlers 
were particularly conscious of the surveying of boundaries because, given their recent arrival, 
this is what secured their right to these lands against squatters, accusations of being squatters 
themselves, and especially against those who already occupied the land beforehand. 
 
The British government, for its part, had its own reasons for shifting towards fixed boundaries. 
After over a century of boundary disputes between the American colonies, it could reasonably 
expect new ones to arise on the Canadian border. The interest of the British government, then, 
was no longer in extending its claim as far to the north as possible, but rather in providing a clear 
and reliable territorial structure which could easily and legitimately resolve disputes. Unlike 
international arbitrations like the one which dealt with the dispute over Acadia’s boundaries, 
which dragged on for years with no resolution, arbitrations between colonies by the Crown were 
much simpler and more likely to return effective results. While New England and Canada were 
under two different crowns, it was typical of the early modern international order in the 
Americas for frontiers to be kept vague. The two empires would make unilateral claims and 
substantiate them with settlements or military occupation. When they were united under the 
British Crown, however, that border became an intercolonial border, and thus it was also typical 
for it to be, just as the other British intercolonial borders tended to be, fixed, surveyed, and 
demarcated.  
 
The French Empire, on the other hand, had maintained its expansive control primarily through 
other means. Compared to the British, the French relied extensively on alliances and hierarchies 
in a network of Native American connections. With a much lower settler population, French 
authorities were less interested in acquiring land for direct use by European settlers, and 
focused more on establishing trading networks. Because the French depended more on already 
existing systems of rule, they had less reason, or ability, to redefine political control by fixing 
linear boundaries, especially at the edges of imperial authority. In this sense, some Native 
Americans may have had a better sense of the boundaries of New France than French authorities 
did. The lines of latitude marking the boundaries between many of the British colonies, which 
extended far beyond actual settlement and even beyond the limits of geographical knowledge, 
would have made little sense in the French context, as future settlement in these areas was not 
imminently anticipated. The dramatic collapse of New France, then, along with that of many of 
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its Native American allies, also contributed to the shift towards fixed boundaries in North 
America, by dealing a substantial blow to resistance against Anglo-American hegemony. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter, in line with recent attempts to theorise the ways in which global modernity and 
international relations emerged out of colonial relations rather than out of the diffusion or 
expansion of structures and practices from one part of the world outwards, has shown how the 
settler colonial context of British North America is key to explaining the emergence of fixed and 
linear borders. Survey rationality, understood as the legibility of both property and territorial 
spaces from a surveyor’s perspective, became a significant societal concern as a result of the 
English enclosure movement just before and during the onset of English settler colonialism in 
North America. But the particular significance that survey rationality took on in the settler 
colonial context meant that it had implications there that it did not have in European 
metropoles. Amidst the uncertainties involved in settlers’ claiming of land, including violent 
conflict with already existing Native American claims to the land, rampant squatting, 
speculation, and fraud, and the difficulty of colonial oversight of the frontier, the practice of 
mathematical surveying was seen as a solution to these problems and thus took on a powerful 
role in society. As a result, inter-colonial borders were fixed and surveyed in a way that they 
were not in other European empires. Moreover, ultimately the borders of the British Empire 
itself began to be precisely delineated, with the independent United States governed in large 
part by a landowning class closely familiar with the practice of surveying land. 
 
The politically transformative implications of surveying practices highlighted here are especially 
relevant today in the context of the global South, in many areas of which land tenures are 
currently being rapidly redistributed.107 In this context, the formalization of customary land 
tenures is not a distant historical legacy but is both an ongoing reality and a major topic of 
scholarly debate. 108  Many have claimed that formalizing property rights, which necessarily 
entails quantitative surveys, can ameliorate some of the world’s worst conditions of poverty. As 
economist Hernando de Soto argues, the poor of the global South experience too little benefit 
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from capitalism because of their unclear property claims: ‘In the West, by contrast, every parcel 
of land, every building, every piece of equipment or store of inventories is recorded in a property 
document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden process that connects all these assets to the 
rest of the economy.’109 A crucial part of this ‘hidden’ process is the commodification of land 
through surveying practices. In the context of the seventeenth-century English countryside, 
many argued that surveys simply allowed landlords to ‘know their own’. Some arguments in 
favour of property formalization today are similar, in that they aim at increases in property 
values emerging from rationally ordered knowledge and measurement of what is thought to 
already exist. As de Soto writes, ‘most of the poor already possess the assets they need to make 
a success of capitalism…But they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on land 
whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded…’ For some surveyors, this has made it 
important to understand the key role that the profession plays in the constitution of land rights 
in the global South and to search for new technologies and techniques, ultimately with the 
intended aim of achieving ‘agricultural growth potential’ and addressing world poverty and 
hunger.110 
 
Critics of large, comprehensive surveying structures have argued that they create a dilemma 
between cost and effectiveness; either surveys will be prohibitively costly for developing 
countries, or they will be inaccurate and proliferate disputes.111 Moreover, it is unclear whether 
the diversity of ‘rights on the ground’ can be integrated into one national framework without 
altering those rights in some way. This chapter sheds new historical light on these issues and 
raises questions for further research. Can mathematical surveys ever simply record ‘what is 
already there’, or does it always involve some kind of dispossession? Can they ever benefit 
subalterns, or do they always result in variations on their historical origins? Whether we analyse 
England, English colonies, or places elsewhere, surveying often involves the imposition of 
formalized, geometric limits where customary boundaries had existed previously, and where the 
precise locations of boundaries had been to some extent left to locals to define in whatever 
workable way they might. Control over the methods and techniques by which boundaries are 
defined, we have seen, is an integral part of the ability to control access to space. Viewed from 
the perspective of international politics, the collapse of any absolute distinction between these 
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two forms of power—the physical means of coercion and the monopolization of the ability to 
make certain forms of geographical measurement and calculation appear unambiguously 
valid—should become as apparent as it was to those who, in many different times and places, 
have resisted the encroachments of surveyors.  
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Chapter Five 
The Logic of ‘Civilization’  
 
 
The logic of private property and the social forces which ensured its expansion make up a 
substantial part of the conditions of possibility for the increasing attempts to make territorial 
boundaries conform to survey rationality since the seventeenth century, not just in the 
Americas. In continental Europe, the rise of the state-controlled cadastre roughly coincided with 
the linearization of territorial borders that became systematic at the post-Napoleonic Congress 
of Vienna and was set in motion by a round of boundary surveys which lasted well into the 
1820s.1 The state cadastral survey extended a not dissimilar logic of control over the countryside 
to that which Anglo-American governments had previously been using, and in so doing, firmed 
up property boundaries in a way that could be useful to international boundary surveyors. 
 
Yet the geometric parcellization of landownership at the turn of the nineteenth century was not 
universalized within the British Empire, let alone outside of it. Agrarian capitalism did not 
transform common-sense spatial practices so radically that other forms of space could not be 
imagined, nor is it a total explanation for the linearization of boundaries. As this chapter will 
show, the agents of European empires continued to participate in the production of spaces in 
the nineteenth century which bore little resemblance to survey rationality. While most of the 
chapter focuses on West Africa, I begin with British India in order to show how the capitalist 
logic of the British East India Company, as it transitioned in the late eighteenth century towards 
extracting wealth directly from land rather than from trade, was at first not enough to force it 
to linearize borders.2  Then, I show how different varieties of colonial spaces continued to 
proliferate in West Africa, and attempts to establish precise territorial boundaries there before 
1870 were almost non-existent. This was because the territorial order of European imperialism 
in the region was based on colonial treaties with local rulers, which developed as institutions 
separately from other contexts. This system, which generally did not involve precise borders, 
made attempts to linearize borders largely unnecessary, and as long as it held together, the 
reasons for avoiding fixed boundaries tended to outweigh the reasons in favour of linearization. 
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Early signs of change in this system can be seen in the 1860s and 1870s as territorial disputes of 
European officials and merchants became more prominent, but only in the 1880s did a new 
system of inter-imperial linear boundaries begin to replace the old system.  
 
The central argument of this chapter is that in order to explain the linearization of borders in 
West Africa, and to some extent the universalization of linear borders more generally as it 
crystallized in the late nineteenth century, the key is to understand ordering practices 
increasingly based on the idea of ‘civilization’. It was this idea which came to be articulated with 
survey rationality by the end of the nineteenth century. Imperial officials had long been making 
treaties with local rulers and recognized these treaties as evidence of territorial claims. Within 
the political context of early nineteenth-century West Africa, this system suited the colonial 
powers well enough, and the natural law tradition had provided a useful theoretical 
rationalization for the contracting of treaties with non-Christian polities. However, certain 
discourses, such as international law and social theory, during the nineteenth century came to 
be concerned in new ways with the boundaries of ‘civilization’, and with determining criteria for 
membership in a community of nations. These concerns were influential enough in nineteenth-
century European societies that they altered the background knowledge and assumptions of 
imperial officials and brought about a shift in the practices of European empires towards linear 
borders. 
 
The logic of ‘civilization’ sharply distinguished between two levels of intersocietal relations, on 
one hand relations between the colonial powers and colonized, or not-yet-colonized peoples, 
and on the other hand between the colonial powers themselves. On the first level, colonial 
difference, especially in the context of West Africa, was imagined to be so great that colonial 
treaties were seen as inherently suspect, no matter how morally or practically necessary they 
remained. As the organization of society on a territorial basis became one of the criteria for 
‘civilization’, the customary recourse to territorially ambiguous colonial treaties became less 
satisfying for officials attempting to resolve disputes. On the inter-imperial level, the idea of 
progress in the ordering of this community of nations contributed to more ambitious attempts 
to control violence between empires. The civilizing mission gave the colonial powers the 
ideology of a common purpose, legitimating the colonization of Africa on the basis of their 
assumed ability to handle a mass land-appropriation in an orderly fashion. But beyond the realm 
of moralizing rhetoric, which can potentially be misleading, the acceptance of the idea of 
‘civilization’ also created the perception that dangerous warfare had to be avoided, whether for 
moral or for selfish reasons, through inter-imperial agreements, rather than maintaining the 
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existing treaty system or by simply claiming as much territory as possible. As a result of all these 
aspects of the concept of ‘civilization’, the legitimacy and efficacy of African colonial treaties 
increasingly came into question, and in turn so did the basis of the older, non-linear colonial 
territorial order.  
 
This chapter, then, moves from a focus on survey rationality’s articulation with a sixteenth-
century rationality of private landownership towards its articulation with a nineteenth-century 
rationality of civilization. More than questions of efficiency, settlement, and productivity, this 
chapter reveals questions of sovereignty, international order, and social evolution which have 
been central, implicitly or explicitly, in many efforts to linearize borders since the nineteenth 
century. This is not to imply that these two sets of considerations are in any sense mutually 
exclusive, or that they did not in many cases follow from one another. Indeed, Anglo-American 
settlers often pointed to their better uses of the land as a justification for their colonial 
expansion, and that Native American land usage was evidence of an inferior civilization. 
Moreover, conceptions of private property were in some ways integral to colonialism in West 
Africa.3 But in the context of the linearization of boundaries private property, strictly speaking, 
is only part of the story. In the landed settler colonialism of Anglo-America or the tax system of 
the East India Company after it became a large territorial entity, the economic basis of 
colonialism was tied to parcels of land, of which it was important for the imperial power to know 
the value or productive potential. But colonialism in much of Africa did not operate this way, 
being based instead on customs revenue from trade. Nevertheless, linear boundaries eventually 
became a universal expectation of territorial claims, regardless of the system of landownership 
in operation within a claimed territory. Understanding how the linear bounding of territorial 
claims came to be part of what it meant to act as a member of the club of civilized nations moves 
us beyond the specificity of regimes of surveyed private property towards understanding the 
emergence of a more universalizing system of territorial boundaries. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine the linearization of borders in British India, in 
order to show how a profit-maximizing capitalist enterprise did not necessarily lead immediately 
to linear borders, and that some other explanation is needed. I then record the history of colonial 
and inter-imperial treaties made by Western empires in Africa up to 1884, in order to show a 
distinction between the linearization of boundaries and the onset of the ‘scramble for Africa’. 
Then I move towards explaining this process of linearization by contextualizing it within the 
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emergence of a profession of international law. I show the implications of these growing 
conceptions of a ‘civilized’ family of nations on the linearization of borders globally in the 
nineteenth century. Finally, I examine the delegitimation of the colonial treaty system as a basis 
for territorial order and the emergence of inter-imperial boundary treaties. 
 
 
British India 
 
South Asian politics before European colonialism was based to a large extent on territorial rule, 
and although there was a substantial degree of variation, a rich vocabulary of geographical 
concepts had meaning across the region. Yet as detailed and formalized as territorial knowledge 
may have been in Mughal imperial records, territories were not generally defined with linear 
borders but rather as lists of places, much like Europe at the time. This section first describes 
the process by which British India transitioned over time towards linear borders. It then argues 
that, while the framework of the previous chapter, based on an analysis of agrarian capitalism, 
may be useful to some extent, it is not sufficient for explaining the process. In particular, this is 
because in contrast to the Anglo-American private property regime, British East India Company 
initially tried to rule within pre-existing territorial logics, despite its capitalist disposition. 
 
 
Gradual Linearization of Borders in British India, 1757-c.1900 
 
At first, as the Company transitioned from its earlier role as a trading empire with coastal bases 
towards its role as a major land power, it appropriated territorial concepts existing in the places 
of its expansion. Within this field of concepts, the precise locations of the boundaries of 
territories was not as important as the various different kinds of titles that could be possessed. 
Following the pivotal 1757 Battle of Plassey, the following was declared in a treaty between the 
Company and the Nawab of Bengal: 
 
All the land lying to the south of Calcutta, as far as Culpee, shall be under the Zemindarry of the 
English Company; and all the Officers of those parts shall be under their jurisdiction. The revenues 
to be paid by them (the Company) in the same manner with other Zemindars.4  
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This meant that the Company now had the right to collect taxes in that area, according to the 
zamindar system established by the Mughal Empire. The area, however, still formed a part of 
the province of Bengal, ruled by the Nawab, which was in turn nominally a part of the Mughal 
Empire. The treaty itself did not specify the territory in question any further than ‘to the south 
of Calcutta, as far as Culpee’. A subsequent order by the Nawab of Bengal did list twenty-four 
parganas, or districts, to be transferred to the Company, but it also noted that whatever part of 
these districts ‘may be situated to the west of Calcutta, on the other side of the Ganges, does 
not appertain to the Company’.5 Likewise, when the Company acquired a greatly expanded 
territorial reach in the 1765 Treaty of Allahabad, this was done by a firman of the Mughal 
Emperor granting the Company diwani rights over the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, 
which had a specific meaning within existing revenue collection structures. 
 
These revenue collection structures usually consisted officially of lists and tables, sometimes 
long and complex.6 Boundaries did not usually appear on maps, which were likely instead to 
show rights of rulers or landowners appertaining to towns and villages in other ways. In these 
systems, local landowners had a great deal of freedom to modify records and manipulate the 
arrangement of lands based on local politics. Moreover, in areas which periodically fell in and 
out of cultivation, some lands were not counted in records while they were temporarily not used 
for agriculture.7 These holdings were liable to reappear later as cultivated land within a unit of 
revenue collection different from the ones they had appeared in previously. At the time of the 
British East India Company’s entrance into South Asian territorial politics, then, pre-existing 
linear borders easily recognizable to them generally did not exist, a situation the British Empire 
had also found itself in previously in North America. Parganas shifted around constantly, and 
rarely formed compact, contiguous areas. Some were little more than lists of widely dispersed 
villages. Yet unlike British North America, the British East India Company at first attempted to 
base its territorial claims on existing units such as provinces and parganas regardless of the fact 
that they were not organized on the basis of linear borders, and instead officials had to rely on 
locals for information. 
 
Attempts to linearize borders began somewhat modestly. As early as 1792, in a treaty by which 
Mysore ceded territory to the Company, while the usual list of districts was specified, the list 
was accompanied by a clause which would consolidate the respective territories into more 
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coherent areas. It stated that any part of these districts northeast of the river Cavery would 
belong to the Company, and any part to the southwest should be returned to Mysore, ‘in 
exchange for others of equal value’.8 In the next treaty with Mysore, in 1799, a similar provision 
was given, but instead of specifying a particular dividing line, it simply required an exchange of 
territories and an explanation; as some of the newly ceded districts were ‘inconveniently 
situated, with a view to the proper connection of their respective lines of frontier’, the 
contracting parties would ‘proceed to such an adjustment by means of exchanges or otherwise, 
as shall be best suited to the occasion’. Likewise in the 1802 Treaty of Bassein between the East 
India Company and the Maratha Empire, the following clause was included: 
 
As it may be found that certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing Article to the Honorable 
Company may be inconvenient from their situation, His Highness Rao Pundit Purdhan Behauder, 
for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the Honorable Company’s possession a good and 
well-defined one, agrees that such exchanges of talooks or lands shall be made hereafter, on terms 
of a fair valuation of their respective revenues, as the completion of the said purpose may require.9 
 
This same clause was also included again in 1817, word for word, in a subsequent treaty between 
the same parties.10 In these early decades of British territorial rule in the South Asian interior, 
then, the Company was clearly concerned with maintaining territorial contiguity in a way that 
the rulers it was displacing had not been. The apparent confusion of territorial units resulted, 
for Company officials, in a kind of ‘cartographic anxiety’.11 A new normative standard was being 
applied to Indian political geography, from the perspective of a bird’s-eye view.12 
 
At the same time, these clauses avoided specifying a particular boundary, which was left open 
for future officers to construct in an ad hoc way. In fact, actual descriptions of borders in these 
treaties were still relatively schematic in comparison to the very detailed border negotiations 
taking place concurrently between Britain and the United States. While territorial contiguity was 
desired since not long after 1765, then, precise boundaries specified in treaties did not appear 
until later, and instead older boundaries persisted but in a form modified to fit British ideas of 
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how territories should be shaped. A rationalizing system of territorial order not involving the 
specification of boundaries in treaty texts, or at least the beginnings of one, can be seen here. 
This would seem to indicate that the goal of bundling tracts of land together, while in a certain 
sense creating linear boundaries, was at the same time different from the survey rationality of 
Anglo-America. The Company could have attempted a radically new geographical logic, as the 
British did in North America, through a combination of mostly rivers and astronomical lines, at 
least in its directly ruled territories, if not also over its sphere of influence generally. If precision 
and the avoidance of future boundary disputes had been the priority, or if ideas had been 
directly applied from North America, this might have been the case. But the Company instead 
attempted to rule through geographical institutions with pre-existing legitimacy, at the same 
time as it rationalized boundaries in a certain way.  
 
In the mid-nineteenth century a particular style of boundary formulation was introduced, 
consisting essentially of ‘north’, ‘west’, ‘south’, and ‘east’ portions, could eventually become 
very detailed, but were not necessarily so. To take one example, a schedule of territory attached 
to an 1819 treaty declared that ‘The frontier extends from the Kistna and Warna on the south, 
to the Neera and Beema on the north, and from the western ghauts, or Syadree Hills on the 
west, to the districts of Punderpore and Beejapore on the east’.13 Yet it also included a far more 
detailed list of lands to make up the state of Satara, at the level of villages and ‘half-villages’, 
suggesting that the description of the frontier was meant primarily to give a general idea of the 
geography, and that any future boundary dispute would have to be solved in reference to the 
lists of villages. 
 
Then, only in the late nineteenth century do treaties show descriptions of boundary lines as 
extensive and detailed as the following: 
 
South. — From pillar No. 1 at the junction of the Khunigadh stream, with the Tons river, up the said 
stream, there forming the boundary of the Jaunsar-Bawar pargana of the Dehra Dun district, to 
pillar No. 2 at a point where two main valleys coming from the Ringali peak meet…then up that 
stream to its source on the main ridge at Suranukiser, pillar No. 14 ; then along the main ridge 
being the water parting between the Tons and Jumna rivers through pillars Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24 to pillar No. 26 at Saloglani…14 
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The description continued similarly through east, north, and west, all the way to pillar 193 before 
arriving back at pillar 1. The boundaries between British India and the Portuguese colonies of 
Daman and Diu seem to have been first determined and demarcated in 1859.15 Likewise, in 1853 
British India determined its borders with the French colony of Chandernagore in Bengal.16 
 
In sum, borders in British India were gradually linearized over the course of the late eighteenth 
to the late nineteenth centuries. At first, treaties between the East India Company and Indian 
rulers appropriated territorial concepts from the South Asian context, and did not mention 
borders as lines. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, the treaties began attempting to 
consolidate territories into contiguous and stable wholes where possible. Finally, by the mid- to 
late nineteenth century, they included detailed descriptions of borderlines, at the level of 
individual boundary markers. 
 
 
Profit Maximization as Insufficient for Linearization 
 
This long, gradual transition towards linear borders did not play out in entirely the same way as 
in North America in the previous chapter. Yet this is not because of an absence of a similar 
motive towards maximizing profit by stabilizing property rights through surveys, nor because of 
an absence of such technology. As in North America, the idea of ‘improvement’ loomed large in 
the minds of Company officials. While the wealth to be gained by the Company would leave 
India rather than enriching a local settler population, the set of economic ideas the British took 
with them to India was not too different from those that emerged from colonialism in North 
America.  
 
From the beginning of the Company’s territorial rule, officials were uncomfortable with a 
geographical order that could not be expressed in terms of linear borders. The most immediate 
problems for the Company upon achieving diwani rights had to do firstly with stabilizing its new 
revenues, particularly in the aftermath of a great famine of 1769 to 1773, and secondly with 
maintaining its legitimacy in London, where it was accused of exploiting the East Indies at a 
criminal level.17 The key to both of these, it seemed, was in finding the right levels of taxation, 
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which in turn required knowledge of ‘the real value of the lands’. The unfamiliar geography of 
the parganas made this a frustrating task for some, and just as the unsurveyed landscape of 
England had in the sixteenth century, signalled that land was being ‘secreted’, or unreported, to 
avoid paying revenues to the Company. As the revenue collector for Chittagong wrote to the 
Company leadership, insisting on the need for more direct oversight of revenue collection, 
 
In the confused and disjoined state of the Chittagong lands not a chakla or pargana stood 
entire…with the districts of one man in five or six, perhaps more, places, it must have been utterly 
impossible for any Collector whatever to ascertain the true and real collection of any one 
zamindar’s district or parganah…The point Government has not hitherto gained is a knowledge of 
the actual collections from the ryots throughout the Province, and how much they exceed the 
established one paid to Government. By such information only of the abilities of the tenants, 
assessments can be formed with precision and equity. The secreted lands are, without a doubt, 
considerable, and are, in fact, the lands of the State.18 
 
But the Company did not trust landowners to accurately and impartially give up this information, 
suspecting them of fraud and rack-renting. In this context it brought about the Permanent 
Settlement, whereby taxes first in Bengal, and later in other provinces, would be fixed in 
perpetuity. According to historian John McLane, ‘a permanent tax was a fiscal oddity, born of 
perplexity and frustration’, much of which came from the inability to comprehend the non-linear 
boundaries of land holdings.19 
 
The alternative to fixing taxes, according to Company discussions, would have been detailed 
revenue surveys which would bypass local knowledge and learn directly the ‘true’ value of the 
land. Revenue surveys would have, and eventually did, give the Company the ability to abstract 
polities and other geographical units from local particularities and understand them instead in 
terms of abstract space divided into distinct areas by abstract points and lines. But surveys are 
intrusive practices which create expectations that something will be done with the information 
collected and often generate opposition or resistance from those affected by the measurement 
of land. English landowners already understood this before the East India Company took on 
territorial administration. While there was not yet a systematic approach to surveys, they were 
occasionally done ad hoc by some officials on their own initiative. The Company’s Council 
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learned of one such survey in 1775 from a group of angry inhabitants of Dacca who insisted that 
their land was granted by the Mughal emperor Akbar and that they did not owe anyone and had 
never paid taxes to any government.20 As a result of experiences like this, the Company was 
under no illusions that surveys allowed them to see the land without being seen, as if they had 
access to a kind of panopticon. A general programme of topographical surveys could have been 
organized, along the lines of the British Ordnance Survey, which began in 1791, but in India this 
was considered impractical. The Permanent Settlement, then, provided a solution to the 
problem of how to use European principles of administration without necessitating the kind of 
detailed topographical knowledge which was coming to be taken for granted in Europe.21 
 
The Permanent Settlement, on one hand, is incomprehensible except in terms of eighteenth-
century European ideas of agricultural production. It depended particularly on the principles of 
physiocracy, the idea that land was the fundamental source of economic value, logically prior to 
all else. Yet on the other hand, although it did not survive long before it was modified, it was a 
clear alternative to the linearization of borders. Because taxes were simply fixed, there was a 
limit to how detailed the information about the land needed by the Company would be, and 
thus a limit to the utility of the extensive topographical surveys. This was by design, as part of 
the reason for implementing the Permanent Settlement was the political and technical difficulty 
of carrying out the surveys that would be necessary for linearizing borders. 
 
At the same time, this information was still thought necessary, and increasingly so. The 
decentralized decision-making of the Company’s surveying activities meant that while it took 
many decades of effort for proponents of a massive, expensive project such as the Great 
Trigonometrical Survey of India to secure approval for it, local officers in some places could still 
carry out smaller-scale topographical surveys on their own initiative when they thought it 
necessary, despite some high-level officials who discouraged them. 22  Regulation 7 of 1822 
represented a turning point at a higher level, as it ordered detailed cadastral surveys for the 
whole of Bengal and the Northwest Provinces for the first time. Maintaining fixed revenue rates 
without periodic adjustments on the basis of information gathered through surveys, it seemed, 
was untenable in the long run. By 1855 the pargana was abandoned as the basic unit of the 
revenue surveys, in favour of the ‘main circuit’, which would not have complex boundaries. This 
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would allow surveyors to first mark off a main circuit, and then proceed to determine individual 
village boundaries, according to the principle that ‘all survey operations work should always be 
carried on from whole to part, and never from part to whole’.23 
 
In the end, the logic of agrarian capitalism likely played some role in moving British India towards 
linear borders, through the imperative to know the ‘real value of the land’. But this did not 
involve simply transposing an already developed system from one place to another, in the way 
that the colonization of Australia began in the late eighteenth century largely with private settler 
ownership based on surveys already in mind.24 Instead it was a slow, protracted transition, with 
the Permanent Settlement along the way representing a possible alternative system of 
maintaining the profit-making functions of the East India Company without undertaking 
extensive surveys. In North America, the surveying process was largely conducted by settlers, 
and came to be accepted by many as a necessary part of owning land, with earlier Native 
American landownership being erased, whereas the East India Company had to work from 
within and modify existing structures in the absence of settlers. Political and technical difficulties 
of extensive surveying, such as resistance to surveying, and the need for the Company itself to 
finance and carry out the surveys, were encountered much more heavily here. The Permanent 
Settlement is thus important to take into account alongside the substantially different kind of 
agricultural capitalism we saw in the previous chapter. It was the Permanent Settlement which, 
albeit temporarily, made it possible to maintain the profit-making functions of the East India 
Company without immediately undertaking extensive surveys. 
 
If agrarian capitalism of certain kinds could be formulated without the necessity of linear 
borders, then, how did linear borders become globalized, and why were alternatives not 
pursued for longer? The remainder of this chapter takes up this question, with West Africa at 
the centre of analysis. It argues that the notion of ‘civilization’ and its articulation with survey 
rationality, separately from capitalism, provides a useful answer. 
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The Linearization of Borders in West Africa 
 
Until the late nineteenth century, the spatial extent of European empires on the east and west 
coasts of Africa found expression more often in treaties between European empires and African 
states than in treaties among European empires. They varied significantly over time and space, 
following no particular overarching pattern. In some cases, they became more precise over time, 
but others remained vague definitions throughout. What did change, however, were treaties 
between European empires, which at the beginning of the century were very rare, and where 
they did exist were quite vague, but in the later part of the century became more frequent, and 
by the end of the century became dramatically more precise and detailed. This section gives an 
overview of the dynamics of treaty-making in West African colonies in this period, before later 
sections go on to explain and make sense of them. The important point here is that the shift 
towards linearization is related to but not reducible to colonial expansion after the Berlin West 
Africa Conference of 1884. 
 
Treaties between European empires before the late nineteenth century, where they existed at 
all, tended to conceive of places such as forts, and were traded between empires as such. For 
example, in the 1667 Treaty of The Hague, Sweden ceded to the Netherlands 
 
all right, possession, actions, and pretensions, that his Sacred Royal Majesty of Sweden, or his 
Swedish-African Company, either actually had, or thought they had, in the fortress situated on the 
promontory called Cabo Corso, and every right derived therefrom, and all the rest of the fortresses 
and magazines in Guinea on the African coast, with all the rights dependent thereupon…25 
 
Boundaries of European holdings in West Africa were rarely mentioned, if ever. In a 1641 Dutch-
Portuguese Treaty of The Hague a reason for the lack of inter-imperial boundaries was even 
stated explicitly: 
 
All that which the Portuguese and the subjects of these Provinces possess on the coasts of Africa 
needs no delimitation, since there are various peoples and nations between them who determine 
and form the limits.26 
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As late as 1850 this format can be seen in a transfer of the Danish Gold Coast to Britain: 
 
His Danish Majesty cedes to Her Britannic Majesty…all the forts belonging to the Crown of 
Denmark, which are situated on that part of the coast of Africa called the Gold Coast or the Coast 
of Guinea, and which comprise Fort Christianborg, Fort Augustaborg, Fort Fredensborg, Fort 
Kongensteen, and Fort Prindsensteen…together with all other possessions, property, and 
territorial rights whatever belonging to His Danish Majesty on the said coast.27 
 
For a better idea of the extent of these relatively small territories on the coast before 1880, one 
would more likely refer to treaties negotiated between European empires and African states. 
These treaties exhibit a considerable amount of variety, probably depending on the particular 
individuals involved in negotiating them. Colonial officials are unlikely to have possessed a great 
deal of legal knowledge. Yet it is possible to distinguish broadly between two types, one of which 
gave some description of the territory to be handed over, and some simply handed over all the 
territory belonging to the African polity. Some correlation can be found with particular colonies.  
 
The more descriptive type of treaty can often be found with the British colony of Sierra Leone. 
British treaties with rulers in Sierra Leone during this period used various methods of 
geographical distinction, not necessarily referring to borders as lines, but also not necessarily 
relying on pre-existing territorial systems as much as in India. A 1788 treaty gave to the colony 
‘all the land, wood, water, &c., which are now contained from…St. George’s Bay, coastwise up 
the river Sierra Leone to Gambia Island, and southerly or inland from the river side, 20 miles.28 
Place-names taken from European languages such as St. George’s Bay and Sierra Leone, and the 
absence of references to any pre-existing political entities in the geographical description would 
indicate the inscription of a new geographic order over the area. At the same time, the treaty 
lacked an explicit reference to any kind of line circumscribing this territory. This was a common 
format, in identifying two points on a coast or a river and indicating a certain depth inland but 
not referring to a line. At this stage, it was not always clear how precise this measure of depth 
was intended to be. Similarly, an 1807 treaty granted ‘all the right, power, possessions of every 
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sort and kind in the peninsula of Sierra Leone and its dependencies’, without clarifying where the 
beginning of the peninsula was considered to be, or where its dependencies were.29 
 
Another format used, more similar to patterns seen at the same time in British India, was to 
name kingdoms being absorbed into the colony. In 1825 the governor-general of Sierra Leone 
issued a proclamation that possession of the Sherbro and Yacomba kingdoms ‘has been by us 
taken in the name of and on behalf of His Majesty, and that the same, by virtue of the powers 
in us vested, are constituted an integral part of the colony of Sierra Leone’.30 
 
As Sierra Leone expanded, these kinds of territorial claims continued, but some became 
increasingly detailed. For example, one 1872 treaty to which a map was attached provisionally 
retroceded to the Quiah kingdom 
 
that portion of British Quiah bounded as follows: commencing at the entrance of Bance Creek, 
thence following the creek at Ro Bruce River to the north of the town of Madonkia, thence in a 
straight line along the proposed road marked A B by Songo Town to the point marked C on Songo 
Town Creek, thence following the original boundary to a point marked D on Quiah Creek and 
thence following the course of the creek and the banks of Sierra Leone River to the point of 
commencement…31 
 
British rule in Sierra Leone in most of the nineteenth century, then, was characterized by a mix 
of more or less brief descriptions of geographical features of the territory without necessarily 
focusing on bounding it in every direction, although with some increasing attempts to specify 
linear boundaries towards the later part of the century. 
 
On the Gold Coast, British treaties with West African states and rulers exhibited a different 
pattern. Until 1874, unlike in Sierra Leone, British rule in the Gold Coast outside its coastal forts 
was informal, yet this does not mean it did not exist as a kind of territory. Three regional treaties, 
in 1831, 1844, and 1852, established different aspects of a British protectorate over specified 
coastal leaders, including taxation and British jurisdiction over certain crimes.32 While these 
treaties may show continued dominance over local affairs to be held by the African rulers 
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involved, British officials clearly believed the Gold Coast to be a part of their dominion and the 
local people to be British subjects, regardless of the fact that no linear borders were established 
until the late nineteenth century. After the Gold Coast Colony was established in 1874, the 
British began to formalize its territory, but this still did not always entail specific borders. One 
1879 treaty recognized British ‘territorial jurisdiction’ over simply ‘the seaboard of Agbosomé 
for two miles from the high-water mark inland’, and an 1886 treaty ceded to Britain ‘The country 
and territory of Aquamoo’, without specifying further.33 
 
French treaties with West African states were, on the whole, even less geographically precise 
than British treaties. For example, in an 1821 treaty with the King of Brackna, the latter agreed 
to give to the French representative ‘all the terrain which he judges convenient to build 
dwellings and grow longan trees’ and also allowed the French to ‘build forts or batteries for the 
defence and protection of the dwellings and longan trees that might grow thereafter’.34 The 
dimensions of the area might be even be specified more precisely than the location, suggesting 
closer similarity to a plot of private property than sovereignty, as follows: ‘The King of 
Boud’hié…cedes in full ownership to the King of the French a site situated to the south of the 
village of Segiou along the river, descending it for 250 metres, with a depth towards the interior 
of 100 metres’.35  Indeed, at this point it is not clear whether property or sovereignty was 
transferred in these treaties, as sometimes treaties suggesting landownership rather than 
sovereignty were later reinterpreted as granting sovereignty, and sometimes they explicitly 
referred to both ‘full ownership and sovereignty’.36 The distinction between the two was porous, 
and the authors of the treaties themselves often did not understand the legal subtleties 
involved. But as treaties later in the century began ensuring explicitly that sovereignty was being 
transferred to France, there was no general increase in their precision or linearity. In 1886 a 
treaty of territorial cession on the Ivory Coast could look much the same as treaties in earlier 
decades: ‘the full and entire sovereignty of the country of Dabou, which extends from the right 
bank of the river Aebi to the country of Bouboury and the territories which depend on it, is ceded 
to the French Republic’.37 
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Treaties between European powers, however, took a radically different turn in the late 
nineteenth century, towards conterminous territories divided by lines specified in treaty texts, 
attempting increasingly scientific precision. In West Africa, the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1867 could 
be regarded as a first step in this direction.38 Whereas before, the British and Dutch had owned 
multiple coastal forts scattered across the Gold Coast, they agreed in this treaty to exchange 
them such that the boundary between them would be ‘a line drawn true north from the centre 
of the mouth of the Sweet River, where their respective territories are conterminous’, allowing 
for deviations ‘as shall be necessary to retain within British territory any villages which have 
been in habitual dependence on the British Government’, and vice-versa for Dutch 
dependencies. This implied that areas under British influence according to the treaties of 1831, 
1844, and 1852 counted as ‘British territory’ and established only a western boundary on them. 
 
In 1882 the British and French made their first treaty of territorial partition in West Africa, on 
the northern border of Sierra Leone. 39  It left the specifics in the hands of a boundary 
commission, but made clear that Britain was to have ‘complete control’ over the Scarcies River, 
and France over the Mellicourie River. It said nothing about the boundary past the sources of 
these rivers. In 1889 this was replaced by a general Anglo-French partition of West Africa. 
Compared to the treaties through which Sierra Leone and Gold Coast annexed neighbouring 
territories, it was relatively detailed. For example, 
 
To the north of Sierra Leone, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1882, the line of 
demarcation, after having divided the basin of the Mellicourie from that of the Great Scarcies, shall 
pass between Bennah and Tambakka, leaving Talla to England and Tamisso to France, and shall 
approach the 10th degree of latitude, including in the French zone the country of the Houbbous, 
and in the English zone Soulimaniah and Falabah.40 
 
Moreover, this was accompanied by an appendix which gave line-by-line interpretations, 
ensuring, for example, that ‘the expression “the line of demarcation shall pass between Bennah 
and Tambakka” shall be taken literally’.41 Afterwards, however, the line simply stopped at a 
point with given latitude and longitude. A further agreement, then, followed in 1895 which 
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continued the line but also qualitatively represented another great increase in detail, beginning, 
‘The boundary starts from a point on the Atlantic coast north-west of the village of Kiragba, 
where a circle of 500 metres radius, described from the centre of the village, cuts the high-water 
mark’.42 The boundary commissioners then made an even more detailed description of the 
boundary, having demarcated it. The line was split into four sections, and each of the four 
sections was made up of 66, 21, 8, and 89 beacons, respectively, the location of each of which 
was meticulously noted, with a few exceptions. 
 
These types of boundaries, which were carefully surveyed, became common throughout the 
African continent, in a process which was set in motion during the 1880s. Broadly speaking, then, 
we see a sudden change from European empires relying on treaties with African polities to 
define their territorial extent in a number of different ways with varying degrees of linearity, 
towards surveyed inter-imperial boundaries with strict linear definitions. 
 
What could have been behind this dramatic change from simply mentioning names of forts to 
be exchanged, as late as 1850, to the need for boundary agreements individually locating 
hundreds of territorial markers, before the end of the century? Changes in territorial practices, 
of one kind or another, may have been inevitable as a result of the larger transformations of 
European colonialism, particularly but not only in Africa, in the 1880s and 1890s. Whereas West 
African colonies had previously confined their direct influence closely to the coastline, the 
colonial powers in the later decades of the century became more willing to take on more 
extensive commitments. Explaining these transformations has been the subject of extensive 
historical debate elsewhere. According to one influential account, for example, the shift was 
triggered in large part by national movements of the 1880s in Ireland, Egypt, and South Africa, 
each key strategic locations of the British Empire, and the interventions launched in response.43 
 
No doubt the projection of direct imperial influence far from coastal regions contributed to the 
shift in territorial practices. However, the move towards boundary demarcation did not quite 
occur simultaneously. Serious Anglo-French conversations about a rationalization of their 
territorial arrangements in West Africa were well underway in the 1870s, at which point a total 
partition of the African continent was still hardly thinkable. Both British and French officials were 
already discussing proposals by the early 1860s, particularly for Britain to give up the mouth of 
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the Gambia River in exchange for compensation elsewhere, as this British colony was 
surrounded by French influence. 44 At that point reasons against giving up existing colonies were 
at that point too strong, but in 1870, a British proposal was sent to France for a northward 
expansion of Sierra Leone to the Dembia River, in exchange for abandoning all claims north of 
that, including the Gambia. This proposal would have had good chances of going through, had it 
not been for a small but considerable lobby of Gambia merchants protesting, among other 
things, that British subjects should not be placed under French rule against their will. The 
agreement, if passed, could have looked much like the Anglo-Dutch agreement of 1867, starting 
at a particular point on the coastline and following a compass direction inland, without any 
particular endpoint. After another abortive attempt in the mid-1870s, what finally led to a 
limited boundary agreement was a series of local escalations which threatened to turn violent 
in the debatable area between Sierra Leone and Senegal. While France would have preferred a 
comprehensive agreement along the lines of the previously proposed exchanges of colonies, 
Britain insisted on limiting the agreement to a formalization of existing arrangements.45 In the 
early 1880s the conventional British imperial policy of avoiding territorial expansion still applied, 
and grand schemes of exchange seemed to imply too much annexation.  
 
The 1882 Anglo-French convention, then, which was the first step towards further definitions of 
Anglo-French boundaries in West Africa, was not the same as the later annexationism that 
characterized both French and British colonial policies. The process of linearizing inter-imperial 
boundaries was already showing early signs before the weight of British and French policy was 
behind territorial expansion. Particularly for British officials, boundary negotiations with the 
French, into the 1880s, were more often about consolidating and simplifying territories than 
expanding them. In order to explain this process, then, we cannot simply refer to the ‘Scramble 
for Africa’ as a self-evident starting point, or look just at the geopolitical factors that caused it, 
but we must look at the wider context of how the relationship between territoriality and society 
were understood by those conducting territorial agreements. In the next section, then, I look at 
this question from the perspective of international law. 
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‘Civilized’ Land-Appropriation: Social Theory and the Emerging International Legal Profession 
 
In the previous chapter the discussion of linear boundaries has dealt mostly with the 
technological aspects of borders and the politics surrounding them. International law was not a 
primary factor in the scaling up of private property boundaries, as it proceeded first through 
layers of intra-imperial governance, within which an imperial Crown remained the arbiter. In 
nineteenth-century colonialism in Africa, however, international law played a greater role, with 
the colonial powers using it to portray themselves as civilized and orderly, not only in dealings 
with colonized peoples, but particularly in their dealings with each other. This section discusses 
the way in which linear borders came to be articulated with that vision of civilization, in legal, 
social-theoretical, and geographical discourses. 
 
Fairness and legality in dealing with native peoples had been strategically performed by 
European empires previously in the colonization of the Americas, but in nineteenth-century 
Africa inter-imperial agreements began to take on a larger importance, along with changes in 
the scope and significance of what Western empires considered ‘civilization’. If Carl Schmitt was 
right that the purpose of amity lines had been to uphold a peace within Europe unencumbered 
by what might happen between imperial agents far from metropolitan control, that system was 
reversed in the late nineteenth century for exactly the same purpose.46 In order to prevent 
colonial conflicts from becoming European conflicts, rather than agreeing to cast a blind eye on 
the periphery, the imperial powers insisted on the exact opposite: precise lines demarcating 
their respective spheres. Thus the argument here is not that the imperial powers sought to 
adhere to international law more closely in the nineteenth century, and thus more precise 
boundaries were drawn. Rather, it is that through changes in the basis of international law itself 
we can see how notions of civilization shaped both the moral and the strategic field within which 
European empires contended for colonies in Africa. ‘Civilization’ was, of course, used as an 
excuse for one of the largest and most rapid land-appropriations in history, and thus in order to 
be legitimate, it had to appear as an orderly process without violence between those partaking 
in it. But more fundamentally than that, insofar as the superiority of Western institutions was 
taken for granted, it created the perception that such a ‘civilized’ cooperation, even in the 
limited form of agreeing on how to divide spoils, was possible in the first place and could limit 
great power warfare. Through the 1880s, the colonial powers were hesitating to draw lines on 
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maps through areas they knew little about, but the idea of ‘civilization’ gave them the 
confidence to do so anyway. 
 
For British international lawyers of the late nineteenth century, civilization and law were not 
simply related but in fact the two concepts verged on becoming identical.47 Legal positivism and 
the increasingly popular idea that law, strictly speaking, could only come from an authority 
capable of enforcing it, was profoundly threatening to the existence of international law, 
especially through the work of John Austin and JS Mill, who did not regard international law as 
really ‘law’. But the one concept that late nineteenth century scholars found most useful for 
grounding international law was civilization. Unlike religion or what had previously been known 
as natural law, civilization did not appear to contradict the scientistic aspirations of scholars of 
the time. At first, then, there were attempts such as William Whewell’s to study morality 
through the natural sciences. But it was the theory of evolution, through the work of natural 
scientists such as Charles Darwin, and social theorists such as Auguste Comte and Herbert 
Spencer, which made possible a more durable grounding for empirical study. By demonstrating 
through historical research that human societies developed a greater sense of order and 
rationality over time, it could be proven scientifically that international law had the potential to 
develop, as long as it could be argued that it was still in a very early stage at the time. 
 
Inspired by the German Historical School of jurists, and their argument that law was not simply 
derived from reason but changed with historical and local circumstances, legal evolutionism 
found its way into international law through the work of Henry Sumner Maine. In a study of 
Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relations to Modern Ideas, 
Maine theorized that law tends to evolve through stages from status, myth, and fiction towards 
contract, codification, and written law. International law was like ancient law, in some respects 
admirable, but at the same time unhistorical and a priori, which to a Victorian audience meant 
it needed to be reformed. The optimism of legal evolutionism made it possible to juxtapose a 
positivist approach to law with a respectable, scientific study of international law; nations still 
went to war with each other, but if private war had successfully been abolished by the law of 
the sovereign state, perhaps international war could be abolished too someday through 
international law. 
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This vision began to materialize in practice in the 1870s, with the beginnings of an identifiable 
profession of international law.48 Germany and Italy achieved national unification, and it seemed 
international society was also coming together with the first meeting of the Institut de Droit 
International in Ghent in 1873, which was called ‘the legal consciousness of the civilized world’ 
and is usually referred to as the first modern professional association of international lawyers.49 
Displaying the influence of the Historical School, these jurists conceived of themselves not as 
legislating but merely codifying and putting into practice a will to civilize the interactions of 
nations which sprang organically from the particular experience of the West. Yet while often 
insisting that their inquiries were based on actual facts rather than utopian thinking, some 
ambitiously imagined the progress of these institutions towards something like a world state.50 
The Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-5 should thus be seen not only in the context of the 
Concert of Europe which saw efforts to coordinate anti-radical policies in Continental Europe 
since the end of the Napoleonic Wars but also in light of this sudden late nineteenth century 
increase in faith in Western civilization to bring order to the world through what was seen as its 
particular brand of law. 
 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, this idea of the progress of civilization came to be 
articulated with survey rationality and a concern for precise borders. As previously seen, up 
through the eighteenth century, Western empires did not generally define precise boundaries 
between each other, with a few exceptions, but after this, boundary commissions became more 
frequent. The idea that clearly and precisely demarcated boundaries promoted peace had 
existed at least since Vattel: 
 
It is necessary to mark clearly and with precision the boundaries of territories in order to avoid the 
slightest usurpation of another’s territory, which is an injustice, and in order to avoid all subjects 
of discord and occasions for quarrels.51 
 
In the nineteenth century, however, border demarcations began to take on new meanings. Part 
of this can be seen as an outcome of social theories which associated fixed territoriality with 
higher stages of civilization. This could be seen, for example, in Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient 
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Law, referred to above. Part of the shift from ancient personalized rule to abstract modern rule 
was the move away from rule of people towards rule of territory.  
 
When the feudal prince of a limited territory surrounding Paris began, from the accident of his 
uniting an unusual number of suzerainties in his own person, to call himself King of France, he 
became king in quite a new sense…The kingship of our Anglo-Saxon regal houses was midway 
between the chieftainship of a tribe and a territorial supremacy; but the superiority of the Norman 
monarchs, imitated from that of the King of France, was distinctly a territorial sovereignty.52 
 
Because modern societies recognized rule by contract rather than status, states governed 
territories rather than people. While not specifically referring to the demarcation of boundaries, 
Maine saw territory as a key component of a modern rule of law which transcended particular 
personal relationships. 
 
For Friedrich Ratzel, writing in 1885 on the eve of the partition of Africa, ‘Want of defined 
frontiers is in the essence of the formation of barbarous states. The line is intentionally not 
drawn, but kept open as a clear space of varying breadth’.53 Later, Ratzel explained further that 
this was because primitive societies did not value land, quoting from an 1885 British account of 
colonial practices in Transvaal, ‘The rights of property of the chiefs among the primitive peoples 
generally overlap’.54 The conclusion from this was that attempts by colonial powers in Africa or 
US authorities to define precise boundaries around their native populations was a ‘mania’ which 
led to ‘the most arrant misunderstandings’. Or, according to American geographer Ellen 
Semple’s ‘translation’ of Ratzel’s work into her own national context, in ‘savage and barbarous’ 
societies, 
 
The low valuation [of land] is expressed in the border wilderness, by which a third or even a half of 
the whole area is wasted; and also in the readiness with which savages will often sell their best 
territory for a song. For the same reason they leave their boundaries undefined; a mile nearer or 
farther, what does it matter?...Owing to these overlapping boundaries—border districts claimed 
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but not occupied—the American colonists met with difficulties in their purchase of land from the 
Indians, often paying twice for the same strip.55 
 
This formulation thus built off of the Lockean labour-mixing theory of property but updated it 
for contemporary considerations of boundaries between racial units. Ultimately the followers 
of Ratzel did not see linear borders as ‘true’ borders but only as superficial manifestations of a 
more fluid and deeply contested site of difference. But a closely related line of thought, which 
was more common among British writers, drew on Ratzel’s evolutionary thought on borders but 
was more faithful to Vattel’s idea that precisely defined borders promoted peace. The clearest 
expression of this line of thought was argued in George Curzon’s Romanes Lecture at Oxford 
University in 1907, which set out a vision of frontiers as ‘the razor's edge on which hang 
suspended the modern issues of war or peace’, and described a number of ways ancient and 
modern polities had arranged their frontiers. 56  For Curzon, demarcated boundaries were 
essentially a modern concept, and one which Eastern peoples apparently had difficulty grasping. 
He gave the example of the Ottoman-Persian frontier which, despite the best efforts of 
mediating Western powers, the ‘Asiatic countries’ had ensured would remain poorly defined: 
 
There, unmaterialized and unknown, it has lurked ever since, both Persia and still more Turkey 
finding in these unsettled conditions an opportunity for improving their position at the expense of 
their rival that was too good to be surrendered or curtailed. In Asiatic countries it would be true to 
say that demarcation has never taken place except under European pressure and by the 
intervention of European agents.57 
 
Yet Curzon insisted that it was ‘incontestable’ that progress was occurring in the delimitation of 
frontiers, as ‘The primitive forms…have nearly everywhere been replaced by boundaries’ which 
are guaranteed by treaties and international law, and are thus ‘an agency of peace’.58 
 
It was because it was thought that higher stages of civilization were better able to peacefully 
agree formally on fixed borders that that it made sense to view peacefully respected boundaries 
between Western empires with cultural pride and as evidence of superior institutions. Srdjan 
Vucetic argues that ‘gentlemanly’ boundary arbitrations between the US and Britain, in 
particular, can be attributed to the popular narrative that the two countries together formed 
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the vanguard of civilization.59 Yet these boundary arbitrations also worked, in turn, to promote 
that narrative. In the context of the Anglo-Saxonist movement, which promoted a racialized idea 
of closer cooperation between and potentially a union of the United States and the British 
Empire, ‘enlightened arbitration’ was an important political tool. Anglo-Saxonists could insist on 
the Anglo-Saxon or American origins of arbitrations, and point to the success of US-UK boundary 
arbitrations between Venezuela and British Guyana and on a variety of segments of the US-
Canada boundary.60 Not always, but most of the time, boundary disputes took centre stage 
among these arbitrations. Anglo-Saxonism did not lead to political union, but it did lend support 
to the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty, signed but not ratified, which would have sent to an arbitral 
tribunal every dispute between the US and Britain which diplomacy failed to resolve.61 Events 
such as this treaty’s signing, or the conclusion of boundary arbitrations, were hailed by 
proponents as transcendent moments in the history of civilization which set an example for all 
nations to follow.  
 
Later, ‘the world’s longest undefended border’ would become a slogan, with a Peace Arch 
monument built along the border between British Columbia and Washington, displaying the 
text: ‘Children of a Common Mother’, ‘1814 Open One Hundred Years 1914’, and ‘A Lesson of 
Peace to All Nations’.62 The Peace Arch and its inscriptions are a popular topic for diplomatic 
speeches, such as Ronald Reagan’s 1987 address to the Canadian Parliament, which imagined a 
time ‘when all borders become what the U.S.-Canadian border so long has been: a meeting 
place, rather than a dividing line’.63 The International Boundary Commission, an international 
organization which has since 1908 maintained the now thousands of monuments linearizing the 
US-Canada border, sees itself as the inheritor of this tradition.64 It began one of its recent annual 
reports with a famous quote from Curzon’s Frontiers lecture, saying that ‘The Commission 
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instituted in 1908 responded effectively to the concerns expressed by Lord Curzon, which were 
doubtless shared by the political class of the day, and has since maintained a clear and well 
demarcated boundary, contributing to peace and prosperity of both countries’. 65  Echoing 
Reagan’s remarks, it gave as ‘proof of its success’ the assertion that ‘the Commission is regularly 
cited as an example the world over, especially in Africa, where serious efforts are being made 
now to define and demarcate the boundaries between several countries’.  
 
These expressions of civilizational superiority through boundary agreements intensified with the 
proliferation of imperial boundary-drawing in the late nineteenth century, but the potential for 
productive relations between the legal fixing of linear boundaries and Anglo-American solidarity 
had long been available. In 1842, for example, while the US-UK boundary dispute over the 
Oregon Territory was growing, the president of the Royal Geographical Society published a 
pamphlet dramatizing the long history of the ongoing Northeastern boundary dispute as a polite 
gentlemanly debate between ‘John Bull’ and ‘Jonathan’:66 
 
J. B. Well, Jonathan, how are you going on? how are all friends on the banks of the Potowmack? 
Jon. Very bad. 
J. B. How so? What's the matter? 
Jon. These eternal misunderstandings between our two Governments…we have told you where 
the real boundary is, and we have had it surveyed… 
J. B. But the treaty is in English, and we both speak the same language; where's the difficulty? 
Jon. There is no difficulty at all, if you will but read the words and interpret their meaning… 
J. B. Well, where is this Treaty? Let us read it over quietly by ourselves… 
 
With this, John Bull proceeds to gradually win over Jonathan through almost comically extensive 
knowledge of the relevant events, treaties, and geographical features, and finally reassures him 
that ‘as you are so very civil, I won't be hard upon you: and if you keep to your word, I think 
there is a fair chance of our continuing to be very good friends’. 
 
Boundary agreements were also invested with meaning through the science and technology 
which was required for implementing them, and the performance of demarcations as 
adventurous exercises in taming the wilderness.67 The narrative of Samuel Anderson, Chief 
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Astronomer for the survey of the US-Canada boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky 
Mountains, published in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, provides an illustrative 
example.68 Consisting of six British officers, a contingent of Canadian surveyors and assistants, 
forty-four of the Royal Engineers, a surgeon, a veterinary surgeon, and a geologist, the British 
commission was greeted at their initial camp on the Red River Prairie by a ‘violent snowstorm, 
from the north-west, which raged with great violence for three days’. They found that in fact 
they could only survey this area during the frost, as the company and their transport animals 
could not wade through the continuous swamps when unfrozen. Anderson wrote, 
 
Although the cold was at times intense, the thermometer often showing 40° below zero, and on 
one occasion 51° below zero, the working parties were for the most part protected in camp by the 
woods, and as long as the air was still, no great discomfort was experienced.  
 
Yet they could not touch metal with bare hands, and occasionally found their eyelids frozen to 
the eyepieces of their instruments. The adventure narrative was followed by a technical 
appendix, heavy with jargon, detailing the commission’s methodology. While they had been 
careful to take into account the curvature of the earth in laying out the 49th parallel, the main 
technical difficulty was the uneven gravitational pull of the earth, which affected the plumb-line 
used to take astronomical readings of latitude. The solution agreed upon by both sides was to 
accept the readings of the instruments as correct at the astronomical stations, and then to set 
up intervening boundary marks on ‘lines connecting the adjacent astronomical stations having 
the same curvature as the 49th parallel of latitude, but not necessarily parallel to the Equator’. 
 
Control over nature in the time of what James Scott calls ‘high modernism’ was seen as integral 
to the project of statecraft.69 But from an international perspective it was also a key component 
of the standard of civilization.70 International organizations formed in the nineteenth century to 
manage rivers such as the Danube and make them safe for commerce seemed to demonstrate 
that control over nature could be a basis for an emerging form of global governance by the 
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‘civilized’ nations. The role of boundaries, especially colonial boundaries in Africa, was very 
similar to this. A formal institutional structure similar to the Danube Commission was only 
pursued in a few particular cases, such as the US borders with Canada and Mexico. But 
maintaining the fixity and certainty of linear borders despite the harsher conditions of nature 
was potentially a necessity anywhere in the world where those conditions existed, and boundary 
commissions contributed to a sense of ‘civilized’ cooperation in a similar way, but on a more ad 
hoc basis. 
 
These boundary narratives drew on the wider late nineteenth century practice of 
mountaineering performances which affirmed a ‘manly’ imperial dominance. 71  Halford 
Mackinder, for example, who was instrumental in the establishment of the discipline of 
geography, could show he was not ‘a mere arm chair geographer’ by journeying to British East 
Africa to climb Mount Kenya. At a time when geographers were still struggling to demonstrate 
the discipline’s relevance, Mackinder made much of the fact that he had beat the German 
climber Hans Meyer to the summit. As a theorist of international relations he stressed the 
importance of force and ‘man-power’, and mountaineering allowed him to demonstrate to his 
peers that he took his principles seriously. For George Curzon, a Viceroy of India famous for his 
use of elaborate imperial rituals, it was crucial that the English, as ‘the first mountaineering race 
in the world’, be allowed to demonstrate their empire in the Himalayas.72 Mountain climbing, 
for Curzon and many others, was not just a scientific or recreational activity but a geopolitical 
act which demonstrated national power and ‘virility’. It was this heroic dominance over nature 
and colonial spaces which diplomats made possible by drawing boundaries across maps, 
regardless of what mountains, snows, or jungles they might traverse, and which boundary 
commissions of the late nineteenth century sought to perform. Thus, while at first, ignorance of 
the terrain constituted a reason to hesitate before drawing boundaries in the African continental 
interior, it could later be portrayed as a welcome challenge, which in a smug nonchalance, the 
British Empire would gladly accept, as suggested by Lord Salisbury’s remark that Europeans 
 
have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have 
been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small 
impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.73 
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It was constantly implied in their interactions with people along the way that the boundary-
demarcating activities of the commissioners were understood as particular to their culture, for 
example, at a difficult mountainous section, ‘the Indians were of opinion that we should fail in 
our attempt to survey and mark the boundary in a continuous line across the mountain. The 
difficulties pointed out by the Indians were not exaggerated…’ Yet the commissioners persisted, 
taking a whole summer season to trace the boundary through 24 miles, and using triangulation 
rather than the usual method of direct chaining. Later, in the middle of a semi-desert, they came 
across a particularly good campsite called Woody Mountain, which ‘does not appear to have 
been visited by any travellers competent to determine its geographical position’, despite that it 
was only thanks to a party of Sioux that they had found it, and that it had been ‘for a few years 
the winter residence of about 80 families of half-breed hunters’. 
 
The racialization of linear boundaries was perhaps most apparent in British India, where Indians 
were often employed as surveyors. It was a matter of some debate whether ‘native’ surveyors 
could be trusted to do work of the same quality as European surveyors. This was situated within 
wider ambiguities over the extent to which European knowledge and technological rationality 
could be diffused to the rest of the world.74 The eighteenth-century notion of the unity of 
humankind later conflicted with the influence of evolutionary biology, leading to critiques of 
attempts to educate colonial subjects. An effort to expand the ranks of surveyors in India by 
opening recruitment beyond the few available Europeans began in the 1820s, alongside a host 
of reforms which included the beginnings of English-language higher education.75 Surveys of 
areas outside British political control often could not be done by Europeans out of fears for 
personal safety, and were done instead by ‘pandits’ dressed as Buddhist pilgrims.  
 
In the early nineteenth century, as colonial difference was understood in terms of a difference 
in education, climate, or system of government, the British tended to assume there was a ‘kernel 
of truth’ in all empirical observations, and that it was the job of the rational observer to mediate 
between conflicting sources. Yet in part due to the influence of evolutionary theories later on, 
training Indian surveyors became more controversial, for example, for Henry Rawlinson, 
President of the Royal Geographical Society in 1873: ‘The native surveys, for settlement 
purposes and for the measurement of fields, are useless for geographical purposes. But the 
professional revenue surveys are most valuable and accurate…It is very satisfactory to find that 
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the system of prosecuting the revenue surveys on strictly accurate principles in all their details, 
and of entirely getting rid of the old inaccurate native measurements, is to be introduced’.76 By 
the 1890s, even Thomas Holdich, who argued strongly in favour of adopting a survey system in 
Africa based on ‘native labour’ along the lines of British India, on the grounds of ‘cheapness and 
general efficiency’, agreed that ‘the chief failing in natives…is a want of method and acuteness 
in general observation’, although it was outweighed by other inherent attributes, such as an 
ability to pick up languages and endure extreme climates.77 
 
 
Colonial Treaties: Necessary but No Longer Sufficient 
 
While clearly defined territory became more closely associated with higher civilization in the 
nineteenth century, treaties made by European empires with native peoples they encountered 
and colonized meanwhile constituted an already existing territorial order which was in many 
cases resistant to precise territorial definition. This section examines how linear inter-imperial 
borders came to be layered on top of that pre-existing order, ultimately becoming more 
important for colonial geopolitics, but without completely erasing it. With a growing concern for 
keeping imperialism ‘civilized’, and thus avoiding territorial confusion and potentially disastrous 
warfare, the colonial treaty system came into crisis, never being completely discarded, but still 
making plain to imperial officials the need for a new, more coherent system of inter-imperial 
borders by the 1890s. 
 
In the context of growing adherence to evolutionary social theories, locating the limits of 
civilization and, by extension, international law, became a topic of public debate in a way that it 
had not been previously. 78  If international law had no other basis for existence than the 
distinctive history of Europe, with the collapse of the metaphysical laws of nature, it was no 
longer clear who was able to participate in it. As JS Mill wrote in 1859, to ‘characterize any 
conduct whatever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only shows 
that he who so speaks has never considered the subject’.79 The many treaties which were being 
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negotiated each year with ‘barbarous’ people, then, became subject to serious criticism. To the 
extent that the concept of sovereignty, for example, was viewed as an exclusive inheritance of 
Europe, it could not be created or transferred by non-Europeans. In the context of West African 
colonialism, this view meant in practice that treaties conducted with local rulers were suspected 
of various kinds of fraud. As the British Colonial Office complained to the Foreign Office about 
the French and German practices of treaty-making, a trader typically 
 
obtains from a native Chief or king, probably in consideration of a bottle of rum or a trade gun and 
some powder, his signature to a document which, even if it is ever read over to him, he does not 
understand, and then sends this paper home to France, saying that he has obtained a cession of 
the country. Without inquiry, the so-called Treaty is accepted, a French man-of-war proceeds to 
the place and hoists the French flag, and the annexation is accomplished.80 
 
Yet however controversial they became, colonial officials continued to seek them out in the late 
nineteenth century, and collecting them was often an early stage of extending colonial rule. 
Some maintained that in fact colonial treaties were in fact indispensable for legal title.81 Many 
took intermediate positions, that the treaties were not, strictly speaking, within the scope of the 
law of nations, but they may be politically expedient, or they may be evidence that an 
occupation was done peacefully, or that they granted ownership over the land, if not 
sovereignty, or that a responsible sovereign was morally obliged to deal fairly with its native 
population. Casting the colonial treaties outside the pale of strict international law only created 
an ambiguity around their meaning and legal necessity. Virtually the whole range of available 
legal positions could be reconciled with colonialism; either African rulers were able to, and had 
fairly granted some kind of authority to the colonizers, or their approval was not necessary. 
Evidence of how widespread the practice was exists not only in the hundreds of treaties left 
behind but also the narratives of officials racing to quickly sign as many as possible. For example 
in 1884 a German official won a race with the British official when the latter ran out of blank 
treaty forms.82 British administrator Frederick Lugard remarked that since  
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treaty making occupies a large place in most modern works of African travel, and since there are 
different methods of treaty making…I am anxious to explain…the proper procedure followed by 
responsible and duly accredited diplomats in that continent.83 
 
The colonial treaties are quite important for understanding the linearization of borders in Africa 
in the late nineteenth century because they had previously provided a basis for colonial 
territorial division which was not necessarily linear. As seen in the previous section, the colonial 
treaties often had no geographical references, other than the name of the polity to be ceded or 
the name of its ruler. This was not simply an oversight, as illustrated by Lugard, who, as 
mentioned above, considered treaty-making a crucial practice in imperial expansion. Based on 
his account of the 1892 British treaty signed with the Kingdom of Uganda, all the formalities 
down to the King’s signature on the document were of utmost importance:  
 
Then the king told some one to sign for him. I would not have this, and insisted on his making a 
mark. He did it with a bad grace, just dashing the pen at the paper and making a blot ; but I made 
him go at it again, and on the second copy he behaved himself and made a proper cross.84 
 
Despite portraying himself, in explaining this interaction, as the bringer of law and order to a 
realm of arbitrary despotism, no negotiation over any particular territory appears, either in 
Lugard’s account or in the treaty itself.85 
 
A major reason why colonial treaties were signed, despite coming under scrutiny, was that they 
had provided the basis of the territorial order before large scale colonial annexations, 
particularly in West Africa. The colonial powers needed some way to legitimate territorial 
control and to distinguish which territory belonged to which power. In contrast to the 
colonization of the Americas in previous centuries, at some level this was assumed by all the 
colonial powers and not seriously challenged. The reason for this was explicated most bluntly by 
the American delegate at Berlin, warning against the wars which plagued American colonial 
history: 
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The present condition of Central Africa reminds one much of that of America when that continent 
was first opened up to the European world. How are we to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate 
events to which I have just alluded amongst the numerous African tribes?...As regards their 
usefulness in time of war, what would be the good of possessing for the purpose of military 
operations abroad, a dependent Colony above the falls of Yellala…The revenues which it would 
bring in to the mother country would never be equal to the expenses which its maintenance would 
require…If we take no precaution against this danger, we shall have cause to regret the incomplete 
character of our work. But if, on the other hand, we were able to establish guarantees against the 
danger of being drawn into conflicts between the interests of foreign Powers, and further even 
against local strifes which might eventually arise in regard to the delimitation of territory and of 
the rights of possession, our work would be indeed complete…They should pledge themselves to 
submit to arbitration, in accordance with the modern customs of civilized nations, any point of 
dispute which might arise between them in regard to rights of possession and territory…86 
 
In other words, the whole effort to colonize Central Africa would be wasted if it became heavily 
militarized. Unlike previous eras of colonialism, this one would have to be ‘civilized’ and would 
thus require formal procedures for claiming territory which could be understood and recognized 
as legitimate by the other colonial powers. Yet from this, we can see that the problem extended 
beyond the realm of legitimacy, indulgence in self-congratulation, and appeasement of powerful 
constituencies at home, although these factors no doubt played a role. The participants in the 
Berlin Conference, far more than in previous colonization movements, viewed their task as to 
achieve a degree of coordination with other powers not simply because they believed in the 
inherent value of what they called ‘civilization’. Aside from this, ‘civilization’ also served their 
purposes of securing trade interests and maintaining or improving their status against their 
rivals, without risking an expensive militarization, which would defeat the purpose of economic 
expansion, or a conflict which could upset the balance of power. 
 
The American delegate had articulated these political motives behind the appeal for a ‘civilized’ 
colonialism more candidly than many of the other delegates, perhaps because many of the 
others were more concerned with appearing interested in the conference’s expressed values of 
abolitionism and free trade, or because referring to a possible militarization might be 
misinterpreted as threatening. But the avoidance of conflict through territorial order was one of 
the central threads running through the international legal discourse surrounding the Berlin 
Conference and the creation of the International Association of the Congo. In an 1883 paper, 
Émile de Laveleye, the co-founder of the Institut de Droit International, argued that European 
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rivalries should be prevented from affecting Africa through a neutralization of the Congo basin. 
The ongoing expedition of Pierre de Brazza to consolidate French control in the area worried 
him ‘no longer as a lone explorer, but as a representative of France and having gunboats and 
several hundred soldiers at his disposal’.87 
 
If the explorers of other nations imitate the example of M. de Brazza and plant their national flags 
on the stations they establish, we will soon have on the shores of the Congo French, English, 
German, Portuguese, Italian, and Dutch territories, with their frontiers, their forts, their cannons, 
their soldiers, their rivalries, and possibly someday their hostilities. Is it not already enough to see 
our rivers of Europe bristling on both sides with formidable armaments? Is it necessary to 
reproduce this deplorable situation in the middle of Africa, and to give to the negros, whom we 
claim to be civilizing, the lamentable sight of our antagonisms and quarrels?88 
 
Central Africa, for de Laveleye, represented a unique opportunity for the newly emerging 
institutions of international law to show their significance and to demonstrate the real potential 
of Europe to deliver peace and order in a region which was still mostly isolated from Europe’s 
own less appealing attributes. ‘Territories are badly delimited in this part of Africa’, agreed 
Gustave Moynier, co-founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross.89 ‘I now consider 
urgent a precise determination of the rights that each nation can claim in these far-off 
places…The most important thing would be that an accord should first be established between 
the civilized races, which would then agree to bring the natives into the arrangement’.90 
 
Before the 1880s, it was the colonial treaties, not inter-imperial treaties, which had provided 
this order. Inter-imperial treaties did exist, but they were relatively few in number, and their 
geographical references were normally limited to islands and coastal points. Efforts to delineate 
boundaries between British and French areas surfaced in the 1860s and 1870s but did not result 
in anything until the 1880s. When territorial disputes arose, the usual method of defending 
territorial claims had been to refer to colonial treaties. For example, in 1860 Liberia seized two 
vessels belonging to a British trader operating in a disputed area without having paid Liberian 
customs, and in response the British navy stormed Monrovia and retook the vessels, demanding 
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compensation.91 The Liberian government, however, produced treaties signed with the local 
rulers of the disputed area, and the British Foreign Office agreed to recognize those treaties. By 
failing to recognize these treaties, the British would risk delegitimizing their own colonies. When 
colonial treaties were dismissed as proper evidence of a title, the justification for doing so was 
usually not that non-state entities, in general, did not possess the capacity to enter into such 
treaties, but rather that the specific treaties being used did not apply, either because the ruler’s 
authority did not extend far enough, or because the language of the treaty was missing key 
technical terms such as ‘sovereignty’.92 
 
Thus, while the colonial treaties became questionable legally and morally, they could not be 
abandoned for political reasons. Yet they came under significant pressure by the 1880s, with 
officials increasingly unable to resolve territorial disputes this way. They reported that colonial 
treaties were not able to give them enough specificity to be reliable tools in defending territorial 
interests: ‘The tribes themselves have as a rule no idea of territorial limits, their locations are 
constantly changing, and there exist small tribes between the large ones which owe allegiance 
sometimes to the one and sometimes to the other’.93 Increasingly popular ideas about the 
uniqueness of Western civilization no doubt had much to do with this, as illustrated by the 
comments of one British official in Sierra Leone that ‘to anyone conversant with these natives’, 
treaties are worth ‘nothing’: 
 
They consider that the signing treaties has ever been accompanied by presents and are quite ready 
to affix their names to anything. When the terms afterwards are distasteful to them they are ready 
to say ‘they no make that book.’ Of course to a European this view of things seems impossible and 
improbable, yet as a fact the people who sign are mostly absolute pagans, without one shred of 
civilisation or sense of truth and honour.94 
 
The tension between reliance on colonial treaties as evidence in cases of territorial dispute, on 
one hand, and their perceived unsuitability for doing so, on the other, was a potentially explosive 
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issue. At Berlin, the American delegate made an argument in favour of formally requiring 
treaties to be made with locals before territory could be claimed, but the president of the 
conference shut down this discussion before it could be had, saying that it ‘touched on delicate 
questions, upon which the Conference hesitated to express an opinion’.95 A legal debate about 
the inherent significance of treaties with non-state entities not only could have derailed the 
work of the conference but could also have led the participants into a chain reaction of 
accusations that each other’s territorial claims were based on treaties which were coerced, 
bought with ‘a pair of boots, or a few bottles of gin’,96 or invalid because the local rulers who 
had signed it did not possess the sovereignty being ceded. Because it was unlikely that any 
‘amicable’ agreement could be reached on the issue, the conference tacitly affirmed the status 
quo, meaning that imperial officials would continue to collect treaties without formal 
international oversight. 
 
The main alternative to colonial treaties, as a way of ensuring an orderly process, at the Berlin 
Conference was not a wholesale partition of the African continent through linear inter-imperial 
borders. Instead, the principle of ‘effective occupation’ was more frequently discussed. Avoiding 
the embarrassing contradictions of the colonial treaties, international lawyers in the 1870s 
began shifting the focus to actual occupation, which they claimed was a much more rational 
basis for legitimate empire than the classic Spanish and Portuguese claims through right of 
discovery and symbolic annexation. 97  Legal positivists could hardly argue with this, as 
occupation was closely linked to the coercive power of sovereign statehood. Moreover, the 
theory of effective occupation opened the way for dissatisfied empires to delegitimize the vast 
territorial claims of others which they viewed as unsubstantiated. Effective occupation was thus 
written into the Berlin Treaty as a condition for new claims on the coast of Africa. 
 
As a comprehensive system for dividing up colonial spoils, however, effective occupation fell 
short. Amidst the rhetoric of eradicating the slave trade and protecting free trade which 
permeated the Berlin discussions, and which was not easily separable from the participants’ 
general aspirations to a civilizing mission, none of the colonial powers were eager to take on 
potentially expensive military and administrative commitments. While the Berlin Conference did 
much to enshrine effective occupation as a principle of territorial claims, formally it was only 
required for new coastal claims, and by this time there were few points on the coasts of the 
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African continent which were not claimed by one or another of the conference participants. It 
would have been difficult for many of the delegates to argue at the conference that a 
requirement of effective occupation would be too much to ask, after criticizing each other’s 
states for empty territorial claims. But the objection to extending the rule of effective occupation 
beyond the coasts, as it was voiced by France during the conference, was that it necessarily 
implied a precise delimitation of territory, which would be difficult in the interior, where the 
conference had little geographical knowledge of actual conditions.98 The delegates were divided 
on the issue of whether delimitations would prevent or create disputes, and the discussion of 
formally extending effective occupation to the interior ended there. 
 
As late as the 1880s, the Western empires were still not entirely convinced of the necessity or 
desirability of delineating fixed inter-imperial borders. In fact, the original purpose of the Berlin 
Conference, according to Bismarck at its opening session, was to extend to Africa ‘The plan 
followed for a number of years in the dealings of the Western Powers with the countries of 
Eastern Asia’, which ‘up to now has given the best results’.99 While Bismarck recognized that 
some differences between Africa and Eastern Asia would have to be recognized, the 
contemporary model of colonialism in China involved vaguely indicated spheres of influence, 
rather than precisely demarcated territory. Many observers by then were anticipating the 
partition of the African continent, but this was by no means inevitable at this point, as many also 
predicted a partition of China that never occurred.100 Whether to fix boundaries remained a 
topic of debate both at the level of colonial officials and at the diplomatic level. There were both 
advantages and disadvantages to defining boundaries, and colonial administrators recognized 
that in some situations it was useful to be able to deny knowing whether or not a particular 
place was within a British protectorate, and in other circumstances it would be embarrassing 
not to be able to offer a clear answer.101 At the diplomatic level, Portugal was as late as 1883 
maintaining that drawing boundaries in the interior, where colonial control was unclear, 
presented ‘invincible practical difficulties’.102  The British foreign secretary, on the contrary, 
insisted that ‘A claim to extend jurisdiction arbitrarily…could not be entertained. In the interests 
of civilization a geographical definition is indispensable…’103 
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The transition, then, from local, ad hoc agreements, mainly involving colonial treaties which did 
not involve specific boundaries, towards linearized inter-imperial boundaries that would later 
be surveyed and demarcated, was slow and reluctant. It could not proceed fully until all 
alternative methods of achieving colonial aims of maintaining commercial interests and avoiding 
inter-imperial conflict had been exhausted. While fixed boundaries, particularly in the 
continental interior, were seen as a last resort, however, we must consider how the system of 
basing territorial claims on colonial treaties became insufficient and how linear borders came to 
occupy this default position. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the process of linear borders historically becoming articulated with 
the idea of civilization in colonial discourse and practice. This occurred along with new 
conceptions of law, society, territory, and history which surfaced over the course of the 
nineteenth century. The particular kind of law and order that defined civilization, according to 
these new lines of thought, was not laid down by a creator or self-evident in nature, but instead 
came from the historical evolution of societies. The possibility of kinds of rationalities which 
diverged from that defined by Christian, European, or Western civilization, but were 
nevertheless natural or human, was excluded ever more sharply. Territories which were not just 
separate areas of sovereignty but also tracts clearly defined by linear borders, became an 
important part of this law and order because they were based on abstraction rather than 
personal relations, contractual agreements rather than custom, and took advantage of the 
technological capacities supposedly possessed by higher civilizations.  
 
In keeping with the concept of articulation, which stresses that relations between certain social 
formations are not logically necessary but historically emergent, this version of the idea of 
civilization was historically particular, and any analysis of its political consequences has to be 
empirically grounded in the relevant historical context. These trends in Western social and legal 
thought can in certain ways be traced back further than the late nineteenth century. But it was 
only in the 1860s and 1870s that these ideas began to affect the colonial order in West Africa, 
at both of its two sharply distinguished levels. On one hand, colonial treaties were delegitimized 
by the particular kind of colonial difference which was imagined as a result of evolutionary social 
thought, and particularly as a result of evolutionary thought’s influence on international legal 
doctrine. Societies that did not organize themselves on a clear territorial basis, according to 
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nineteenth-century legal innovation, were not members of the community of nations, and as 
such, treaties made with them were not part of international law. On the other hand, many were 
optimistic about the possibilities for international law between sovereign states, and the idea of 
‘civilization’ gave the emerging international legal profession a new foundation and purpose. 
This conception of an exclusive European community of nations reshaped the moral and 
geopolitical field within which European states competed in the late nineteenth century. 
Solutions to the problem of the colonial treaties which were conceptualized a priori, such as a 
free-trade zone or the principle of effective occupation, failed as a comprehensive system for 
land-appropriation. But this did lead to a search for a way to manage the colonization of Africa 
in an unambiguous way, avoiding a colonial great power war which would be costly in both 
material and prestige terms. A wholesale linear territorialisation of the continent was then 
carried out, despite contradicting most of the colonial aims of 1880, as linear boundaries had 
increasingly become identified with ‘civilization’ over the course of the century. 
 
Seeing the linearization of borders in West Africa this way, as an articulated part of modern 
imperialism rather than a logical necessity, gives us a different picture from the common 
assumption that ‘New Imperialism’ or the Berlin Conference brought sharply defined 
territoriality to Africa. The two are related closely, but under close examination, that relationship 
does not appear straightforward. On one hand, signs of the process can be seen before the 
imperial centres had fully committed to aggressive policies of securing protectorates in the 
continental interior, particularly in Anglo-French diplomatic correspondence. On the other, the 
question of whether or not the European empires should define all their boundaries precisely 
was still left open at the Berlin Conference, and was not decisively resolved until the 1890s, 
when it was recognized in practice that no other system was workable. 
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Chapter Six 
The Techno-Politics of Territory 
 
 
Up until now the thesis has been concerned with the historical origins of linear borders as a 
relatively autonomous system of governing space in international politics. Rather than being 
simply a second-order derivative of centralized authority (sovereignty) or rule specified by 
geographical area (territory), linear borders required substantially different preconditions. In 
particular, the previous two chapters went into detail on the way in which capitalism and 
‘civilization’ in specific contexts came to require survey rationality and the linearization of 
borders. But if I am right that linear borders constitute a relatively autonomous system, they 
must also make a difference in international politics that cannot be reduced to structures such 
as sovereignty or territory. Demonstrating this is the aim of this chapter and the next. In this 
chapter I show how linear borders affect the politics of geographic knowledge production, and 
in the next, I examine the role linear borders play in the proliferation of territorial partitions 
since the eighteenth century. 
 
Survey rationality, having emerged as it did in interconnected, yet particular histories, consists 
of specific types of knowledge which have become increasingly complex since the eighteenth 
century. At one time amateur surveyors in the British American colonies could often find their 
way through the practice, and landowning in many cases relied on some knowledge of surveying. 
But today, the engineering of linear borders without relying on people with a great deal of 
specialized knowledge, which is mediated by formal institutions like universities, is hardly 
thinkable. This has significant implications for the possibilities of border-drawing. In simple 
terms, the ability to use or call on the purveyors of this specific set of knowledge in some sense 
determines who is able to participate in territorial politics today. Thus one of the effects of the 
linearization of borders on international politics is to empower certain kinds of experts and the 
states that employ them. 
 
This chapter illustrates that theoretical argument about the particular kind of power made 
possible through linearization by using it to make, in parallel, a historical argument. It examines 
the origins and impact on international politics of a body of knowledge now known as Border 
Studies which, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epitomized the 
kind of scientific knowledge which underpins and is made necessary by linear borders. Border 
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Studies today encompasses a wide range of different types of inquiry, but its early lineage is 
typically thought to include works by colonial geographers such as Thomas Holdich and George 
Curzon which were primarily concerned with determining the conditions for the creation of 
stable, precise borders during that period of global history when this process was approaching 
a kind of universality, and during the redrawing of the borders of Europe following the First 
World War. 1  In particular, I trace the changing meanings of the concept of the ‘scientific 
frontier’, which was at the centre of some of the earliest debates of the field.  
 
According to conventional narratives, the ideal of self-determination was achieved at the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference, and later spread to the rest of the world through decolonisation.2 This 
chapter complicates these narratives, arguing that the 'scientific' basis of borders drawn at Paris 
entailed a reflection of colonial practices back on Europe. The increasing preoccupation with 
territorial precision as a means of pursuing geopolitical stability was a major factor in the 
expansion of the discipline of geography, according to colonial officials-cum-geographers such 
as Thomas Holdich and Lord Curzon. With the outbreak of WWI, however, geographical 
discourse shifted its orientation towards Europe, and was utilised to legitimate the exclusion of 
Eastern Europeans from the post-war redrawing of the European map. While the new scientific 
geography appeared to be mobilizing on behalf of oppressed peoples, it was in fact being used 
to reconceptualise territorial borders based on a discourse and data which could only be 
accessed by a technocratic elite. This argument therefore both reverses the temporal logic of 
standard narratives and exposes the imperialism of Wilsonian 'national self-determination'. 
 
In the first section I briefly retrace the colonial origins of the concept of the ‘scientific frontier’. 
Second, I show how this concept became a respectable one in the context of an expanding 
academic field of geography, through colonial border-drawing practices. The third and fourth 
sections examine some of the ways in which linear and scientific borders affected the colonial 
politics of territory. Fifth, I show how the idea of the scientific frontier became generalized and 
applied in Europe at the Paris Peace Conference. In the final section, I offer an extended case 
study of one specific part of the Conference’s work, in determining the boundaries of Italy, 
showing in more detail the impact of colonial knowledge. 
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The Colonial Origins of the Scientific Frontier 
 
At the Paris Peace Conference, convened in 1919 to determine a settlement in the aftermath of 
the First World War, the American delegation arrived with a remarkably novel conception of 
how to proceed with reordering Europe and much of the world beyond, inspired by ideas 
associated with President Woodrow Wilson. 3  Rather than the back-room diplomacy and 
balance-of-power politics that had characterized European politics, the Wilsonians thought, the 
new map would be based on knowledge, science, and expertise, and would thus be rational, 
logical, and just. Nations such as Poland would be reconstituted, out of their former imperial 
subordination, by scientifically examining the geography of their lands and peoples and taking 
this into account when drawing the new borders.  
 
Like previous European settlements since the 1815 Vienna Congress, the outcome of the Paris 
Conference was a series of treaties defining territoriality in a particular way, as bounded by 
precise lines of no width. Unlike at the Vienna Congress, however, the very principles 
underwriting the new peace would depend far more fundamentally on the concept of the linear 
border, and thus the run-up to the Paris Conference provides us with a useful case study in which 
to demonstrate the constitutive effects of linear borders. In particular, the new borders were to 
be ‘scientific’ and required the involvement of geographers and other scientists at high levels. 
The question of nationality, rather than being obscured as it was in the post-Napoleonic 
conservative restoration, was to be put front and centre. The well-known difficulties of drawing 
precise lines around national groups of people, far from making it impossible to imagine linear 
borders, made it all the more important to involve geographers in this task, which was assumed 
to be the only way of apportioning territory.  
 
Scientific frontiers had already been drawn before, however, in the colonized world. The idea of 
a scientific frontier was first popularized in the late 1870s within the debates around the 
northwest frontier of India. Associated with the ‘forward’ policy of Benjamin Disraeli’s 
Conservative government and his Viceroy, Lord Lytton, it was ‘a strategic concept that 
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attempted to define the most effective arrangement of forces in order to ensure the defence of 
north India’.4 The existing frontier of India, Disraeli argued in 1878, was ‘haphazard’, 
 
And, my Lords, what is a scientific Frontier compared with a haphazard one? Why, it is, as a military 
authority has said, this—a scientific Frontier may be defended with a garrison of 5,000 men; while, 
with a hap-hazard one, you may require for its defence an army of 100,000 men, and even then 
not be safe from sudden attack.5 
 
Yet at first, while it drew on the symbolic capital of ‘science’ for the rhetorical purposes of 
drumming up support for a more militarily active policy in Afghanistan, in practice, it had 
relatively little to do with academic geography or any cartographic technology.6 While it was in 
part concerned with the location of a boundary, the concept could be appropriated for various 
uses. For William Patrick Andrew, a key developer of railways in India, for example, the frontier 
was unscientific because, without roads running along it, and without a bridge over the Indus 
River, it was inaccessible to the military. ‘Thus the frontier righteously deserved the appellation 
“a haphazard one,” not by reason of its natural configuration so much as by reason of our neglect 
to improve it’.7 Nor was the success of this rhetorical strategy a foregone conclusion. Liberal MPs 
derided the idea as a ‘hazy phantom’, for which ‘the Government have not vouchsafed to us at 
present any definition of what they understand by it’.8 They ridiculed the ‘military authority’ the 
Prime Minister had cited, ‘a scientific soldier writing about a scientific Frontier from a scientific 
club’ who actually had no experience in India. In reality, military opinion was at best divided as 
to whether expenses could ever be spared simply by ‘placing behind our backs a range of 
mountains 100 miles broad, 13,000 to 17,000 feet high, and swarming with turbulent and 
faithless mountaineers’. In fact, a mountain boundary ‘is the very worst and most dangerous 
line to defend. You have not only to protect your main Passes…you have to watch and block 
every mule track, and even foot track, by which Infantry could pass in order to take your 
garrisons in the rear’.9 
 
In this time and place, then, when the word ‘imperialism’ was beginning to appear in British 
politics as a pejorative description of Disraeli’s aggressive policies and fondness for Napoleonic 
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pomp, the imperialist undertones of the ‘scientific frontier’ concept were not lost. For one 
Liberal MP, a ‘scientific rectification of the Frontier’ meant, ‘in other words, an absolutely unjust 
and criminal invasion of another's territory, in order to obtain property which does not belong 
to us’.10 
 
But the imperialism of this concept, however obvious in the 1870s, would become obscured by 
the time of the Paris Peace Conference, by the increasingly prevalent belief that a scientific 
frontier was actually possible. An important part of what changed during these decades was in 
the use of science and technology on the frontier. Survey technology had, of course, long been 
used to facilitate imperial control over India.11 What was novel in the late nineteenth century 
was the routine frequency with which boundary commissions were sent to demarcate borders 
in even the most difficult of terrains, and the faith invested by British officials in the geographic 
certainty they engendered to uphold inter-imperial peace and the pacification of peoples on the 
frontier. This change in practices resulted in two things: first, the development, out of a 
rhetorical device originally intended to justify imperial expansion, of a whole discourse of 
scientific frontiers which genuinely and literally aimed at finding international stability in the use 
of the scientific method applied through the concepts and technology of geodesy. Second, as a 
corollary, rather than having to simply carry out the orders of politicians, geographers would, 
perhaps for the first time, necessarily have to be involved in the drawing of borders, and would 
be given more political significance than ever before. 
 
 
Thomas Holdich and the Transformation of the Scientific Frontier through Survey Practices 
 
While politicians debated over the merits of a possible scientific frontier, geographers were 
working to put it into practice, which in time changed the meaning of the concept. While in the 
1870s, the whole idea of a scientific frontier could be challenged as a fanciful politician’s 
conjecture, by the turn of the twentieth century, geographers generally recognized it as a serious 
concept, and debates were generally limited to whether or not a particular frontier was scientific 
or not. This section shows how geographical fieldwork served to make this concept a serious 
one. 
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For geographers such as those of the Royal Geographical Society, the Russo-Afghan Boundary 
Commission (1884-1886) which emerged as a response to the instability on the frontier was a 
watershed moment in boundary demarcation. In 1930 its work was ‘still reproduced in text-
books, as an example of how such survey should be carried out’.12 No expenses were spared in 
terms of personnel: ‘the total strength of the Commission mounted up to a figure which certainly 
seemed disproportionate to the object in view…there must have been between two and three 
thousand members of the British Commission in Turkestan, without reckoning the small army of 
local employés…’. 13  The utmost precision was attempted in maintaining the commission’s 
location at all times, always measuring angles and distances using multiple methods, including 
timed telegraphs, theodolites, astronomical observations, and perambulators. 14  Series of 
triangulations were done from Quetta in British India, through southwestern Afghanistan, to 
Mashad, inside Persia, the location of which was checked using a telegraph and chronometer to 
measure the distance to Tehran, which had already been linked to Greenwich. Proceeding from 
there along the new border with Russia, the triangulation series was then extended across 
northern Afghanistan, then towards Kabul, to link up with surveys done during the Second 
Anglo-Afghan War, proving mathematically the accuracy of the whole endeavour. At this point, 
the account of Thomas Holdich, the head of the surveying team, provides a glimpse into what 
has been termed the commission’s ‘epistemophilia (i.e., the fetishization of the acquisition of 
knowledge)’ when this mathematical link was established:15 
 
There was joy in the camp of the surveyors when they met again in the general gathering up of the 
Commission at Kabul, and found that all the great mass of patchwork fitted together with 
satisfactory exactness, and that the work of two years was closed with no displacement, and no 
corrections necessary in our geographical maps.16  
 
In 1887 Holdich received the Gold Medal of the Royal Geographical Society for his services on 
the boundary commission, and soon found himself the society’s expert on borders, becoming in 
1892 the Superintendent of Frontier Surveys.17 It was by drawing on this experience and prestige 
that, shortly thereafter, he began to argue a point which he would continue to argue for 
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decades, and which would provide a compelling rationale for a generalized scientific study of 
borders: borders drawn by politicians alone were unscientific and needed input from 
geographers. 18  While the expansion of geographic study had long been associated with 
imperialism in the general sense that knowledge facilitated control, Holdich was making a more 
specific case that greater scientific attention to borders would help politicians to draw more 
permanent and more effective borders and therefore serve the cause of empire. The problem 
was one which received much more attention later, during the period of decolonization: the 
straight-line boundaries being drawn in Africa ignored local realities. Drawing boundaries 
‘crossing the lines of drainage and dividing the main arteries of a country, jump[ing] from ridge 
to ridge’ was ‘unscientific, for it is the application of an absolute quantity to what is really a 
differential problem’.19 For a young discipline just becoming established in British universities, 
Holdich’s case for greater national investment in geography was politically relevant, directly 
applicable, and well-timed. 
 
After then serving on the Afghan-Indian—or ‘Durand Line’—Pamir, and Perso-Baluch Boundary 
Commissions, Holdich re-articulated his argument, stressing that ‘Misunderstandings, delays, 
expense, and mutual international mistrust have over and over again arisen from quite 
insignificant causes connected with inattention to exactness in geographical definitions’.20 He 
gave multiple examples of catastrophically imprecise phrases found in boundary treaties, such 
as ‘the foot of the hills’ or ‘in an easterly direction’. The Himalayan mountains made an excellent 
border, ‘provided we do not define it as the watershed between India and Tibet…What is true 
of the Himalaya is true of nearly all the great mountain systems in the world, i.e. the watershed 
of the system is beyond, and apart from, the highest mountain chain’.21  
 
What was most important about Holdich’s line of argument was that the stakes of making 
borders scientific went far beyond the frustrations of an insignificant survey officer tasked with 
delimiting an impossible boundary. Far from remaining a problem of the survey officer on the 
ground, the difficulties encountered by the surveyor rebounded back into the political sphere 
and risked violent confrontation. ‘The first rock upon which delimitation treaties split’, as he put 
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it, was ‘the want of geographical knowledge.’22 Indeed, he claimed that the highest political 
consequences attended on unscientific boundary agreements: 
 
It is, perhaps, in those international negotiations and agreements which concern the political status 
of great countries, and determine their boundaries and the respective limits of their 
responsibilities, that the danger of inaccurate geographical knowledge is greatest, and the results 
of it are the most disastrous…[L]ooking back over the boundary episodes of the last twenty 
years…the greater part of the political difficulties which have arisen in connection with boundary 
demarcation have been due to a want of appreciation of the necessity for a sound geographical 
basis to the text of treaties and agreements.23 
 
In effect, Holdich was calling upon politicians to cede ground to scientific geographers, in the 
interest of better politics. In direct terms, Holdich’s argument was heeded to some extent, 
gaining some followers within geography. As Edmond Hills put it,  
 
[W]e have at this moment in Africa alone about 5000 miles of frontier common with 
France…[which] contain the germs of future misunderstandings. To avoid and guard against such 
misunderstandings is the function of the diplomatist and to aid him in this task he must call to his 
assistance the scientific geographer…to uphold the interests of our country and to safeguard the 
peace of future generations.24 
 
Holdich went on to be frequently referred to as the ultimate expert on borders, or according to 
Francis Younghusband, one of the more prominent frontier officers, ‘the greatest authority in 
the world on the practical work of demarcation of frontiers’.25  When Britain arbitrated a Chile-
Argentina border dispute, then, he was asked to lead a boundary commission which became a 
textbook case in political geography, and is a crucial illustration of the steady encroachment of 
experts on politics through the science of border-drawing.26 As usual, Holdich’s observation 
about the Chile-Argentina dispute was that it was fundamentally based not on a power-political 
clash of interests but rather on a defective understanding of geology. It had been previously 
assumed that the watershed boundary and the highest crest of the Andes mountains were one 
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and the same. But anyone familiar with as much practical experience of boundary demarcation 
in mountain ranges as Holdich had accumulated on the frontiers of India, he suggested, would 
know that this is almost never the case in reality. This would make him, rather than a diplomat 
or a legal expert, or anyone with direct knowledge of South America, the best person to secure 
peace between the two countries. 
 
When Holdich returned from the commission, which determined a line which was agreed upon 
by the Chilean and Argentinian governments, it was widely hailed as a success, and the stability 
of the border thereafter was attributed to Holdich’s expertise. According to Douglas Freshfield, 
the President of the Royal Geographical Society, the Chile-Argentina delimitation 
 
by Sir Thomas Holdich and his colleagues, has been the means of preventing a war which 
threatened to be long and ruinous to two young and growing States. So highly was their work 
appreciated in South America that when a similar dispute arose between Peru and Bolivia the 
statesmen on both sides applied for the help of British officers, with this difference—that instead 
of appealing to His Majesty's Government they came to the Council of the Royal Geographical 
Society and begged us in the final resort to act as arbitrators.27 
 
By bypassing the British government and going straight to the RGS, Peru and Bolivia 
demonstrated to the geographers that their influence had, at least in this case, surpassed that 
of political authorities. Holdich himself went even further in estimating the importance of this 
knowledge. For him, the success of the Chile-Argentina delimitation was just an illustration of 
the progress of geographical science in limiting warfare through the global process of the 
linearization of borders.  
 
This is an age of boundary making, of partitioning and dividing up territory, and it has by no means 
come to an end yet. It may well continue as long as the world endures…All sorts of countries, under 
all sorts of governments, from the black barbarism of Central Africa to the hot-house civilization of 
South America, have been subjected to the process, and of all of them may the same thing be said, 
i.e. that the process of frontier defining has resolved itself into a strictly geographical problem. It 
must always be so.28 
 
Being reduced from power-politics to a ‘strictly geographical problem’, scientific borders would 
tame the instabilities of even the most warlike and irrational civilizations by removing one of the 
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main causes of war, geographical ignorance. While the geographical education of statesmen had 
only fifty years earlier been almost non-existent, he argued, recently, 
 
many boundaries have been settled in many quarters of the globe (especially in Africa and in South 
America) which have led to no disastrous disputes whatever, and have called for no arbitration. 
This is a satisfactory proof of the gradual development of geographical teaching for which the Royal 
Geographical Society may fairly claim a share of credit.29 
 
It is important to remember that statements such as these were always aspirational, and should 
be considered as part of a process rather than taken seriously as declarations of success. Holdich 
realized this as well as anyone, by acknowledging that the age of boundary making ‘has by no 
means come to an end yet’, and ‘may well continue as long as the world endures’. Borders in all 
parts of the world, including British India, continually required further bordering efforts into the 
twentieth century. Historians have rightly stressed the fractured nature of the colonial state’s 
spatial projects, characterizing them as ‘contested and fragmented zones of variable state 
penetration, knowledge, and interest, which only intermittently and in limited respects held 
together as coherent wholes’30 
 
But the important point to take from these efforts of Holdich and other geographers was a 
dramatic widening of the idea of scientific boundary-drawing from what could otherwise have 
been considered minor technical issues on the frontiers of British India to an explanation for the 
general lack of inter-imperial conflict in the ongoing worldwide scramble for colonies. In effect, 
he was arguing against what would become the realist approach of International Relations, or 
the idea that only centralized state power could determine war and peace. It was not the 
security dilemma or competition for resources that would cause war, but simply ignorance of 
the contours of the earth’s surface. Yet neither was it common economic interests, international 
law, or supranational governance that would provide the basis of a more peaceful international 
system. It would fall to scientific geographers to specify increasingly closely and more carefully 
the geographical confines of the territory of each nation and each empire which would function 
as barriers against warfare. True knowledge, rather than power, self-interest, or common 
humanity, would secure a territorial peace. 
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From Reason of State to Reason of Science: The Politics of Scientific Geography 
 
Whether due to the persuasive power of Holdich’s articles in The Geographical Journal 
themselves, or simply because of a larger shift in British geographical discourse, the increasing 
usage of a scientific logic in imperial frontier politics was a theme of the pre-WWI decades. From 
the beginning of the inter-imperial confrontation on the Northwest Frontier of British India, the 
discourse of power politics had always been a recurring frame for British understandings of the 
region, whether this was in terms of maintaining the prestige thought necessary for continued 
control over India, or in terms of playing a ‘Great Game’ with Russia for the inner Asian 
continent. As is well known, power-political discourse flourished in Western understandings of 
the world more generally in the late nineteenth century, with the growth of social Darwinism, 
and the beginnings of geopolitics as a distinct mode of thought, via Friedrich Ratzel, Ellen 
Semple, and Halford Mackinder.31 Less well-known, however, is the branch of colonial frontier 
science which, in parallel to European geopolitics, developed from the work of frontier officers 
such as Holdich. This can be seen in many of the issues of The Geographical Journal, the journal 
of the Royal Geographical Society, in the decades prior to the First World War. 
 
While informed by, and occasionally in conversation with the promoters of geopolitics, these 
frontier geographers, in contrast, aimed to remove political contestation from its central role in 
compartmentalizing the not-yet-colonized world, and replace it with a scientific logic. One way 
this was done was by attributing conflict not to contradictory imperial interests and goals within 
a particular region but instead simply to geographical ignorance, perhaps inspired by Thomas 
Holdich’s many articles on this line of argument. On the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary, for 
example, the contest was not between Britain and Germany but between the dangers of 
ignorance and the stability to be gained through co-operation and knowledge, according to one 
frontier commissioner: 
 
The whole demarcation had been carried out on the give-and-take principle, within the limits laid 
down, neither side gaining or losing any appreciable amount of territory…It is hoped that this 
demarcation will be final, and that this, the least-known and most mountainous frontier in West 
Africa, which has taken so many years to determine, is now permanently established. There should 
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be no local frontier difficulties, as the officials on both sides are now furnished with an identic map, 
whereas hitherto they have had no maps at all.32 
 
The important assumption to recognize here is that any ‘frontier difficulties’ would arise from 
frontier officers lacking specific cartographic information about their responsibilities. The 
absence of this information would either result in accidental territorial transgressions or provide 
a cover for ambitious officers looking to advance their frontier. The ‘give-and-take’ of the 
boundary commissioners, then, unlike politically engaged frontier officers, transcended the 
geopolitical goals of their respective empires and worked cooperatively to make the world safe 
for a more cosmopolitan colonialism. 
 
At the same time, of course, despite the apparent cosmopolitanism of this international regime 
of knowledge and science, only certain people could possess this knowledge, and only certain 
kinds of knowledge mattered. Earlier boundary commissions, and especially those in Asia rather 
than Africa, had taken an arguably much broader range of types of information, such as the 
Goldsmid Mission which arbitrated between Persia and Afghanistan in 1870-72. 33 They had 
followed a pattern more akin even to early boundary missions in France in the early seventeenth 
century, in that gathering information from locals by word of mouth was integral to the 
process.34 This included, for example, genealogical, legal, and historical evidence which helped 
the commission to linearize and fix boundaries that already existed but in a vague and 
fluctuating condition. 
 
By the time the ‘scramble for Africa’ was clearly underway, however, the narratives written by 
boundary commissioners stuck strictly to scientifically verifiable facts. In particular, geological 
knowledge appears increasingly, such as the following: 
 
It appeared to me that the whole region lying along the frontier from the Niger to the bluffs near 
Bussa and the Duchin Zana, extending to the north as far as Tawa, or even further, and possibly to 
the south as far as Sokoto, had, some time after the deposition of the shale above the chalk, been 
covered with a sheet of lava, of which the laterite is now the remains. The portion of this sheet 
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lying east of the line Illela-Tawa must have become subject to subaërial denudation for some long 
period before the westerly portion, to account for the very much greater depth of the valleys. 
Probably, therefore, when the lava flowed over the bottom of the shallow waters in which the 
shales were being deposited, the earth-crust in this region was undergoing a gradual upheaval, the 
eastern portion rising before and higher than the western.35 
 
Unlike genealogical information, for example, locals appeared to have little to contribute to this 
type of newly important knowledge. This is not to say that the surveyors could afford to ignore 
them in the process of boundary-drawing. The desirability of drawing borders following the 
contours of existing political units was never completely lost on them, and rather than falling 
out of the picture entirely, local political units simply blended into the naturalized landscape 
from the perspective of colonial geography. As the mountaineer and later RGS president Douglas 
Freshfield put it, ‘no line can be satisfactory that bisects the Ruwenzori range, the intricate 
valleys of which are inhabited by closely connected tribes…as a general rule, a frontier region is 
peculiarly liable to disorders where among primitive peoples it runs through the heart of a 
chain’.36 Maintaining good relations with the locals they encountered was apparently a central 
consideration commissions made: 
 
I invariably sent on a messenger overnight from each village to my next halting place, after he had 
seen me pay the headmen of villages for goods received. This went a long way towards promoting 
a proper understanding with the inhabitants of the country; it is so often due to a most trivial 
misunderstanding that regrettable incidents occur, sometimes causing delay, or even failure, in 
many of the not unimportant undertakings of the work of a Boundary Commission…[Native 
servants] can help or hinder equally well; it is so easy to spoil them, yet any show of mistrust is 
equally fatal.37 
 
Indeed, boundary commissions met some of their greatest obstacles in local resistances.38 In 
India as well, as Matthew Edney shows, survey workers were often opposed by those inhabiting 
the land under surveillance.39  For boundary commissions on the frontiers of India, military 
escorts could number in the thousands. In Africa they were generally smaller, with the escort of 
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the 1907 Anglo-German Nigeria-Cameroon boundary commission, for example, at its largest, 
consisting of 101 soldiers of the Southern Nigeria Regiment. The geographical and geological 
descriptive narratives of commissioners were seamlessly interwoven with episodes such as the 
following: ‘The attitude of the natives was friendly to the Commission throughout, except in the 
Sonkwala valley. This valley is inhabited by Bassas, who are cannibals’, which was the only given 
explanation for why the commission was attacked, killing one Southern Nigerian soldier. After 
retreating, the commission acted quickly in retaliation: 
 
Fortunately, at this time Oberleutnant Von Stephani, who had taken over the duties of German 
Commissioner, was expected at my camp, so, knowing that the inhabitants of the Sonkwala valley 
numbered 2500 men, and that it was doubtful how far the hostility had spread, I asked him if he 
would assist us…Bika and the surrounding villages were attacked, the natives not making much 
resistance, and a couple of Maxim guns being brought into action at about 5000 feet above sea-
level completed the rout. This put an end to the actual resistance. 
 
Unlike the information-finding and -sharing between colonial powers that was crucial for 
effectively fixing boundaries, then, it was necessary to maintain a distance from the ‘natives’, 
from the perspective of boundary commissioners, or even to conceal information about the 
boundaries being drawn around them:  
 
In those days we just took a blue pencil and a rule, and we put it down at Old Calabar, and drew 
that blue line up to Yola…I recollect thinking, when I was sitting having an audience with the Emir, 
surrounded by his tribe, that it was a very good thing that he did not know that I, with a blue pencil, 
had drawn a line through his territory.40 
 
Here the structure of knowledge production has been entirely reversed from the old model of a 
boundary commission as essentially an exercise in asking locals where the boundary is. Instead 
of providing the key source of knowledge, the locals are more likely to be considered a threat to 
the entire project of the boundary commissions to secure a territorial peace, and if anything, 
information is to be kept from them rather than gained from them. Of course, the knowledge of 
colonized peoples was usually crucial in the construction of empire, but imperial officials were 
at pains to obscure this fact.41 
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Viewing the ‘scramble for Africa’ with a focus on the boundary commissioners who physically 
enacted the re-division of the continent, then, reveals a picture quite different from a group of 
national representatives sitting around a map in Berlin. Rather than a process of negotiation 
between competing national interests on a Bismarckian geopolitical chessboard, the surveyors 
reveal a struggle between ‘scientific’ knowledge on one hand, and on the other hand a vast array 
of other types of knowledges. As can be seen from this section and the previous section, 
scientific geographers waged this knowledge war on two fronts. On one front, using discursive 
methods vis-à-vis political officials and diplomats, they began to establish their exclusive claim 
to know the terrain being divided up, and to know how to divide it up in a way that would 
minimize interstate warfare. Whether consciously and actively in cases such as Thomas Holdich, 
or simply by contributing to the same corpus of geographical knowledge and expertise, they 
worked to delegitimize traditional methods of territorial appropriation as ignorant, 
irresponsible, haphazard, and impermanent. By promoting friendly ‘give-and-take’ with 
boundary commissioners of other empires and settling borders by mutual agreement, they 
sought to limit the potentially dangerous activities of frontier officers, who were either hot-
headed or without sufficient information, and ultimately to colonize the world in a ‘civilized’ and 
orderly fashion. 
 
On the other front, they fought in a more physical and direct way the ‘natives’ who stood in their 
path. Yet the theodolites, perambulators, and chains that the surveyors carried with them were 
just as essential as weapons as their Maxim guns. Rather than try to infiltrate, co-opt, and 
reshape already existing knowledge networks, boundary commissions were increasingly used to 
replace them with more ‘accurate’ and ‘scientific’ knowledge. Despite the cosmopolitan 
appearances of boundary commissions, and the universal pretensions of the knowledge they 
applied, this shift precipitated by geographers away from understanding boundaries in local 
terms towards a technical application of scientific knowledge cannot be understood without 
referring to the colonial context in which it developed. The cultural differences perceived 
between colonizer and colonized were crucial in setting up the distinction between the valid 
knowledge of the surveyors and the supposed indifference or hostility to knowledge of the 
‘natives’, which necessitated the development of a whole new apparatus for establishing 
territorial boundaries. Without the opening of this gap between knowledge systems, there could 
hardly have been such a great need for a geographical discourse which required no input from 
locals. 
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Holdich’s argument in favour of better geographical knowledge in frontier regions was made 
through articles in The Geographical Journal, but its significance was by no means limited to 
academic circles. In 1907, having returned from his position as Viceroy of India after resigning in 
disgrace over a dispute with his Commander-in-Chief Lord Kitchener, Lord Curzon delivered a 
Romanes Lecture at Oxford University, on the subject of frontiers, which would be both 
applauded by ardent imperialists and long remembered in the field of Border Studies.42 The 
basic point was that in order to further the imperial civilizing mission, the British Empire needed 
to pay more systematic attention to its frontiers: 
 
Frontiers are the chief anxiety of nearly every Foreign Office in the civilized world, and are the 
subject of four out of every five political treaties or conventions that are now concluded…as a 
branch of the science of government Frontier policy is of the first practical importance, and has a 
more profound effect upon the peace or warfare of nations than any other factor, political, or 
economic…43 
 
Curzon went on to argue that much of human history, in any time and in any place, could be 
interpreted as a history of border struggles: 
 
In our own country how much has turned upon the border conflict between England and Scotland 
and between England and Wales...The Roman Empire, nowhere so like to our own as in its Frontier 
policy and experience - a subject to which I shall have frequent occasion to revert - finally broke up 
and perished because it could not maintain its Frontiers intact against the barbarians.44 
 
This was Curzon’s particular interpretation of both history and of contemporary international 
relations, but it was not extremely far removed from the conversations happening in British 
imperial circles at the time. The debates over establishing conscription and reorganizing the War 
Office, for some, hinged on Britain’s conterminous frontiers. For example, Lord Rosebery, who 
was not in favour of conscription, called it  
 
a melancholy and arduous burden laid upon the great European States by reason of their 
conterminous frontiers, and by their mutual armed exertions. This nation, which has not these 
frontiers, would never undertake that burden…45 
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Yet in response to such arguments Prime Minister Arthur Balfour retorted, just as Curzon would 
later argue in his Romanes Lecture: 
 
[N]o man can blind himself to the fact that the whole trend of circumstances in the East is to make 
us a Continental Power conterminous with another great military Continental Power, and that is 
the dominating circumstance which we have to take into account in framing our Army Estimates.46 
 
One speech, by the conservative imperialist Lord Meath, particularly closely prefigured Curzon’s 
frontiers lecture. Arguing that ‘some form of universal military training [was] necessary for the 
safety of the Empire’, it was the great extent of frontiers across the world that was the primary 
factor to be considered: 
 
We have an ever-increasing Empire with extensive land frontiers, and I am afraid there are many 
who do not appreciate the extent of those frontiers. For so long in our history were we an island 
kingdom that we have got accustomed to think that we still are more or less an island Empire…If 
we look into the matter, we find that our Empire has extensive frontiers conterminous with the 
United States, France, Germany, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium—if the Congo Free State 
be considered as practically administered by Belgium—Italy, Turkey, China, Persia, Siam, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Guatemala…the land frontiers of our Empire are probably more extensive than 
those of any other Power in the world.47 
 
A paraphrased version of this speech was Curzon’s starting point in his 1907 lecture: 
 
I wonder, indeed, if my hearers at all appreciate the part that Frontiers are playing in the everyday 
history and policy of the British Empire. Time was when England had no Frontier but the ocean. 
We have now by far the greatest extent of territorial Frontier of any dominion in the globe…We 
commonly speak of Great Britain as the greatest seapower, forgetting that she is also the greatest 
land-power in the Universe.48 
 
Whether or not one sees linear borders when one looks at politics will necessarily depend on 
one’s perspective. The imagery of the line may or may not be a relevant reference point, 
depending on one’s lived experiences and the symbols that one is exposed to. But for 
rationalizing global empires increasingly interested in totalizing geopolitical theories, it was 
convenient to think of the world in these terms, which seemed just as valid in the ‘empty spaces’ 
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of Africa as they were in the middle of European ‘homelands’. Given that space is assumed to 
be universally divisible by lines into discrete territories, borders can act as a kind of lowest 
common denominator for thinking about international politics, and virtually any political 
problem can seem to be addressed by moving a boundary or drawing a new one. Under 
conditions of formal rationalization, where a premium is placed on the methodical application 
of universal rules, such a reductionist view of politics is in high demand. 
 
Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the faith of certain 
influential geographers in their ability to address political problems such as the problem of war 
with the concepts, theories, and practical experience of their own discipline suddenly increased. 
In particular, the idea took hold among many that border-drawing between territories was a 
process which crucially involved a heavily technical component, and was thus a threat to 
international stability when left solely in the hands of politicians and diplomats. While British 
geography had always been implicated in the colonial project, its political implications had been 
largely implicit in the mid-nineteenth century. To some, geography’s political implications were 
simply accidental. The idea of a ‘scientific’ frontier meant little more than a secure one, or a 
well-designed one, and for opponents of a forward policy on the Afghan frontier, it amounted 
to a thin disguise for a dangerous expansionism. 
 
To a large extent this shift can be attributed to events and experiences of colonial relations. The 
origins of the phrase ‘scientific frontier’, for example, were in the policy debates over the 
Northwest Frontier of British India and the relations of the British Empire with Afghanistan. It 
later became a key term of the early debates in border studies primarily through the writings of 
Thomas Holdich, one of the more prominent frontier officers of British India, and a key factor in 
the persuasiveness of Holdich’s arguments were his experiences in border drawing from India 
to South America. The great many border commissions implemented in the decades leading up 
to WWI, mostly in the colonial world, were also a significant factor in consolidating the 
confidence of geographers in their ability to stabilize international politics through the 
application of technical expertise. Since no major colonial war had broken out, the narrative 
went, amidst the colossal re-appropriation of the earth’s surface that was nearing its end, border 
commissions must have been doing their job well. 
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Colonial Reflection: Scientific Frontiers at the Paris Peace Conference 
 
The idea that a border could be ‘scientific’, which emerged in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century debates, at first primarily in the context of the expansion and rationalization 
of British imperial rule, had far-reaching consequences. This section explores how this idea 
underwrote the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which, in contrast to previous comparable 
settlements such as the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815, relied heavily on experts such as 
geographers. At Vienna, the goal of many of the leading diplomats had been to achieve a balance 
of power after the chaos and transformation brought by the Napoleonic and French 
Revolutionary wars.49 Populations and territories were beginning to be counted and tabulated 
to some extent, but reliable figures and exhaustive cadastral mapping were not quite yet 
available. Moreover, what was most important was that the settlement would be legitimate—
in a conservative sense of the word—and would contain safeguards against the rise of another 
Napoleon, particularly through a balance of power, by then an old, traditional concept. ‘The 
balance of power was not to be simply a territorial arrangement; it was, more importantly, a 
strategic and military balance. It could not be weighed precisely, and was not measured or 
calculated to leave each of the five powers with an equal share’.50 
 
At Paris, by contrast, much of the territorial content of the resulting treaties were processed by 
experts, rather than simply politicians or diplomats. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919. 
Bringing the First World War officially to a close, the Paris Conference was centrally concerned 
with territorial changes in Europe, drawing three thousand miles of new borders. With the 
collapse of the major continental European empires, the victorious Allies sought to balance 
resurging national aspirations against each other, along with their own interests, in a turbulent 
context of revolution and scattered continuing warfare. The difficulties of drawing linear borders 
cartographically separating intricately intermixed national groups were well known, but the 
institution of linear borders was never seriously questioned, resulting in an advantage to those 
who could best manipulate them. Thus in a certain respect, the basic logic of the peace process 
resembled more closely the colonial boundary-drawing of the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth centuries than the Vienna Congress. While there had been some precedent for peace 
preparations during wartime, this was done during WWI to a far greater extent than before, by 
France, the British Empire, and the US. The Americans at Paris believed that all sorts of 
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information had to be compiled, from ethnic and linguistic demography to history to economic 
data, and processed together by appropriate experts, into the end product: maps with certain 
linear borders. It was this scientific process, more than any traditional concepts such as the 
balance of power, which would legitimate the peace. At Vienna, delegates had aimed at a 
general balance of population sizes, but at Paris, the nationality of populations down to the 
village level was hotly contested.  
 
Despite increased scholarly attention to the topic, the concept of the scientific frontier did not 
become any clearer, and differing definitions proliferated rather than becoming consolidated. 
In some cases, the imprint of the colonial boundary-drawing experience is more or less directly 
observable, which I deal with later in the chapter. But the new map of Europe drawn at Paris 
was not always a direct implementation of any of the particular ideas of Holdich or Curzon, 
although the geographers consulted were undoubtedly familiar with their work. More 
importantly, it is the idea that the ‘scientific frontier’, once Benjamin Disraeli’s much-mocked, 
thinly veiled justification for imperial expansionism, could be genuinely put into practice in the 
first place, and on a global scale, that is owed to their careers as geographers, and which forms 
a link between Holdich’s imperial ‘boundary-making era’ of the late nineteenth century and the 
scientific peace of the early twentieth century. 
 
 
The Generalized Scientific Frontier 
 
The possibility of recognizing a scientific boundary or frontier anywhere, as opposed to the 
earlier use of the phrase ‘scientific frontier’ in its specific context of the British India frontier 
debates, can be observed before the First World War in the work of Ellen Semple, the first female 
president of the Association of American Geographers. In an influential book which adapted 
Friedrich Ratzel’s environmental determinist human geography, or ‘anthropogeography’, for 
introduction to an Anglophone audience, Semple defined a ‘scientific boundary’ as ‘Any 
geographical feature which…presents a practically uninhabitable area’.51  This was ‘not only 
because it holds apart the two neighboring peoples and thereby reduces the contact and friction 
which might be provocative of hostilities, but also because it lends protection against attack’. 
Examples included the Appalachian Mountains to the west of the Thirteen Colonies and the 
Scandinavian Mountains between Norway and Sweden. While scientific boundaries were often 
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mountains, they could also potentially be rivers, in the presence of ‘some physiographic feature 
which makes the stream an obstacle to communication’, such as the lowest portion of the 
Danube, ‘strewn with swamps and lakes, and generally unfit for settlement’.52 Semple was not 
the first to use the phrase, but she may have been the first to give it this particular definition, 
and the first geographer to discuss the concept theoretically. Ratzel theorized ‘geographical’ or 
‘natural’ frontiers as obstacles to human movement or habitation, but used the phrase ‘scientific 
frontier’ rarely, in quotation marks, and in a very different way, referring the entrenched, 
fortified boundaries of old states rather than geophysical features.53 As Semple drew extensively 
on Holdich’s and similar work, it is likely that mountain barriers came through as such an 
effective ‘scientific boundary’ here in large part because of the importance of mountain 
boundaries for British India and, by extension, Anglophone geography, rather than because of 
Ratzel. 
 
But the real moment for a generalized scientific approach to borders in geography came with 
the outbreak of the First World War, when the question of the future boundaries of Europe was 
posed virtually as soon as the war began. In this context Holdich, as the designated boundaries 
expert among British geographers, became associated with the concept after he argued for a 
generalized ‘scientific boundary’ using mountain chains and watershed boundaries.54 Showing 
the extent to which his background in colonial surveying shaped his view of boundaries, Holdich 
continued to point to the Himalayas as the absolute ideal frontier. Lionel Lyde, on the other 
hand, made an internationalist argument against Holdich’s boundaries of separation: ‘The 
insistence on physical barriers and purely military frontiers denies alike the fundamental 
economic unity of the world and the dawning political comity of Man.’55 Instead he favoured 
river boundaries for purposes of assimilation; ‘In a navigable river’, he argued, ‘we have a feature 
encouraging a maximum of peaceful tendencies’.56 Economist Simon Patten, moreover, argued 
that economic progress made it inevitable that states would conform to large economic zones. 
‘Scientific boundaries could easily be arranged that would bind together the people within 
them’, while a small state like Belgium, for example, ‘is an artificial state created out of the whole 
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cloth with no regard to social or economic condition’. 57  Societies such as the RGS were 
concerning themselves with Europe as they never had before. 
 
Running through the whole discourse was the question of national boundaries and whether they 
should become political boundaries after the war. While many agreed that states should be 
conterminous with nations as an ideal, while not necessarily practicable in reality, geographers 
such as Leon Dominian argued that it was the only way to curb warfare:  
 
The European war is no exception to the fact that almost every conflict of magnitude has been due, 
in part, to ill-adjusted frontier lines…The part played by language during [the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries] is of tantamount importance to the religious feeling which formerly caused 
many a destructive war.58  
 
Yet while Dominian disagreed with Holdich on the importance of nations, he held the same belief 
in scientific boundaries, holding that ‘Never has it been realized better than at the present time 
that an ill-adjusted boundary is a hatching-oven for war. A scientific boundary, on the other 
hand, prepares the way for permanent goodwill between peoples’. 59  The reason for the 
particular focus on languages, rather than nations more broadly, was methodological: ‘Having 
developed naturally, they correspond to national aspirations. Such being the case, the task of 
frontier delimitation can be made to assume a scientific form’.60 The stage was set, then, for the 
rationalization of Europe, using the practical geographical knowledge gained and practices 
developed in the British Empire from the rationalization of imperial peripheries. 
 
 
The Inquiry 
 
The discourse on scientific boundaries ended up having an important influence on the Paris 
Peace Conference, most notably through the United States. The US was not the only involved 
power that was able to use this particular type of knowledge to its advantage, but it did so 
perhaps more clearly than any other party, through its specially designed body of experts, called 
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‘The Inquiry’.61 President Woodrow Wilson set up the Inquiry in 1917, only a few months after 
the American declaration of war, bringing together a large group of mostly academics from 
various disciplines. The Inquiry was a secretive organization separate from the State Department 
and answerable only to President Wilson, through Edward House, Wilson’s right-hand man, and 
Sidney Mezes, a philosopher of religion and House’s brother-in-law. It incorporated academics 
from a wide variety of disciplines, but geographers in particular exerted a strong influence over 
the activities of the organization, much of which consisted of making maps and reports on 
particular boundaries. Isaiah Bowman, who since 1915 had been reenergizing the American 
Geographical Society as Director, relaunching its journal as the Geographical Review and 
doubling membership, arguably emerged as the de facto leader and policymaker of the Inquiry.62 
Bowman and the human and cartographic resources of the AGS, which he brought along with 
him, were seen by the Inquiry’s leadership as crucial for their efforts. 
 
It was an unprecedented effort, in type and scale, to compile and process scientific knowledge, 
before the beginning of the negotiations, to put the US delegation in the best possible position. 
Conceived essentially as a human computer, it was intended to be able to supply US negotiators 
with data and maps at a moment’s notice in order to support the American position. Obtaining 
copies of the ‘Black Book’, which contained the Inquiry’s key maps and desired European 
boundaries, was reportedly a goal of other delegations. Unmatched by any of the other 
delegations, the US was the only party to the conference that was able to assemble a concrete 
set of proposed borders for the whole of Europe in the early stages of the negotiations. But more 
than that, Wilson relied on the members of the Inquiry, who were constantly referred to casually 
as ‘experts’, for rationally defensible political goals which would free Europe from the petty and 
antiquated balance-of-power politics which Americans assumed was the cause of the war. 
Wilson himself had outlined the ‘Fourteen Points’, but it was up to the Inquiry to apply the 
Wilsonian vision in practice by filling in every minute detail. As Wilson said to Bowman, ‘Tell me 
what’s right and I’ll fight for it. Give me a guaranteed position’.63 
 
Members of the Inquiry working on boundary issues were well aware of, and in several cases 
participants in, academic discussions using and debating the concept of the scientific frontier. 
Ellen Semple, a decade before the Inquiry, had already been using the concept to mean a 
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strategic barrier, or line of separation, in the fabric of human geography, usually one which was 
conditioned by non-human forces, such as geology or climate.64 Leon Dominian, a staff member 
of the AGS before the Inquiry, had published an article in 1915 in the AGS Journal on ‘Linguistic 
Areas in Europe’ which argued that the course of recent history had been towards the formation 
of distinct areas of nationality defined by language, allowing the use of the science of linguistic 
geography to determine ‘valid and practicable’ boundaries.65 While he did not use the exact 
phrase ‘scientific boundary’ then, by the time he had been working for the Inquiry and enlarged 
this article into a book, he did call boundaries ‘scientific’ when they had been determined with 
reference to linguistic areas, suggesting that this parlance may have come to him through 
collaboration at the Inquiry.66 Inquiry member Douglas Johnson, additionally, who had worked 
with the US Geological Survey between 1901 and 1905, and had taught physiography at 
Columbia, published an article on boundaries in 1917 in the AGS Journal.67 As Thomas Holdich’s 
conception of boundaries as strategic barriers, utilizing topographical features like mountain 
ranges, was probably dominant among Anglo-American geographers, Johnson began with 
Holdich. The work of British colonial officials, particularly Thomas Holdich and Lord Curzon, in 
one way or another, shaped the way in which all three of these members of the Inquiry viewed 
boundaries. 
 
The Inquiry, and other efforts like it, had an important impact on the outcome of the conference. 
Without this supply of facts and expertise to counter opposing claims and arguments, Wilson’s 
much-ridiculed project of a just and fair settlement could easily have been marginalized by the 
conference. As a historian of the Inquiry put it,  
 
It is virtually inconceivable to think of the peace treaties of 1919 assuming the form they did 
without benefit of the enormous preparatory effort exerted by the Allied governments and the 
United States…Perhaps there is no better measure than the work of the Inquiry to indicate that 
the United States by 1917 had reached the status of a great power.68 
 
In practical terms, the expectation that precise borders would have to be agreed on at the 
conference created a demand for a particular kind of knowledge, which the US was able to 
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supply. The large number of borders that had to be drawn and the great detail required in 
delimiting the contours of boundaries mandated the input of geographical facts. As noted by 
Isaiah Bowman, the head of the Inquiry, ‘Unfortunately, nations cannot be separated 
approximately. A boundary has to be here, not hereabouts’.69 Command over socially privileged 
forms of geographical knowledge were particularly determining in areas of Europe such as the 
Balkans, where the most powerful states were not highly invested in any particular outcome, as 
long as agreement on borders could be reached. These time-consuming tasks were usually 
handed down to territorial commissions, where experts—some taken directly out of the 
Inquiry—had almost free reign to draw borders. But even in more widely contentious areas, 
such as Poland, Inquiry experts had a decisive influence on the outcome. According to one 
observer, ‘most of the articles in the treaties were taken bodily without change from the reports 
of the commissions’.70 
 
In terms of legitimation, moreover, the message of Wilsonian self-determination risked 
perceptions of naïveté at the negotiating table unless it could be backed up with cold, hard 
‘science’. As Wilson and Bowman both understood well, maps always made political choices in 
terms of what to include or exclude, but could be very persuasive by taking on an appearance 
of neutral objectivity. As Bowman put it, ‘A map was as good as a brilliant poster, and just being 
a map made it respectable, authentic. A perverted map was a life-belt to many a foundering 
argument’. 71  Bowman ensured that maps would always be at the ready for the American 
delegation. Despite inexperience and internal divisions, it was this cartographic virtuosity, 
necessitated by linear borders, for which the US drew praise from other delegations. 
 
 
Italy’s Scientific Frontiers 
 
One of the most intractable areas dealt with by the Peace Conference was the delimitation of 
the Italian borders with the successor states of the collapsed Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it is 
this set of problems which perhaps best illustrates the way in which the politics of expertise 
influenced the outcome. In the 1915 Treaty of London, Italy had been promised territories by 
the Triple Entente, in the Austrian Alps and scattered along the eastern Adriatic coast, in 
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exchange for joining them and ending its alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. As a 
member of the winning alliance, Italy might have been expected to receive this compensation, 
which was mostly in former enemy territory, without much trouble.72 Italy was also a member 
of the Council of Four, along with Britain, France, and the US, and so based on the structure of 
the negotiations, its views should have been privileged over those of the weaker and brand new 
states of Austria and Yugoslavia. On top of this, Italy had managed to achieve an armistice line 
with Austria along nearly the same line as the Treaty of London, and had occupied these 
territories with minimal allied participation in the last moments of the war.73 Weighing against 
Italy, however, was number nine of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, delivered in January 1918, which 
read as follows: ‘A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognizable lines of nationality’.74 Britain and France, not eager to revisit their promises to Italy 
but wanting to stay on good terms, decided strategically to avoid major roles in the negotiations. 
In the end, the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye gave Italy almost precisely the territories 
it was promised on the Austrian frontier. However, it gained little of the Adriatic coastal area it 
had hoped for, with the Yugoslav border remaining unsettled until the bilateral 1920 Treaty of 
Rapallo, after the end of the Peace Conference. 
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Figure 3: Lines Proposed in the Tyrol, 1914-191975 
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Figure 4: Lines drawn in the Adriatic, 1915-192076 
 
                                                             
75 René Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), 92. 
76 Ibid., 305. 
182 
 
No explanation of the marked variation between the Italo-Austrian and Italo-Yugoslav outcomes 
can avoid referring to the politics of expertise. While the Inquiry was impressive and ground-
breaking in some ways, its level of expertise and knowledge on the incredibly vast array of 
different parts of the world it aspired to was, at best, varied.77 The Inquiry possessed several 
staff members with extensive knowledge of a particular country or region, both first-hand and 
through university training. Its ranks included natives of Canada, Poland, Romania, Russia, and 
Turkey, and members who had studied in Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
and Russia. In many cases, however, their expertise on the questions they were assigned to 
research was academically questionable. For example, most of the members producing reports 
on parts of the Ottoman Empire were classicists. On Italy, in particular, the Inquiry’s expertise 
was near non-existent. It had two ‘experts’ assigned to Italian issues, one of which was a 
professor of English history who had picked up ‘some’ Italian while researching medieval Anglo-
Papal relations. The other was also an instructor of medieval history, but had no knowledge of 
Italian at all. As Gelfand concludes, this arrangement of personnel ‘was either an indication of 
some gross underestimation as to the huge dimensions of the Italian question in the peace 
settlement or of the inability of the Inquiry to find a qualified student of modern Italian history 
in the United States’.78 Indeed, one staff member remarked, ‘It is exceedingly difficult to find a 
historian who is not already engaged in one form of war work or another who has knowledge of 
Italian’.79 
 
In the absence of much specialist knowledge on Italy, the Inquiry’s thinking on Italy’s Austrian 
border, and thus Wilson’s position, was strongly influenced by the concept of the scientific 
frontier, which repeatedly was shown to contradict the nationality principle. Discussion of the 
future Italo-Austrian border among geographers went back at least to 1915, when Douglas 
Freshfield, then President of the RGS, in a paper read to the society, had advanced Ratzel’s 
argument that the Italian Alps, despite being largely within Austria, were geographically ‘wholly 
Italian’.80 Freshfield was a mountaineer par excellence of his time, presenting himself as an 
expert on the area who had climbed its tallest mountain, and concerned himself with mountains 
in his political interventions, having favoured boundaries along mountain ranges in his earlier 
work on the Uganda frontier.81 He advocated for the accepting Italy’s claimed frontier, which 
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bisected the crucial Brenner Pass, despite acknowledging that Bozen/Bolzano, one of the two 
largest cities included in the Italian claim, was ‘undoubtedly Teutonic in its language and its 
architecture, if not in its landscape’.82 Douglas Johnson, two years later, agreed with Freshfield 
in an article in the AGS journal. Unlike Freshfield, Johnson considered the Austrian counter-offer 
to be closer to the linguistic boundary than the Italian claim, yet as an ‘impartial observer’ still 
supported the latter on strategic grounds, since it would allow Italy access to the key mountain 
passes. Holdich was undoubtedly an influence here, not just because the article had begun with 
Holdich’s theory of boundaries, but also because it was a ‘strategic’ frontier, meaning one which 
would serve as an effective barrier to either side, which Johnson favoured in the end, over the 
nationality principle. 
 
Within the official activities of the Inquiry, there was only one report on the Italo-Austrian 
border, written by Ellen Semple. Semple had previously written a chapter in her book, The 
Influences of Geographic Environment, on mountains as a barrier to human movement, using 
Holdich’s writings on the Himalayas and Hindu Kush, as well as the Alps, as some of the most 
prominent examples.83 It was no surprise, then, that her report for the Inquiry concurred with 
Johnson and Freshfield on the justice of the Italian claims, arguing that in order to prevent Italy 
from having to fight a literally ‘uphill battle’ in the future, the boundary should be adjusted from 
the perspective of strategic needs as well as nationality.84 By the time of the Peace Conference, 
an additional reason to view the frontier from a military-strategic point of view had appeared, 
as the collapse of Austria-Hungary had reopened the German Question and made Austria’s 
unification with Germany a real possibility and clear threat to Italy’s future.  
 
As of 21 January, 1919, the Intelligence Section of the American delegation submitted tentative 
recommendations for the boundaries of Europe and the Ottoman remnants, giving an Italo-
Austrian frontier ‘midway between the linguistic line and the line of the Treaty of London, 
1915’.85 The recommended line did not give Italy all it wanted, but it clearly bore the stamp of 
Holdich’s line of thinking, as the fact that it was beyond the linguistic line was justified in that it 
‘is a good line from the geographical standpoint, follows natural lines of demarcation and 
coincides with the marked topographical barrier between regions climatically dissimilar’. Yet in 
the end, Italy received all of its northern demands, even including some it had made after the 
Treaty of London. According to Johnson, who was present at many high-level discussions as the 
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US representative on the Subcommission on Territorial Questions,86 this significant amendment 
of Wilson’s earlier concern with the nationality principle was because: 
 
In the opinion of the American specialists, to push the frontier northward only so far as the 
ethnographic frontier would still leave Austria, or Germany and Austria combined in case of their 
future union, in possession of very great strategic advantages over their Latin neighbour, 
advantages which might invite aggression. To push the boundary farther north, to the natural 
topographic boundary referred to above, would give reasonable protection to Italy by making 
invasion from the north so difficult as to be highly improbable…87 
 
Wilson himself, in a memo to the Italian Prime Minister, said of the Italian territorial questions, 
‘There is no question I have given more careful or anxious thought than I have given to this’.88 
The result of this careful thought appears to have been a complete acceptance of the American 
experts’ position on the Austrian portion of the Treaty of London frontier, which would establish 
‘an absolutely adequate frontier of safety for Italy against any possible hostility or aggression…’ 
 
In contrast to its Austrian border, Italy did not achieve its aims with regard to its Yugoslav border. 
Based on advice from the American experts, Wilson did not accept the validity of the Italian 
arguments here, and the border could only be settled outside the context of the Peace 
Conference, after it had finished. In large part this was because, despite its relatively weak 
military position and the precarious condition of its recently formed state, Yugoslavia had a 
stronger hand than Italy in terms of the politics of expertise. This was already true to some 
extent before the beginning of the conference, as a result of the professional connections 
existing between Yugoslav academics and American geographers and members of the Inquiry. 
Historian Robert Kerner, for example, whose special assignments within the Inquiry emphasized 
nationalisms within Austria-Hungary, knew all the main Balkan languages and had written a book 
on The Jugoslav Movement.89 In an article, ‘The Foundations of Slavic Bibliography’, he noted 
that ‘an increasing interest has been manifested in the history, languages, and literatures of the 
Slavic people’, and made it his mission to organize into a bibliography the existing ‘scientific 
information about the almost unknown Slavic people’, revealing a detailed knowledge of 
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scholars from the region.90 Kerner was regarded by many in the Inquiry as being strongly biased 
towards Slavs, but objections to his membership of the Inquiry were overruled because of his 
knowledge of languages.91 An important part of the Inquiry’s knowledge of Yugoslavia was thus 
situated within a broader emergence of ‘Slavonic Studies’, as evidenced by new academic 
institutions such as King’s College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
(SSEES), founded in 1915 by Tomáš Masaryk, a sociologist and later first Prime Minister of 
Czechoslovakia.92  
 
But probably no one did more to both increase the academic visibility specifically of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia, or for that matter to coordinate the technical aspects of the Yugoslav position at the 
Paris Peace Conference, than Jovan Cvijić, professor of geography and rector of Belgrade 
University.93 Cvijić founded the Geographical Society of Belgrade, along with a journal, and 
according to SSEES’s journal, ‘Cvijić's advent marks the beginning of Serbian geographical 
scholarship and foreshadows the end of the Austrian propagandist patronage of the subject 
states’.94 He conducted fieldwork in the Balkans every year from 1888 to 1915, the results of 
which were published in British, French, and American journals, among others, including the 
AGS journal under Isaiah Bowman’s leadership.95 In addition to being known through his work, 
he was personally well-connected with Western academics, having travelled through Western 
Europe on a two-month-long collective geological fieldwork exercise with a team of prominent 
geographers such as Lucien Gallois and William Davis, as well as future Inquiry chief cartographer 
Mark Jefferson.96 Cvijić had also been invited to Paris to teach at the Sorbonne by French 
geographer Emmanuel de Martonne while Belgrade was occupied during the war. 97  De 
Martonne, in turn, was the son-in-law of Paul Vidal de la Blanche, the preeminent geographer 
in France at the time, and worked for the Comité d’Etudes pour la Paix, the French counterpart 
of the Inquiry. Thus, thanks to Cvijić and his colleagues and students at Belgrade, if Americans 
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generally felt less than familiar with the people and geography of the Balkans, the Inquiry at 
least was by no means hindered from seeing Serbian perspectives on the region. 
 
At the Conference itself, Yugoslavia’s ability to take control of the areas Cvijić insisted were 
inhabited by Yugoslavs was by no means guaranteed. Officially the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes, it came to the conference as an unrecognized state, having just been proclaimed 
in December 1918, and had had just a month to prepare, at a time when ‘”Serbia” and “Croatia” 
were uneven quantities and largely unknown to each other’.98 It could count on its neighbours 
in all directions disputing its borders, especially Romania and Italy, who had ended the war on 
the winning side. Moreover, the Russian Revolution had removed from the Paris Peace 
Conference the major traditional ally of Serbian Radicals, who made up an important part of 
Yugoslavia, leaving the new country diplomatically isolated. Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which had 
promised the peoples of Austria-Hungary ‘the freest opportunity to autonomous development’, 
gave the Yugoslav officials hope, but not quite confidence.99 Many peoples in other parts of the 
world were soon deeply disappointed by how limited the eventual application of Wilsonian self-
determination was, and indeed at the start of the Conference Wilson had intended to break up 
Yugoslavia into two or three units, which might be governed by the League of Nations as 
mandates.100 
 
A comparison of the Yugoslav and Italian delegations exhibits an important contrast in terms of 
formal qualifications and expertise. The Italian delegation, on one hand, included three 
members noted as academics, including two law professors and one historian of Italian 
unification.101 It included many of the typical categories among its ‘Technical Experts’, such as 
‘Political and Diplomatic Questions’, ‘Labor Questions’, and ‘Colonial Questions’, made up of 
politicians, diplomats, and colonial administrators. It did not have a section dedicated to 
geography, ethnography, or cartography. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, had 29 delegation 
members listed with academic positions, most of whom were professors. It had a 23-strong 
section dedicated to ‘Ethnographical and Historical Questions’ led by Cvijić. This was one of the 
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a recognized state at the beginning. 
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largest such delegation sections at Paris, although Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia also 
had smaller versions. Czechoslovakia, for example, had an eight-member section for 
‘Geographical, Ethnographical and Statistical Questions’, mostly professors, in addition to three 
professors in charge of ‘Cartographical Questions’, and one politician member specifically for 
‘Questions Relating to the Affairs of Teschen and of the Rectification of Frontiers of Czech 
Silesia’. But Italy had none. Thus, in addition to Cvijić’s professional reputation and connections, 
and the already existing validation of his perspective by Western academics, Yugoslav expertise 
at the Peace Conference in general, at least on paper, was overwhelmingly greater from a 
scientific perspective. This does not mean that Italian perspectives were not represented at all 
in academic circles. In fact, just while the negotiations at Paris were beginning to escalate, the 
RGS hosted a lecture by one Commander Giovanni Roncagli focusing on discrediting Cvijić’s 
geographical arguments on the Italo-Yugoslav border, which found a not unsympathetic 
audience.102 But at this point it was too late, and in any case British politicians were less likely 
than Wilson to be swayed by expert opinion.  
 
Unlike the Austrian frontier, then, which was quickly agreed upon amongst the American 
delegation, and then the Conference itself, the Yugoslav frontier opened up deep divisions on 
the American side, and no treaty was able to settle it during the Conference. On one hand there 
were American experts such as Douglas Johnson, who met with Cvijić in 1918 and 1919 to discuss 
the matter, and were convinced that the preponderance of ‘Jugo-Slavs’ in the disputed areas 
meant that they could not go to Italy.103 Their report accepted unproblematically the existence 
of a ‘Jugo-Slav’ people, which for example ‘have been settled in Dalmatia for twelve centuries’, 
showing the influence of a particular perspective shared by Cvijić, who had been referring to 
them as a historical people in his AGS journal articles.104 On the other hand, some Americans 
situated themselves closer to Italy, such as Edward House, the president’s right-hand man, 
Sidney Mezes, the side-lined nominal leader of the Inquiry, and George Louis Beer, the expert 
on colonial affairs. Their thinking was one of the clearest manifestation of opinion on the 
American side against the predominant fixation with science and expertise; as Beer put it, ‘the 
world is really waiting for a solution until Johnson can be brought to make some compromise 
between geography and politics’.105 But he also captured the group’s broader sentiments in 
                                                             
102 Giovanni Roncagli, ‘Physical and Strategic Geography of the Adriatic’, The Geographical Journal 53:4 
(Apr. 1919), 209-223. 
103  Crampton, ‘The cartographic calculation of space’, 743; Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace 
Conference, 426-428. 
104 Cvijić, ‘Geographical Distribution’; ‘The Zones of Civilization of the Balkan Peninsula’, Geographical 
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lamenting that ‘Germans, Magyars and Italians were being sacrificed to people whose cultural 
value was infinitely less…It is far preferable to have Poles under Germans and Jugo-Slavs under 
Italians than the contrary, if there is no other good alternative’.106 Thus the debate within the 
American delegation was framed as between the authority of scientific geography and expertise 
on the Yugoslav side, and superior civilization and sober geopolitics on the Italian side. 
 
With the debate framed explicitly in this way, Wilson could only side with the former. While 
Wilson was away from Paris, House began to cede negotiating ground significantly to the 
Italians, backed by his brother-in-law Mezes as head of the Inquiry, and they reported to the 
President that the specialists supported them.107 But Bowman, Johnson, and others had sent 
Wilson an ‘experts’ letter’ confirming that they had done no such thing. Wilson’s trust in House 
was irrevocably severed by this revelation. He thoroughly entrenched himself on the Yugoslav 
side, driving the Italians to walk out of the negotiations, and the end, it was up to the Italians 
and Yugoslavs to sign a treaty largely of their own making over a year later. Fiume/Rijeka, which 
had been the focus of the struggle, was made a free state, and while Italy received all of the 
Istrian peninsula, it failed to gain any part of the former Austrian province of Dalmatia outside 
the city of Zara/Zadar, nor did it receive any of the major islands it claimed to the south of 
Dalmatia. Italy’s insistence on territorial expansion, to the point of walking out of negotiations, 
coupled with its powerful military position, was far from inconsequential, as Italy was able to 
gain Istria. But the fact that Italy did not achieve the commanding position over the rest of the 
Adriatic that it had hoped for, and for which it had entered the war, was in large part due to the 
politics of expertise, within which Yugoslavia had better chances than Italy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Linear borders are constructed through and make possible certain historically particular kinds of 
knowledge. The possibility of making this knowledge seem authoritative, objective, and neutral, 
rather than political, is what distinguishes it as a particular political tool. This had been an 
aspiration in the Thirteen Colonies, where institutions were set up to try to regulate settlers’ 
land claims in order to secure private property, and to deny Native American claims to those 
lands, by implementing survey rationality. The creation of a technical sphere of society including 
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surveyors enabled colonial governments, and later, the federal government, to control the 
settlement of the frontier while at the same time presenting themselves as simply liberal 
protectors of private property. It was only through the assertion of a separation between politics 
and the realm of technical knowledge that this system was possible. In the eighteenth century, 
this technical knowledge was often passed down orally through apprenticeships, and since the 
translation of the basic geometrical principles of surveying into vernacular languages, it had 
retained a certain separation from the higher arts and sciences, although some political and legal 
theorists recognized its importance. Yet in the late nineteenth-century context of the 
construction of disciplines and scholarly associations, the technical expertise of boundary 
surveyors found a niche in the academy itself, and Border Studies came to exist as a subfield of 
geography. Thus emerged the boundary expert, who could advise diplomats and politicians on 
the best location for a border. Having no especially deep knowledge of the people or the place 
of any particular border area, what was important for the boundary expert was an 
understanding of the technical process of creating boundaries in general, and of abstracted 
geographical factors on human societies. As part of a broader faith in scientific expertise in the 
early twentieth century, these boundary experts played important roles in redrawing the 
boundaries of Europe after the First World War, both directly as commissioners formulating 
policy positions, and more diffusely as part of the foundations of the legitimacy of the Wilsonian 
approach to international politics. 
 
The emergence and evolution of the concept of the ‘scientific frontier’ illustrates these points. 
In its original context of the British India frontier debates, the scientific frontier simply meant a 
strategic optimization of the Northwest Frontier of India. While it was a rhetorical device which 
took advantage of all that ‘science’ meant in an industrializing society, its meaning included the 
arrangement of forces, the building of railroads, and anything else that might bring security. In 
this sense it was a particular problem looked at from a general perspective. With the 
systematisation of boundary surveying knowledge in the form of Border Studies that began in 
the late nineteenth century, along with the consolidation in practice of the global linearization 
of borders, the scientific frontier became a general problem seen from a particular perspective. 
Instead of involving a variety of components, the scientific frontier came to be concerned strictly 
with the placement of a clearly defined line onto a landscape, and, no longer confined to the 
Northwest Frontier context, it could be applied anywhere, whether South America or Europe. 
Yet although the concept was now applied universally without always remembering its origins, 
it remained tied to its original context. Whether it was abstracted as a fortification or wall, better 
natural but potentially artificial, or as any landscape whose geography conditioned separation 
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between societies, the concept had been constructed so as to single out the frontiers of British 
India as some of the best there were. Thus one of the clearest impacts that Border Studies had 
on the Paris Peace Conference was in the extension of Italy’s Austrian frontier to the Brenner 
Pass despite the predominance of Germans on both sides, or in other words, the establishment 
of a scientific frontier on the model of India’s, regardless of anyone’s nationality. 
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Chapter Seven 
A Genealogy of Partition 
 
 
A recurring phenomenon in modern international politics is what is known as territorial 
partition. Various definitions of partition exist, but I understand it here as a new political 
separation of a territory into two or more territories, typically, but not necessarily, along newly 
demarcated lines.1 While this concept of partition could potentially be a useful one in analysing 
territorial politics of any time and place, it is only since the eighteenth century that it has been 
used as such.2 Several IR scholars have noted that since the late nineteenth century states have 
decreased in size on the whole, reversing a previous trend of increasing state sizes, and have 
tried to explain this pattern.3 Partition is a significant part of this. At certain points in recent 
decades, the various communal conflicts for which it has routinely been proposed as a solution 
have appeared to be a defining feature of politics in the post-Cold War world.4 A vast literature 
within IR has attempted to address the question of whether or not partition is an adequate 
response to these instances of violence.5 
 
In chapter three I briefly outlined several reasons why the linearization of borders is important 
for understanding why, by various measures, partition seems to be increasing in relevance for 
international politics, in terms of the longue durée. First, space becomes divisible in new ways, 
                                                             
1 For example, quite often partition is defined in the literature so as to exclude relatively historically 
distant partitions which do not seem to follow today’s patterns, such as the various treaties and 
agreements referred to historically as the ‘partition of Turkey’, or what is still today called the ‘partition 
of Poland’. For example, Brendan O’Leary defines a partition of a country as being drawn through its 
national homeland, excluding Ottoman Turkey. Brendan O’Leary, ‘Analysing partition: Definition, 
classification and explanation’, Political Geography 26 (2007), 886-908. Robert Schaeffer considers 
partition to involve some kind of devolution, excluding Poland. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics 
of Partition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 5. 
2 Not counting the first Partition Treaty of 1698; discussed below. T. G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India 
and Palestine (London: Macmillan, 1984), 4. 
3 Ryan Griffiths, Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016); David Lake and Angela O’Mahoney, ‘The Incredible Shrinking State: 
Explaining Change in the Territorial Size of Countries’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:5 (Oct. 2004), 699-
722. 
4 Allan Buchanan in the 1990s proclaimed ‘the age of secession’, later modified to ‘the age of wars of 
secession’. Allan Buchanan, ‘Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law’, in Robert Kim and Jeff 
McMahan (eds), The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 301. 
5 Chaim Kaufmann, ‘When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth 
Century’, International Security 23:2 (Fall 1998), 120-156; David Campbell, ‘Apartheid cartography: the 
political anthropology and spatial effects of international diplomacy in Bosnia’, Political Geography 18 
(1999), 395-435; Reece Jones, ‘The false premise of partition’, Space and Polity 18:3 (2014), 285-300; 
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as a technically infinite number of possible divisions can be traced over any given territorial area, 
even as the requirement of precision establishes new limitations. Second, the concrete 
abstraction of linear borders, and the appearance of precision and measurability makes it 
possible to territorialize and spatialize in new ways conflicts and divisions which might not 
otherwise have a strong spatial aspect. Third, linear borders and the abstraction of territorial 
division from other forms of division give partition the appearance of being fundamentally the 
same everywhere, allowing new transnational connections to be made in discourses and 
practices. 
 
In this chapter I focus specifically on the third of these claims, and illustrate it through an analysis 
of a broad range of what has been called partition since the term came to be applied to polities. 
The existing literature on partition tends to look at individual partitions as cases of a general 
trend or universal potentiality, or to make comparisons between them.6 In contrast, this chapter 
emphasizes the connectedness of partitions and the thick set of social relations that make up 
the international.7 Thus this chapter examines partition as one object of analysis, greater than 
the sum of its parts. Partition is not only a concept that objectively describes certain kinds of 
territorial changes which have the potential to appear in any historical time or place, nor is it 
simply the logical outcome of an international environment where nationalisms play a significant 
role. Partition, rather, is also a discourse and a set of practices which have a history. 
 
Benedict Anderson argued that nationalism is a ‘modular’ phenomenon, or in other words, it is 
‘capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of 
social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and 
ideological constellations’. 8  Beginning with the anti-colonial movements of the Americas, 
nationalisms in certain places had international significance because the content of those 
                                                             
6 Much of the literature on partition falls into George Lawson’s category of ‘history as scripture’, in that it 
mines history as data from which to draw inferences that can be abstracted from history, rather than 
taking seriously the uniqueness of events. George Lawson, ‘The eternal divide? History and International 
Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 18:2 (2012), 203-226. For general accounts of 
partition with a greater focus on, in Lawson’s terms, context, eventfulness, and narrative, see Fraser, 
Ireland, India, and Palestine; Schaeffer, Warpaths; and Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals 
of Partition (London: Verso, 1997). Constitutive and causal connections between partitions, however, do 
not feature prominently in any of these. 
7 Arie Dubnov gestures towards a similar approach to partition history in ‘Notes on the Zionist passage to 
India, or: The analogical imagination and its boundaries’, Journal of Israeli History 35:2 (2016), 177-214. 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Connected Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia’, 
Modern Asian Studies 31:3 (July 1997), 735-762; Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘Retrieving the Imperial: 
Empire and International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31:1 (2002), 109-127. 
8  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 2006), 4. 
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movements found resonances and were politically useful elsewhere. This chapter builds on that 
argument, by showing partition as a series of events transnationally connected by the borrowing 
and adapting of concepts and tropes from other parts of the world. Using tried concepts and 
tropes from other contexts can be a powerful technique not only because it builds on the 
discursive work of articulation done by others but also because it can lead to certain 
expectations of success, given a certain interpretation of what the results of that articulation 
were elsewhere. As a framework for imagining and analysing events which can appear natural, 
perennial, or inevitable, ‘partition’ can also serve to limit the range of actions and outcomes that 
seem possible or plausible. 
 
This does not mean that partition does not change. Partha Chatterjee has argued that 
Anderson’s modular nationalisms write a script which leaves nothing left for the rest of the world 
to imagine, consigning those in the postcolonial world to be perpetual consumers, and not 
producers, of modernity.9 My intention here is not to describe such a script which would explain 
the outcomes of partitions, or to establish a general pattern which they all tend to follow, 
beyond the very loose way in which I define the concept. The argument is simply that territorial 
division, when it relies on linear borders, opens up the possibility of making discursive 
connections with other territorial divisions, and that these connections can prove important in 
the way in which partition unfolds in particular contexts. Such connections are not always made, 
and there is no determinism here. This becomes clear early on, for example, as connections 
made in the nineteenth century between partition in the colonial sphere and partition in Europe 
were denied validity, on the basis that breaking up an entity which had no sense of nationhood 
was not the same thing as the partition of a ‘civilized’ nation. Moreover, the meaning of partition 
has changed considerably over the centuries, particularly in terms of its connotations and 
associations. In this chapter I focus on three variants, the emergence of which were due to 
historically particular constellations of forces, but which nevertheless influenced each other. 
 
 
Partitions of Cooperative Territorial Expansion, 1772-1904 
 
In tracing its historical emergence, partition as a particular set of possibilities should be 
distinguished from a more general notion of territorial division, for which the only real 
precondition is territorial rule itself. An example of territorial division which is not the kind of 
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partition this chapter is interested in would be the division of the Roman Empire, which was 
effected in different forms from 285 until the collapse of the Western empire in the late fifth 
century.10 These divisions were territorial in the sense that co-emperors took administrative 
charge of particular geographical areas, but in terms of imperial ideology, the Roman Empire 
remained one entity. Co-emperors recognized each other’s status by issuing coins depicting both 
rulers together or by reckoning dates in terms of the year of each of their reigns, rather than by 
emphasizing a territorial division.11 In the official conception of this division, what was important 
was less the geography of it and more the extent to which the co-emperors ruled jointly as 
colleagues, or alternately, sought to delegitimize each other by referring to each other as 
usurpers. 
 
In estate law, the concept of ‘partition’ has a complex history which stretches back many 
centuries.12 In this context it has usually referred to the dividing up of lands among inheritors 
after the owner’s death. The legal ability, or inability, of inheritors to partition land among 
themselves had an important impact on society in that unlimited partitions could easily dissipate 
a landed family’s fortune after only a few descents. British parliamentary records as early as the 
sixteenth century reveal frequent debates about estate ‘partitions’.13 It was in this proprietary 
sense that the Spanish Empire, made up of disparate holdings across Western Europe and 
overseas, was the object of the three ‘Partition Treaties’ of 1668, 1689, and 1700, in a failed 
attempt to avert a major European war following the king’s death.14 Partition, then, did not 
come from nowhere. Yet it makes sense to begin in the late eighteenth century because, while 
sovereignty has never completely shed its associations with private property, partitions created 
at that point much more clearly carried the sense of drawing lines through homogenized 
territories, than the sense of apportioning out the earthly belongings of a dying patrician. 
 
The dismembering of Poland among Prussia, Austria, and Russia, begun in 1772 and completed 
in 1795, was rooted in a long process of weakening relative to its neighbours for at least a 
century. 15  Many observers at the time blamed Poland itself for its constitution, which 
                                                             
10 Fraser, Ireland, India and Palestine, 3. 
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12 William Lloyd, ‘Partition’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 67:2 (1919), 162-190. 
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encouraged political paralysis through the liberum veto, the right of any single nobleman to 
block any law claimed to be ‘harmful to the Commonwealth’, but this situation had long been 
carefully maintained by outside powers such as Russia. In the process of the three partitions, 
the divisions became more cartographically scientific, with an ‘Acte Définitif’ signed in 1797 
between the three powers specifying the exact locations of boundary markers and triangulation 
instructions, in response to disputes over boundaries of previous partitioning.16  
 
The partitions of Poland were a major part of the migration of the concept of partition out of 
estate law and explicitly into the realm of geopolitics, and evoked responses that locked Poland 
into the memory of politicians and diplomats. The way in which the partition cut through Poland 
was memorialized in illustrations that almost invariably depicted lines representing the new 
borders. In a particularly influential allegory drawn by Nicolas Noël le Mire and Jean-Michel 
Moreau le Jeune, the monarchs of Europe tore up pieces of a map of Poland, each taking their 
bit.17 Depicting the partition as a somehow shameful and damaging, if not violent, act, the image 
must have provided some audiences sympathetic to Poland with a compelling visualization, as 
it was copied numerous times by other illustrators.18 
 
 
Figure 5: The Twelfth Cake, Le gâteau des rois19 
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Great’, Women in German Yearbook 18 (2002), 74. 
19 Ibid., 75. Image in public domain. 
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Almost as soon as references to the partition of Poland begin to appear in parliamentary 
debates, it began to be applied to other contexts. Perhaps the first of these was Mysore, a 
kingdom in India which was proving to be a major source of resistance to the East India 
Company’s drive towards hegemony in South Asia. With it, the concept of partition took a 
negative connotation of territorial greed in debates over the activities of the Company. For 
example, within the charges Edmund Burke laid out against the leader of the Company in 1786 
was included 
 
That the Object of this fraudulent Policy (viz. the utter Destruction of Hyder Ally, and a Partition of 
his Dominions)…was incompatible with the Treaty of Peace, in which Hyder Ally was included, and 
contrary to the repeated and best-understood injunctions of the Company…’20 
 
Or to take another example, Lord Loughborough in 1791 declared the ‘unpardonable guilt’ of 
Britain in entering ‘into a treaty with the Marattas and the Nizam, to exterminate Tippoo Sultan, 
and to make a partition of his country…Could we expect…to be suffered by enlightened Europe 
to proceed in this course?’21 In response to such arguments, a proponent of the Company was 
careful to portray Tipu Sultan himself as having ‘a restless desire of conquest’.22 Far from being 
treacherously expansionist, the Company’s partition of Mysore would bring back the princes 
who were the rightful rulers:  
 
It has been said that another motive of the war was, to divide his territories.—Such a partition 
among the Princes who now languished under his tyranny, would be an event highly desirable…it 
would certainly appear as an act of justice to restore the native Princes… 
 
If a similar moral rejection of partition in both the Polish and Mysore contexts seemed natural 
to some in the late eighteenth century, this connection had to be unlearned in the nineteenth 
century, when a distinction between relations among ‘civilized’ nations and among other 
nations was drawn more sharply. For the most part this was done implicitly, but occasionally 
there were explicit arguments that colonial partitions should not be considered as part of the 
same category. For example when in 1855 Lord Robert Cecil (later Lord Salisbury) argued against 
coming to the aid of Poland,  
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The partition of Poland had been called a scandalous violation of public law, and a great public 
crime; but was the hon. Gentleman prepared to justify his doctrine on that point, as of universal 
application…There was not a quarter of the globe in which England had not increased her territory 
by precisely the same process of aggression.23 
 
Prime Minister Lord Palmerston replied that ‘the progress of the British arms in different parts 
of the world’ was morally an entirely different matter from ‘the different partitions of the 
independent kingdom of Poland’. The former conquests were ‘made against great and powerful 
enemies’, and ‘to talk of the nationality of conquered colonies taken either from France or 
Holland, or from any other power with which we were engaged in war, is really a total 
misapplication of the term’. With regard to India, it had been a ‘blessing to them to be relieved 
from the tyranny of some of those native chiefs under whose oppression they had previously 
groaned’. Instead, partitions occurring in India were usually referred to in this era in much the 
same way as property partitions were, as a morally neutral question of establishing technically 
correct legal procedures. In Julian Go’s work on the intersection of postcolonial thought and 
social theory, Go argues that much of modern social theory is encumbered by a fallacy he calls 
‘analytic bifurcation’, or the a priori separation of the social relations of the colonizer and the 
colonized and the obscuring of their mutual constitution.24 Arguably, this can be said not only of 
academic theory but also the discourses of imperialism themselves which provided the 
background for much early social theory, and it is surely apparent in these parliamentary 
discussions of partition. 
 
The question of whether or not it was appropriate to see a particular context through the lens 
of ‘partition’, and thus to read into it all manner of preconceptions taken from previous 
experiences, was a highly political issue. Whether in non-Western contexts like India, or in 
Western contexts like Belgium, it mattered greatly whether or not it was appropriate to make 
comparisons with Poland, or other partitioned entities. Even following the Holy See’s 
appointment in 1850 of Catholic diocesan bishops in England for the first time in centuries, 
implying that England would be divided up into dioceses, one MP referred to the action as 
potentially ‘the first partition of England’.25  
 
Yet the importance of the transferability of preconceptions from context to context is perhaps 
clearest in the way in which the debate over the imminent partition of the Ottoman Empire in 
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the second half of the nineteenth century was, unlike most colonial contexts, deeply shaped by 
the romanticized infamy of the Polish partitions. British policies intended to ‘regenerate’ the 
Ottoman empire were aimed at keeping such strategic positions such as the Bosporus and the 
Nile out of Russian or French hands, which were perceived as more threatening. But it was 
believed essential that such policies, if they were to be successful, did not appear as crude 
realpolitik to British public opinion.26 Differentiating British policy with regard to the Ottoman 
Empire from the Polish partitions, and showing an awareness of the lessons to be learned from 
them, then, became rhetorically necessary. In this context it made sense for an MP in 1854, 
during the Crimean War, to accuse the Times at length in the House of Commons of publishing 
a ‘feeler to see how far a plan for the partition of Turkey would be accepted by the public in this 
country’.27 When he declared that, ‘to such a partition of Turkey as might be imagined by those 
who had taken part in other partitions, England would never be a party’, it was clear which other 
partitions he was referring to. With Polish uprisings occurring throughout the nineteenth 
century, the guilt of having allowed the heinous act of partition in Poland was a common theme 
in Parliament, and it was all too easy to apply the lessons and morals of the Polish partition to 
the imminent partition of the Ottoman empire. 
 
The link between partitions was created not only by the word itself, and associated concepts, 
but also by visual means. An early re-use of the cake-cutting metaphor was in James Gillray’s 
depiction of Britain and Napoleonic France dividing the world up. 28  But it continued to be 
relevant into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in imagining colonialism in Africa 
and China. The cake in these illustrations was homogenous and ready to be carved up into any 
combination or arrangement of pieces, depending solely on the appetites of the attendees of 
the feast. It was because of the way in which linear borders altered the apparent divisibility of 
space, obliterating feudal entailments and cultural discrepancies, that this was an appropriate 
metaphor. Regardless of place or context, any area or part of the world could be a cake and 
could be apportioned out as such. One example, in Puck magazine, made this point particularly 
well, in which Britain defended the United States against the disapproval of the other major 
powers for its imperialist stance towards Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The American cake, in 
its sphere of influence, was no different from the Chinese cake that Britain and its rivals were 
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about to divide among themselves. The homogenization of these spaces, through the 
linearization of the divisions being made, is what made this type of comparison possible. 
 
 
Figure 6: James Gillray, ‘The Plumb-pudding in danger’, 180529 
 
 
Figure 7: L’Illustration, ‘A chacun sa part’, 188530 
                                                             
29 James Gillray, The plumb-pudding in danger: -or- state epicures taking un petit souper, reproduced 
with permission from the National Portrait Gallery. 
30  ‘Découpage de l’Afrique à la conférence de Berlin’, Journal L’Illustration, image available at 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IMGCDB82_-
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Figure 8: Louis Dalrymple, ‘No chance to criticize’, 1898.31 
Caption: No Chance to Criticize. John Bull (to the Powers)—What are you mad about? We can’t grudge him a light 
lunch while we are feasting! [The bottle is labelled ‘Porto Rico’, and the decanter ‘Philippine Islands’]32 
 
Cultural representations of partition, however, were not limited to Western powers, but 
travelled across contexts. One context where this was particularly true was in China, beginning 
especially in the late nineteenth century.33 Poland remained a focal point in certain discussions 
of partition which took many elements from history and geography texts written by European 
missionaries for Chinese audiences. For this reason, narratives of Poland’s internal weakness, its 
neighbours’ greed, and Polish resistance to Russia were familiar in China even before a ‘partition 
of China’ became widely discussed. Yet combining these with Chinese elements was important. 
Rather than the ‘plumb-cake’ metaphor which had surfaced in European cartoons, the term 
guafen, or ‘cutting up like a melon’, which had long existed but was previously a rare term, came 
to be the common translation of ‘partition’. Chinese history, moreover, enabled some to come 
                                                             
_Caricatura_sobre_conferencia_de_Berl%C3%ADn,_1885.jpg, under Creative Commons license (CC BY-
SA 4.0); Gabriëls, ‘Cutting the cake’, 146n. 
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image in public domain. 
32 Rudolf Wagner, ‘”Dividing up the [Chinese] Melon, guafen 瓜分": The Fate of a Transcultural 
Metaphor in the Formation of National Myth’, Transcultural Studies (2017), 89. 
33 Ibid., 11-24. 
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to very different conclusions from the problematic of partition debated in the British parliament. 
For example, a Chinese diplomat in Japan wrote the following in 1887: 
 
I therefore think that as to being partitioned and split apart, with arms and turmoil everywhere, 
nothing compares to the “seven heroes” of the Warring States period, but this was the time of the 
greatest blossoming of ethics and model conduct… 
 
He believed that the best theories of ‘dao and de’, ‘heterodox teachings’, agricultural and 
craftsmanship techniques, medicine, and in short, ‘human talent was at such a peak’ during 
China’s division into multiple polities that this Warring States period produced ‘the founding 
fathers of all later professional specialties’.34 
 
A more influential Chinese narrative than this was that which critics of the Chinese court 
articulated with the intention of prompting it to take action against encroaching Western 
powers. One element of this which arose in response to the Western narratives was indignation 
against being bullied and humiliated: 
 
The Westerners’ ridiculing of China is really going too far. When they want to wipe out a state 
belonging to others, they inevitably bring this up in their parliament and publicize it in the 
newspapers, talking every day about the abysmal quality of its governance, the chaos in its social 
order, and the officials’ wanton abuse of power.35 
 
Another point that was often stressed, through learning explicitly from the Polish example, was 
the urgency of the need for ‘self-strengthening’ in order to stave off a partition. 
 
If one wants to do reforms for purposes of self-strengthening, it is best to go about it as early as 
possible…Liaodong peninsula, which belongs to our homeland, now de facto under Russian power, 
is due to its being lost because of the [Trans-Siberian] Railway, and this year we have handed over 
Lüshun and Dalian, at every step there are obstacles… We ourselves truly are Poland!36 
 
Partition discourse in China reached a peak around the turn of the twentieth century, when 
‘Poland’ itself became a metaphor for partition, or ‘Polandization’.37 It was at this point, Rebecca 
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Karl argues, that Chinese intellectuals began to fashion, albeit with an ambivalent distaste for 
the masses, a concept of ‘the people’ or ‘the social’ which could be a basis for the rejuvenation 
of the Chinese polity. Poland provided a key example, as a state which was lost, but a nation 
which was still alive in its literature and consciousness. The example of Poland appealed to the 
masses as well as the gentry in Shanghai, where in 1904 a play by opera reformer Wang Xiaonong 
was staged in front of a large crowd, entitled Guazhong Lanyin, or ‘Seeds of the Melon, Cause 
of the Orchid’. While Gua recalled the familiar melon to be cut up, Lan was not only the word 
meaning ‘orchid’, but also alluded to Bolan, or ‘Poland’. The play, written and performed as 
Russia’s and Japan’s armies clashed in Korea, involved a war between Poland and Turkey, ending 
in Poland’s defeat and partition. The implication that China could be next loomed in the 
background. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image, a drawing of a man dreaming of a pig being eaten by a group of men, has been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation] 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Marumaru Chinbun, “Ketōjin no negoto” 
毛唐人の寐言 [A Foreigner Talks in his Sleep], 1884.38 
                                                             
38 Ibid., 86. 
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[This image, a drawing of a group of men about to slice a giant melon with a giant knife, has 
been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation] 
 
 
Figure 10: Minquan huabao 民權畫報 [Popular Rights Illustrated] “Guaxi” 瓜戯 [Melon Theater], 191239 
 
 
Partition, 1905-1948: Divide and Federate 
 
The second type of partition, proceeding chronologically, is the type more often referred to as 
historically paradigmatic in the partition literature, including the early twentieth-century 
partitions of Ireland, Palestine, and India. It is sometimes called ‘divide and quit’, as it is 
conceived as a last-ditch effort to quell communal conflicts ahead of an imperial withdrawal. 
This is somewhat historically misleading, as it obscures the ways in which these partitions were 
intended to salvage imperial influence in the aftermath of partition, rather than simply to end 
violence for its own sake, and thus their connectedness with the broader phenomenon of 
partition. As Radha Kumar notes, the phrase ‘divide and quit’ was coined by a former colonial 
administrator who was consciously alluding to the idea of ‘divide and rule’.40  While these 
partitions were intended to extricate the colonial power from direct rule, the overall purpose 
was to preserve the empire in whatever form was still possible, not to dissolve it. 
                                                             
39 Ibid., 107. 
40 Kumar, Divide and Fall?, 6. 
204 
 
 
‘Divide and rule’ was exactly what the British were accused of in the first example of a ‘partition’ 
which gained extensive attention in parliamentary debate which did not follow the pattern of 
cooperative territorial expansion. Originally conceived as a measure to increase administrative 
efficiency, the 1905 partition of the Bengal Presidency was enacted in large part because of a 
British perception that the educated Hindu Bengali community and the Indian National Congress 
were exercising too much influence on the government. As one administrator put it, ‘This is the 
Congress point. Bengal united is a power; Bengal divided will pull several different ways. This is 
perfectly true and is one of the great merits of [partition]’.41 This was not the first time the British 
Empire had subdivided its colonial units, calling it ‘partition’, but it did create a new kind of 
outrage which forced public attention onto the government at home.42  
 
There, parliamentary debate revealed that the term was still controversial due to its associations 
with Poland, and led to a certain amount of reflection on the meaning of the word. Lord Curzon, 
who as Viceroy took much of the blame for the results of the partition, in defending his actions, 
argued that ‘Partition, I think, is in itself an inapt and undesirable phrase. It suggests a forcible 
dismemberment of the country, much as Poland was torn to pieces by its avaricious 
neighbours’.43 The forcible nature of the partition of Bengal was, of course, visible in the volume 
of protest against it, and no one would disagree that Bengal had been split up. But even the 
liberal Secretary of State for India who took over after the conservative government came to an 
end that year had to come to the same conclusion on the inapplicability of the term, while still 
criticizing the policy: 
 
The word "partition" I am afraid is rather misleading, and we are apt to think of Poland and 
other nefarious transactions of that kind. I should be very sorry to admit that this was a 
partition in that sense. But it was, and remains, undoubtedly an administrative operation 
which went wholly and decisively against the wishes of most of the people concerned.44 
 
Surely if MPs were so keen to disavow any connection between Poland and Bengal, it was 
because they understood the political danger of allowing the connection to be made. Yet these 
comments reveal that a kind of analytical bifurcation still stood in the way of rhetorically 
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effective comparisons being made between partitions of cooperative territorial expansion and 
the new type of partition that was taking shape in Bengal. This changed as proposals for the 
partition of Ireland took centre stage in the early 1910s. At this point both Poland and Bengal 
acted as warnings against repetition in Ireland for opponents of partition such as conservative 
Lord Killanin: 
 
[I]f you are going to have a partition of the United Kingdom I say that, if you ignore Ulster, your 
partition will meet with the fate of the Partition of Bengal, and you will have to revoke or reshape 
it as soon as it is done.45 
 
These kinds of comparisons were made frequently between the cases of Ireland, Palestine, and 
India, and between these nascent partitions and other historical and ongoing events. By the 
1940s, with the Republic of Ireland still protesting partition, and India and Palestine 
contemplating a prospect of partition, not to mention the aftermath of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet 
‘fourth’ partition of Poland and countless other potential and actual partitions, each began to 
blend easily into the other in parliamentary discourse, as in the following examples: 
 
We certainly in this House have no excuse whatsoever for ignoring the dangers of the evil of 
partition—we who have on our own doorstep and under our very eyes the sad and sorry result of 
the bitter experiment of partition in Ireland. No man in his sane senses would like to see a Stormont 
erected on the hills outside Jerusalem.46 
 
I am also told that if the troops are brought away from India the Muslims and Hindus will slaughter 
one another. The same in Ireland, if the partition is removed Catholics and Protestants will tear 
one another to pieces.47 
 
If we were to accept partition for Palestine it would be difficult, from a logical, fair, and just point 
of view, to refuse Pakistan to India.48 
 
I also happen to have served in [Ireland] at the time of the Sinn Fein troubles. The problem in 
Palestine now, with the terrorists, is almost identical with the problem that had to be solved from 
1918–20 in Ireland.49 
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Having created [India], we must see that nothing is done which alters the process of history by 
supporting any line which would lead to the partitioning of the country…that would be regarded 
as an attempt to pepper India with about 300 Ulsters.50 
 
The parallels appeared so close and self-evident that a level of detail could be reached without 
much explanation. Ulster was Pakistan, Palestinian ‘terrorists’ were Sinn Fein, and Catholic-
Protestant violence was Muslim-Hindu strife. What made this possible was that partition had 
become a modular phenomenon. All of these situations had been defined in terms of two 
communities which were not only territorialized in a broad sense but could also be split apart, if 
it came to it, by a line drawn in one specific place or another. That such a line could be 
constructed was not questioned, even if the wisdom of doing so was debated. Once used in 
Ireland, partition by means of linear borders had become part of the imperial repertoire. 
 
 
Federalism: Transforming Partition from Imperial Expansion to Retrenchment 
 
One way we can examine in greater depth the transnational links made possible by partition in 
the British Empire is through the system of ideas known as imperial federalism. While partition, 
as seen above, by now had a long history, it became entangled with imperial federalism, another 
discourse which, like that of partition, made sense of imperial affairs in different parts of the 
world by linking them together. Federalism reveals not only relatively diffuse linkages between 
partitions, such as the drawing of inspiration from the memory of one partition for motivating 
emotional reactions to another, but also relatively direct connections, such as the involvement 
of particular individuals in the practice of partitions in disparate locations. Federalism was the 
system of ideas which, for imperial officials, most coherently placed these various partitions into 
one logic, and individual federalists did much of the practical work of articulating these 
connections. 
 
The territorialisation of communities and pursuit of spatial homogeneity, of course, is a 
recurrent feature of Western modernity, and these partitions within the British empire bear a 
family resemblance with other colonial policies, such as the French-mandated Syrian 
federation.51 But the policies of partition enacted in Ireland, Palestine, and India are so similar 
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in certain respects that they constitute a pattern that begs explanation. In all three cases, the 
British government reluctantly favoured, after drawn-out communal violence and political 
deadlock, a territorial separation between two communities understood as both ethno-national 
and religious units, in order to salvage some degree of its declining influence in the area, with 
support from leaders of one of the two communities. 
 
Originally conceived in the late nineteenth century as a way to halt the growing independent-
mindedness of the British settler colonies by converting the empire into some kind of global 
state, imperial federalism after the turn of the twentieth century boiled down to the idea of 
saving the empire through devolution. 52  Federalism was not a well-defined theory, and 
federalists sometimes disagreed bitterly, but the basic idea uniting them was that something 
needed to be done to tie together the empire before it fell apart. It was developed by a well-
organized and well-connected pressure group with a distinct sense of purpose, first as the 
‘Kindergarten’, and later as the Round Table Movement.53 At first, federalists met regularly and 
devoted much time to developing their ideas through memoranda, by travelling throughout the 
empire, and by lobbying politicians. By mid-century, little was left of the federalist aspiration, 
and they found themselves limited to different ideas of what form the Commonwealth could 
take and how to justify it as a moral force for international cohesion. There has been debate 
over the extent to which they continued to meet in secret and coordinate policy long 
afterwards.54 At the very least, the members of the movement continued to share an interest in 
applying a distinctive style of historical reasoning to the practical challenges of the British 
empire’s decline, and the movement’s journal, The Round Table, continues to be published 
today. 
 
Reginald Coupland was a member of the Round Table movement and editor of the Round Table 
from 1917 to 1919, and thus firmly committed to the goal of rejuvenating the British Empire 
through federalist ideas. Coupland made clear his positioning within imperial federalism in his 
1921 inaugural lecture as Oxford’s Beit Professor of Colonial History, in which he argued that the 
first of ‘two paramount political problems of our time’ was ‘the problem of nationality’.55 The 
First World War had been caused in part by ‘the shallow nineteenth-century doctrine that ideally 
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all states should be uni-national’, and nationalist movements worldwide were being encouraged 
by the new fallacy ‘that every nation has a positive right to be a state’. Against these ideas he 
argued, ‘there can be little peace or prosperity on earth until certain truths concerning 
nationality are understood…that somehow the ideal of national freedom must be harmonized 
with the ideal of international unity’. Coupland’s international unity was the British Empire, 
which, following leading federalist Lionel Curtis, he had begun to call a ‘Commonwealth’, or ‘an 
endeavour to keep a motley company of nations living together both in freedom and in unity; a 
unique experiment in international relations’. These nations could either follow a civilized path 
to co-existence in multi-national units such as Britain, Canada, or South Africa, or ‘tragic’ paths 
to communal strife as in Ireland. While an Alexander Hamilton or a Round Table Movement 
could provide study and careful constitutional crafting to smoothen the process of union, 
nations could not be coerced into unions against their organic free will. As had been the case in 
most British political thought since the nineteenth century, the nation was supposed to be a 
step on the way to the universal, not the particular. Only defective nationalities required 
separation from other nations. 
 
The ideas of federalism and the activities of federalists played an important role in making 
partition ultimately a palatable option in Ireland, Palestine, and India. Federalists did not start 
from the premise that partition was the only way to end communal violence, nor did partition 
enter their discussions until the Irish crisis of the 1910s. Their ideas, though, did lead some to 
see partition as a last resort, and partition came to be bound up in the politics of federalism. 
Federation, in the context of decentralization, did not seem possible without some kind of 
partition, nor did federalists try to think of ways to accomplish federation without some kind of 
territorial differentiation. As such, partition came to be a modular solution applicable to very 
different problems, but nonetheless still reliant on the same fundamental aspect of abstract 
territoriality as in the nineteenth century, its apparently universal applicability. Before partition 
was seriously contemplated in all three cases, federalist discussions had already connected them 
together as examples of communal strife. Thus part of what was imagined as modular was also 
the national community itself, as logically prior to the partitioning of national units. But through 
federalism, the meaning of partition was changed, and the concept of partition began to appear 
with a whole new set of associated ideas. 
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Ireland 
 
In the nineteenth century, partition usually referred to cooperative efforts among empires to 
acquire and share new territory, and federalism referred to the formation of a union between 
two pre-existing territorial entities. In the twentieth century, partition came to refer to the 
splitting of what was one political entity through the territorialisation of a communal conflict 
within it. These partitions were sometimes conceptualized through the lens of federalism 
because of the potential to retain an existing but failing union.  
 
While the partition of Bengal was in some respects a precedent, federalists began to 
conceptualize partition with Ireland. Many federalists were initially opposed to Irish partition 
because they were opposed to Irish home rule in general, and because thus far federalism had 
meant an association between pre-existing units, not partition. 56  But ultimately federalism 
made a key contribution to partition in Ireland by helping make partition acceptable to unionists. 
British unionists, in particular, cared more about maintaining the United Kingdom than 
protecting Irish Protestants from Catholic rule. They had adopted an approach emphasizing the 
injustice of including loyal Ulster Unionists in a home-ruled Ireland against their will simply 
because earlier approaches arguing that the Irish were racially unfit appeared outdated and 
unconvincing. 57  Through federalism, however, it became imaginable that a partition might 
actually strengthen the United Kingdom. In fact, some federalists were proposing ‘Home Rule 
All Round’, or in other words, devolution of power over local issues to several parliaments within 
the UK, of which Ireland might have one or more.58 Winston Churchill, a unionist, was persuaded 
by members of the Round Table to make such a proposal, and while he did not say how many 
parliaments Ireland would have, his speech was widely interpreted as advocating partition, and 
contributed to the Ulster Unionists’ acceptance of home rule given the exclusion of Ulster.59 As 
Austen Chamberlain put it, ‘”Federalism” makes the “exclusion” of Ulster easy’.60 
 
The radical scheme of home rule all round never caught hold, but federalism did leave its mark 
on the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The former, largely 
the work of the federalist MP Walter Long, assigned home rule parliaments separately to 
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Northern and Southern Ireland, as well as a Council of Ireland, which it was hoped would lead 
to unification. With the Irish Republic in open war against the UK, the act was not applied in the 
South, but in the Treaty of 1921, republican leaders accepted dominion status in the British 
Empire, and Northern Ireland was given the option to join. As The Round Table put it,  
 
It was and is partition for unity’s sake. Nothing has yet happened to invalidate the belief inspiring 
the policy, that…fixed severally with responsibility for their areas, the two majorities in Ireland 
must face the necessity of coming peaceably to terms…the period through which Ireland is passing 
would sufficiently prove it, if proof were needed, one country.61 
 
Northern Ireland, in the event, declined to join the Irish Free State, but the British seriously 
hoped that it would. What followed was essentially a struggle over symbols and technicalities 
more than substance, as the Irish leaders had to sell the treaty in Ireland to a republican 
audience, and the British to Tories concerned with the integrity of the Crown. In an act of faith, 
the British did everything they could to make sure constitutional procedures were followed, and 
that no symbolic act of revolution could have been committed, enlisting Lionel Curtis, a 
prominent member of the Round Table Movement, to mastermind the government’s legal 
implementation of the treaty.62 The main purpose of Curtis’s effort to apply federalist principles 
to the Irish settlement was to keep Ireland in the Empire by making it as palatable to Irish 
republicans as possible, in its new guise as the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’. But the federal 
structure of the Empire held out a certain appeal even to republican leaders because it made 
reunification more likely.63 Despite the unlikelihood, in retrospect, of either Irish reunification 
or the UK maintaining meaningful sovereignty over the South in the long term, it was the federal 
idea that made all of this seem just plausible enough in London to work there as a politically 
feasible settlement. 
 
 
Palestine 
 
Federalism and federalists also played an important role in making this new type of partition 
transferrable to new contexts, by favouring it as also a solution for Palestine, through the work 
of Reginald Coupland and the 1937 Peel Commission. Before 1937, partition had been proposed 
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by some individual Zionist activists and others outside the Palestine administration, but only 
‘cantonization’ on a Swiss model had been debated within the administration, and this had been 
effectively rejected.64 But in response to a major surge in violent clashes between Arab and 
Jewish communities in Palestine, the British government established a Royal Commission under 
Lord Peel to investigate its causes. Going beyond the limits of the League of Nations Mandate, 
and in disagreement with the consensus of British administrators, the Peel Commission 
recommended an outright partition. Reginald Coupland, as a member of the Commission, is 
usually credited with a leading or even determining role in swaying his peers towards this 
conclusion, and with Lord Peel severely ill, Coupland wrote most of the report himself.65  
 
It is impossible to determine to what extent Irish politics, or federalist thought on Ireland, 
influenced Coupland to make the decisive push towards partition in Palestine. Some have 
speculated that it was primarily Ireland that convinced him that some nationality conflicts were 
irresolvable. Others, however, have argued that the significance of his having edited the Round 
Table during the Irish War of Independence, having visited Ireland and commented on Irish 
partition before participating in the Peel Commission, are more apparent than real.66 More 
easily substantiated, however, is the idea that the same imperial federalist understanding of 
nationality which led to the creation of a devolved government of Northern Ireland and a Council 
of Ireland also led the Peel Commission to recommend partition in Palestine. He was an admirer 
of Lionel Curtis’s work, hoping to ‘follow up and spread abroad the principles’ of his teaching, 
and credited Curtis with giving him the ‘key to confused situations’ which he applied in Palestine: 
‘As soon as I asked myself what the end was, it was harmony between Arab and Jew and the 
first step towards that end was Partition’.67 
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On one hand Coupland admitted that ‘One of the finest and most characteristic features of the 
British Commonwealth…has been the manner in which the conflicting claims of nationality have 
been reconciled within its borders’, but on the other hand he recognized that 
 
where the conflict of nationalities has been overcome and unity achieved—in Britain itself, in 
Canada, South Africa—one of the parties concerned was English or British, and that, where that 
has not been so, as in the schism between the Northern and Southern Irish or between Hindus and 
Moslems in India, the quarrel, though it is centuries old, has not yet been composed.68 
 
Coupland thus linked the activities of the Commission both to his earlier work on nationalities 
and to the two other cases of communal violence which were eventually addressed with 
partition. For federalists, the mark of a civilized nation was that it was able to associate with 
other nations, in particular through the Commonwealth. They could not be forced to do so, but 
had to do so of their own free will, with elites and intellectuals only able to guide the process. 
This had been the basis of the preoccupation with avoiding the ‘coercion’ of Ulster into a Home 
Rule Ireland. Partition, federalists hoped, would dissipate the perception of coercion and allow 
for a more organic and meaningful union. Thus Coupland insisted that most Englishmen would 
stand by the King’s wish, expressed in a speech at the opening of the Belfast parliament, that 
the ceremony would be ‘the prelude of a day in which the Irish people North or South, under 
one parliament or two as those parliaments may themselves decide, shall work together in 
common love for Ireland’.69 The substance of the speech, unsurprisingly, had been written by a 
prominent imperial federalist: the South African General Jan Smuts, whom the Round Table 
described as its ‘Oldest Friend’.70 
 
These same federalist ideas necessitated partition similarly in Palestine. In its official diagnosis, 
the Peel Commission accused the Mandatory Government of overly segregationist policies 
which ‘could scarcely have been better calculated than it is to keep the races apart’.71 Yet it also 
blamed Arab and Jewish nationalism for being ‘intense and self-centred’.72 In particular, it noted 
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that Jewish nationalism seems to reject ‘the very idea of a real Palestinian community’ and that 
Arabs were irrationally disinterested with the objective material improvement brought by the 
Jews: ‘though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish 
immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect’.73 As the Round Table put it in defending the 
Peel Commission plan, the mandate had things backwards when it assumed that the Palestinian 
Arabs would behave as ‘our own classical political economists’ imaginary homo economicus’ 
while remaining ‘immune from the nationalism of our Occidental homo politicus’.74 The reason 
for this, the Commission believed, was that Jewish immigration had been forced on the Arabs 
against their will.75 The essence of the problem, then, was that ‘to maintain that Palestinian 
nationality has any moral meaning is a mischievous pretence. Neither Arab nor Jew has any 
sense of service to a single state’.76 The difference was that Palestine constituted a complete 
failure to achieve cohesion, while the partition of Ireland retained some hope of future 
reunification. Otherwise, from the perspective of Coupland’s federalist approach, the two were 
fundamentally alike in terms of the ends and available means of imperial policy. 
 
 
India 
 
In India partition took centre stage in political debate not because of a Peel Commission, but 
instead mainly due to the campaigns of Indian politician Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Rather than 
imperial federalism, Jinnah took his inspiration from scholar and reformer Syed Ahmad Khan, 
who had been at the forefront of promoting Indian Muslim consciousness in the late nineteenth 
century, and from poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal.77 If federalism had any influence on 
this, it was most likely by way of the Peel Commission’s 1937 recommendation of Palestine’s 
partition, which many Indian Muslims, including Iqbal, vigorously protested against as an 
injustice to Arab Muslims. Jinnah had previously promoted cooperation among Hindus and 
Muslims, and had even been a member of the largely Hindu Congress party before later joining 
the Muslim League, which advocated for safeguards for Muslims from what it saw as a nascent 
Hindu rule. But it was right at the time that partition came to the forefront of Palestinian politics 
that this began to change, as Iqbal and Jinnah began corresponding in 1936 on how to expand 
mass support for the Muslim League and developing a separate Muslim consciousness. Jinnah 
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gradually moved towards Iqbal’s position, and by 1940 he was advocating for a completely 
separate Pakistan.  
 
The timing of Jinnah’s shift was primarily due to a need to change the League’s political message 
in order to attract new supporters, but other partitions may have been an influence as well. It 
would have been unlikely for Iqbal and Jinnah to use explicitly the Peel Commission’s 
recommendation as a precedent for their demand for Pakistan, given the unpopularity of the 
Peel Commission among Indian Muslims. Jinnah did, however, use Ireland as a precedent, and 
was clearly aware of the discourse of federalism which frequently referred to the 
multinationalism of the British Empire. In the Manchester Guardian, he wrote to the English 
people that they should not draw parallels too closely with 
 
the experiments tried in Canada and Australia, where after all the foundations of government are 
suited to the genius of the people, mainly British in stock. It is very doubtful as to how it will work 
in South Africa where there are two powerful rival communities like the Boers and the British, and 
even here the differences between them are not so fundamental as between Hindus and Muslims. 
Even Ireland, after decades of union, did not submit to the British Parliament in spite of the close 
affinity with the English and the Scot.78 
 
Jinnah even drew on the rhetoric of the Ulster Unionist leader Edward Carson, who was asked 
by an Irish nationalist leader why he wanted to separate from Ireland: ‘What was Carson’s reply? 
“I do not want to be ruled by you”. My reply to Mr Gandhi is, “I do not want to be ruled by 
you”’.79 
 
Federalism, however, was yet again in India an important basis of British policy, as Round Table 
member Leo Amery was now Secretary of State for India, and Amery relied at key moments in 
the early 1940s on Coupland for advice, having admired Coupland’s work in the Peel 
Commission. In 1942, the fall of Rangoon and Singapore to Japan suddenly introduced a certain 
seriousness in British efforts to secure Indian participation in the war through promises of 
political change.80 It was through Amery’s insistence that this took the form of a declaration 
which specified that India would become a federation which no province would be forced to 
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enter. Inspired by Canada and Australia, Amery’s goal was not partition but a voluntary union, 
because ‘once the freedom of choice is conceded, I believe they will all come in’. Both the 
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief disagreed, believing that, on the contrary, this would open 
the door to Pakistan, as it would be the first time Britain publicly admitted the possibility of 
partition, overturning the previous promises in the Act of 1935. Coupland, who had gone to India 
as ‘an informal Royal Commission of one’ on Amery’s behest, provided support for Amery’s push 
for a federal framework. Like Amery, Coupland believed that Muslims should be given the 
chance to join the federation of their own volition, and so ‘the first means of preventing Pakistan 
is not to rule it out’.81 Rather than taking sides publicly for or against partition, Britain should act 
as an impartial mediator, despite the fact that the government agreed union was the better 
option. 
 
The relationship between federalism and partition was thus crucial but paradoxical. The goal of 
the imperial federalists was to provide a new moral purpose and more durable structure to the 
British Empire-Commonwealth. They intended to create unity by binding the various nations of 
the Empire-Commonwealth to the Crown, not disintegration, the particularism of which they 
associated with narrow-minded nineteenth-century nationalism. The basic theory had already 
been conceived as part of imperial federalism, long before it evolved into partition, as stated by 
Charles Dilke in his treatise on Greater Britain: ‘the strongest argument in favour of separation 
is the somewhat paradoxical one that it could bring us a step nearer to the virtual confederation 
of the English race’.82 But by conceiving of the nation as a self-evident unit with one cohesive 
will, and by arranging imperial policy so as to act as an impartial arbiter between subject nations, 
without appearing to ‘coerce’ them, they achieved exactly the opposite of what they understood 
to be their own goals: divide and rule. As the Irish nationalist politician William Redmond put it,  
 
[T]he defect is writ in one word, and that is "partition." The idea of thinking that by dividing a 
country into two units and setting up two executive authorities you are then going to bring it 
together again is surely a rather muddleheaded Saxon way of dealing with a problem of this kind.83 
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The Cold War Partitions: Germany, Korea, Vietnam 
 
Studies of partition often distinguish the Cold War partitions of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam 
quite sharply from other historical phenomena that have been referred to as partitions. 
Partitions that are today considered typical tend to involve separation on the basis of long-
abiding differences of identity, whereas few would make the argument that partitions in 
Germany, Korea, or Vietnam were made on that basis. Instead, these are attributed to the Cold 
War, whether this is understood as an ideological confrontation or a global power bipolarity, 
and territorial divisions in those places are seen as individual, concrete manifestations and 
reflections of a larger, more abstract world division. When, unlike most existing studies, we view 
partition as a discourse and as a modular political technology rather than as an analytical 
framework, this distinction appears at first not completely without merit. Those who planned 
and put into practice these partitions did not tend to make explicit comparisons to, for example, 
the partitions of India or Poland; the relative distinction of this group of partitions is not a 
scholarly invention but was also assumed to a certain extent by decision-makers at the time. In 
fact, a potential partition of Germany was perhaps more often referred to as a ‘dismemberment’ 
than a ‘partition’, although both terms were used. During Allied planning for the aftermath of 
WWII, a potential German partition was more often seen by its champions, such as FDR, and by 
those less enthusiastic about it, such as George Kennan, as a return to Germany’s pre-Bismarck 
past rather than as a transplantation into Germany of a policy worked out elsewhere.84 And after 
the end of the war, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam became comparison cases for each other, 
rather than India and Palestine, where partition occurred very nearly contemporaneously.  
 
Yet the Cold War partitions, just as much as any others, show the importance of examining 
linkages between partitions. In the case of Germany, even though such links were rarely made 
explicitly, the history of partition was nonetheless present in the form of the wide range of maps 
and plans made for partitioning Germany, and in negative connotations of the word ‘partition’ 
which were linked ultimately to Poland and the colonial partitions. The transnational impact of 
Korean partition can then be seen by 1950, as the strategic field in partitioned Germany 
appeared differently in light of the invasion of the invasion of South Korea. Finally, the partitions 
of Germany and Korea set possibilities and expectations for Vietnam. The idea of partition might 
not otherwise have been posed as a solution to the Indochina War, and the repeated pattern of 
an unintentional slide from a temporary military partition into a permanent political division, 
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observed in Germany and Korea by many, was almost a self-fulfilling prophecy in Vietnam. As 
with the partitions of cooperative territorial expansion, as well as the partitions of imperial 
federalism, the parallels made obvious by the apparently universal applicability of linear 
partition exerted a transnational influence. 
 
 
Germany 
 
Whether or not Germany was to be partitioned at the end of the war was one of the first 
questions to be considered by American planners. Winston Churchill may have suggested 
partition to Roosevelt in December 1941, the month the US entered the war, but by early 1942 
the partition question was firmly on the agenda of the State Department’s Advisory Committee 
on Postwar Problems.85 While the State Department itself was against partition on economic 
grounds, the Advisory Committee was mired in endless debates, and President Roosevelt was 
for it, proposing at the Tehran Conference in 1943 a division into five states and two 
international zones. Unlike perhaps any previous partition, the primary aim of partition would 
be to reduce Germany’s military capacity, as many feared it could bring about a third world war. 
For Roosevelt, this was couched within a broader view that Europe’s time at the centre of world 
affairs was over, and that its ideal replacement would be a collection of small states, or as one 
historian put it, ‘an Indian Raj writ in European terms’.86 The Big Three’s interest in partitioning 
Germany became an intention at the Yalta Conference in 1945, when they decided that 
accepting Germany’s surrender would mean reserving the right to take steps including ‘the 
disarmament, demilitarization, and dismemberment of Germany’.87 With Western media closely 
following the evolution of partition plans, a variety of official and unofficial maps proliferated, 
resembling somewhat the partition cartoons of the long nineteenth century. Using the 
cartography of linear borders, anyone with a map and a pencil was capable of making their own 
post-war plan for Germany to rival these. 
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Figure 11: Theodore Kaufman, map from Germany Must Perish!, 194188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image, a map of Germany divided into Eastern, Southern, and Western Germany, has been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation] 
 
Figure 12: Life Magazine, based on plan by Sumner Welles, 24 July, 194489 
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Figure 13: A suggestion by President Roosevelt for the postwar partition of Germany, September 194490 
 
Figure 14: Zones of occupation in Germany as approved at the Second Quebec Conference, September 194491 
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One unofficial plan, created by Theodore Kaufman, a Jewish theatre-ticket agency owner in New 
Jersey, was to not only partition Germany amongst its neighbours but also to sterilize all 
Germans, with the object of exterminating them within two generations.92 It would likely have 
been inconsequential had it not been picked up by the German press and came to the attention 
of the Nazi party leadership soon after Germany invaded Russia and its propaganda focus shifted 
towards the Jews as the coordinator of the Allied plans to destroy Germany. Joseph Goebbels 
noted, ‘This Jew did a real service for the enemy [German] side. Had he written this book for us, 
he could not have made it any better’. Goebbels ordered a pamphlet summarizing the partition 
and sterilization plan, and had five million copies printed. The Kaufman plan, which was alleged 
to have emerged from the Brain Trust of President Roosevelt himself, became the centrepiece 
of the Nazi propaganda effort to make Germans fearful of the consequences of defeat and to 
justify the mass murder of Jews. 
 
If Kaufman’s plan was far too radical to be endorsed by US government officials, it nevertheless 
illustrates a certain element of thinking about partition as a national punishment which was 
widespread in a more subdued form. Anglo-American publicists in the early 1940s debated 
prominently whether it was the German leadership or the German nation as a whole which was 
responsible for the war, and while Kaufman’s explicit anti-German racism was relatively 
marginal, many people such as Lord Vansittart blamed ‘centuries of misteaching’ for the 
Germans’ willingness to ‘follow any Fuehrer, cheerfully and ferociously, into any aggression’.93 
For Roosevelt himself, Germany could not be ‘restored just as much as the Netherlands or 
Belgium’, and instead ‘It is of the utmost importance that every person in Germany should 
realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation’ and ‘have it driven home to them that the 
whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern 
civilization’.94 Moreover, in these early stages of planning, it was through personal suffering that 
Roosevelt wished for the Germans to realize the extent of their guilt and its consequences.95 
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This desire for a national punishment of the Germans was undoubtedly a major part of the 
reason why Roosevelt endorsed the plan of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau for partition, 
which would have decimated heavy industry and left two primarily agricultural German states. 
A ‘complete shutdown of the Ruhr’ industrial area, according to the plan, would necessitate 
either evacuating large numbers of inhabitants or feeding them from army soup kitchens.96 
When the plan leaked to the press, however, Roosevelt backed away, and while not giving up 
his preference for German partition, he shied away from its more controversial aspects. While 
there was widespread American support for a ‘tough’ peace, the draconian Morgenthau Plan 
engendered fierce debate over how best to prevent another world war, and with the 1944 
election nearing, Roosevelt had no interest in taking up a new controversy. 
 
The fait accompli of the partition of East and West Germany as it ultimately emerged must, of 
course, be understood against the backdrop of the growing mistrust and animosity between the 
US and the Soviet Union, which made the fusing together of the two Germanys unworkable. But 
the origins of German partition, which began to surface far from Cold War logics of bipolarity 
and well before many in the West were thinking seriously about a post-war Soviet threat, instead 
as a way to humble and subdue Germany is important for our purposes in drawing out the 
significance of Germany for a genealogy of partition. The Allies did eventually agree to work 
together towards a unified Germany, after the Morgenthau plan lost favour, and as fears of a 
resurgent Reich began to fade. Their failure to achieve unification out of their separate 
occupation zones was in large part due to mistrust between the West and the Soviet Union. But 
the separation of the various occupation zones was a decision made during the war, at a time 
when Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin were committed to partitioning Germany to weaken it. 
This division was by no means inevitable, and in fact a member of the British Foreign Office in 
1943 proposed an ‘interlarding’, or dispersed occupation.97 If this proposal had been accepted, 
the division of Germany might have been avoided altogether, but the decision to keep separate 
occupation zones, which was made before the breakdown of the wartime alliance, was a major 
factor in the partition which later endured for decades. 
 
Seen as an outcome of the Cold War, German partition is remarkable as a historical break with 
the past that set the scene for the decades-long world division which followed. But seen instead 
as a diluted version of a certain kind of national extermination attempt, it follows more closely 
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in the pattern set by the partitions of Poland and Mysore, as well as the partition of the African 
continent. Most partitions from Poland to Africa were not, like the Kaufman plan, conceived 
directly or primarily for the purpose of eradicating pre-existing polities, but those consequences 
were well known to the partitioners, whether they lamented those polities as collateral damage 
or eagerly anticipated their demise. During the deliberations over the post-war administration 
of Germany, explicit comparisons to other partitions were not particularly common, but those 
that were made are revealing, such as this passage from Henry Morgenthau’s defense of his 
partition plan, which was reminiscent of Curzon’s earlier attempt to get away from ‘partition’ as 
‘an inapt and undesirable phrase’ in defending the partition of Bengal: 
 
Partition has a rather ugly sound to free men. It recalls the various dismemberments of Poland by 
predatory nations. It recalls the ruthless way in which European powers split up most of Africa 
among themselves with little regard to the inhabitants…Actually, the partition of Germany would 
have nothing in common with these examples of a discredited imperialism. There is no intention 
of making the two separate segments of the German state a part of an alien community, nor of 
parceling them out under the overlordship of different masters. Each of the two would have as 
much independence and freedom as the single Germany could be permitted, perhaps more since 
they would not be so dangerous.98  
 
The absence of Ireland, Palestine, and India, potential or already accomplished partitions which 
were being hotly debated in the 1940s, is striking, and suggests that the divide-and-federate 
partitions had not yet made their mark on the concept of partition itself. Instead, it suggests that 
the memory of the Polish partition and its widely negative moral significance lay in the 
background for those arguing against Germany’s partition. This memory was, after a century 
and a half, still being kept alive, as Poland’s borders were yet again up for negotiation, and after 
the 1939 German-Soviet Pact assigning spheres of interest in Eastern Europe was aptly referred 
to as the ‘Fourth Partition of Poland’. 
 
While the partition of Germany was often seen at the time as an event without comparison, 
parallels were later drawn from the outside. Notably, Irish-West German relations in the 1950s 
turned crucially on the issue of the two countries’ parallel partitions.99 Ireland had refused to 
join NATO, in protest against continued UK control over Northern Ireland, or against ‘partition’, 
as it was often referred to, yet still strongly and unconditionally supported German reunification. 
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Portraying partition in general as problematic, using the German case, was seen as a way of 
making its case for Irish reunification more persuasive and visible. As Irish diplomat John Belton 
noted in 1950, for example, ‘no country in Europe can appreciate the evils of partition better 
than the Germany of today. It is my consistent experience that it is pushing an open door to 
explain to Germans how the Irish people feel about the partition of Ireland.’100 Belton may not 
have been exaggerating; despite receiving most of its information from British press agencies, 
the West German press was generally sympathetic to Ireland. For example, in 1950 one Berlin 
periodical published an article on the tiny Irish town of Pettigo, which it claimed called itself ‘The 
Berlin of Ireland’.  
 
The official West German response was complicated because it appreciated all the international 
support for its reunification it could get, without having a seat of its own at the UN, yet it was 
unwilling to offend the UK, whose troops it needed to keep in Germany. It needed to avoid being 
drawn into the Anglo-Irish controversy, which it had no intention of trying to solve, through the 
partition parallel. The West German ambassador to Ireland in 1960 was instructed to ‘practice 
restraint with regard to occasional Irish comparisons of the partition of the Irish and German 
peoples’.101 The best that could be done was to point out the differences between the two 
partitions, as Northern Ireland, unlike any part of Germany, had chosen partition in a 
referendum, and that living conditions in Northern Ireland could not be compared to those in 
East Germany. 
 
 
Korea 
 
The impact of partition parallels was particularly strong in Germany after the onset of the Korean 
War, which shocked many and prompted reassessments of the nature of the global Cold War. 
Struggling to comprehend the North Korean invasion of South Korea, which was assumed to 
have been directed by the Kremlin in spite of the fact that it did not consider Korea of primary 
strategic importance for the Cold War, the US searched for a new logic behind Soviet strategy.102 
Rather than rely on its own military to achieve its expansionary aims, the US concluded that the 
USSR had achieved a new capability of using satellite forces instead. With partition a central 
feature of both German and Korean politics, the new logic was instantly applied to Germany. 
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Until the Korean War, the main threat according to US strategic thinking was a crisis similar to 
the Berlin Blockade of 1948. Such a threat would be dangerous but manageable and relatively 
limited in scope. After the invasion of South Korea, however, the main threat in Europe became 
the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften, the East German paramilitary force, which would have launched 
a military action on West Berlin or West Germany. This was a much more serious danger and 
required a fundamental change in the US approach to European security. As top US officials in 
Germany put it in 1950,103 
 
The most significant change in the Berlin situation has been the growing capability of [East 
Germany] to attempt a coup in the Korean pattern. Heretofore, it has been felt that the Soviets 
would not risk war over Berlin and that ‘war over Berlin’ connoted the use of Soviet troops against 
Allied troops…Influenced by the foregoing reasoning, the Allies have been satisfied with 
maintaining military forces in Berlin capable of doing little more than putting down civil 
disturbances…[R]egardless of the validity of the former reasoning, a new threat has arisen through 
the increased capabilities of [East Germany]…[T]he outbreak of hostilities in Korea…reveals a 
pattern which the Soviets may follow with respect to Berlin. 
 
The Korean War had a great impact on many aspects of the Cold War more generally, as well as 
specifically in Germany, shifting the political climate in the US towards allowing a vastly increased 
defence budget and reconciling US allies with German rearmament, as direct military action in 
Europe became much more plausible. 104  No doubt the Korean War would still have had a 
similarly important impact on the perceived possibility of limited war if it had consisted of, for 
example, a Chinese attack on an unpartitioned Western-allied Korea. But it is likely that the 
similarity between the partitions in Korea and Germany made much more realistic and 
imaginable a repetition of the North Korean invasion of South Korea in an East German invasion 
of West Germany. 
 
 
Vietnam 
 
As war in Indochina between France and anti-colonial fighters increased in the early 1950s, and 
the US pursued a settlement on good terms for France, the Korean and German partitions also 
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began to affect a third region. In fact, Indochina had already been conceptually linked to Korea 
at least since the end of WWII by General Order No. 1, issued directly following the Japanese 
surrender, which partitioned each of them with a numerical line of latitude:105 
 
a. The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China, 
excluding Manchuria, Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16° north latitude, shall surrender 
to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. 
b. The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, 
Korea north of 38° north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet 
Forces in the Far East… 
 
This order, in one stroke, laid the groundwork for partition in both Korea and Vietnam at the 
same time. It created the partition between Soviet-occupied northern Korea and US-occupied 
southern Korea, which became the border between North and South Korea when efforts towards 
a unified Korea collapsed. Along a different parallel, it also created a partition between Chinese-
occupied northern Indochina and southern Indochina, which would be occupied by British and 
French colonial troops. As Chinese troops withdrew from Indochina in 1946, leaving France to 
attempt to recover its pre-war colony, the partition was temporarily ended. At the 1954 Geneva 
Conference, however, after nearly a decade of colonial warfare, as France searched for a way to 
avoid complete defeat, partition returned as a solution which was supposed to separate the 
belligerents in Vietnam, with the Viet Minh in the north and the French in the south, until 
elections could be held for all Vietnam.106 While the 16th parallel was not precisely followed in 
the 1954 agreement, as it was in 1945, it was the starting point for the Geneva negotiations.107 
In the end, it was very broadly similar, and was commonly referred to as ‘the 17th parallel’.108 
With both the Korea and Vietnam partitions being, in a sense, outcomes of General Order No. 1, 
it is possible to see how the similarities between them were not simply due to the globalization 
of a bipolar international structure but also owe much to the availability of partition as a political 
technology which is treated as transferrable and applicable to any part of the world. 
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Without the recent proliferation of other partitions, perhaps including the British divide-and-
federate partitions, but especially the German and Korean partitions, as well as the temporary 
post-war military partition of Indochina, partition might have been an unlikely proposal at the 
1954 Geneva Conference. The military positions of the opposing sides were so intermixed that a 
simple separation into two territorial halves was far from self-evident as a solution. As a State 
Department report noted, partition’s ‘first problem would be to achieve any basic line of 
demarcation’.109 If ‘an attempt was made to freeze the zones of control along lines coinciding 
with present military occupation, the result would be an impossible patch of enclaves, of pockets 
within pockets, with the advantage clearly with the Viet Minh’. Considering only the 
contemporary situation of Vietnam, in isolation from all the partitions that had recently 
occurred, there was no obvious dividing line, as the memo put it, only ‘a ubiquitous and 
indeterminate bamboo curtain’.  
 
Partition made sense as an option in Vietnam for outside officials because it had been done 
elsewhere. By 1954, there existed a wealth of precedents that could be drawn on, although Korea 
was by far the most common, and lessons of the Korean War were frequently referred to. 
Partition continued to be seen in negative light and as something generally done to a people 
from the outside. For the French-supported government of Vietnam, this was a central 
consideration, as it could not under any circumstances support a partition of the country, and 
demanded a written promise from France that the latter would not agree to a partition.110 The 
US, in turn, had to limit any semblance of imperialism that might result from appearing to impose 
partition from the outside. As US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles mentioned to the 
Vietnamese foreign minister Nguyen Quoc Dinh, in searching for ways partition might be 
proposed, there was hardly a case in history where the people of a country had themselves 
proposed or agreed to territorial partition.111 US officials knew that the Vietnamese ‘would fear 
the transformation of their country into another Korea’ in case of a partition.112 This was also 
true of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, whose leadership believed, from the beginning of 
the Geneva conference, before partition had been decided on, that ‘the plan of the enemy was 
indefinite partition of the country like in Korea’.113 
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But beyond this, one of the main lessons that could be taken from both Korea and Germany, was 
that temporary partitions intended originally as zones of military occupation could very easily 
become permanent and political territorial divisions. Because of the experiences of recent 
partitions, any hint at a clear-cut territorial division, no matter how much it was claimed to be a 
temporary expedient aimed towards a unified Vietnam, risked being seen by the Vietnamese 
government as a slippery slope to a permanent division.114 As the State of Vietnam noted at 
Geneva, 
 
Although this partition is only provisional in theory, it would not fail to produce in Vietnam the 
same effects as in Germany, Austria,115 and Korea…the state of Vietnam renews its proposal for a 
cease-fire without a demarcation line, without partition, even provisionally…the chief of state of 
Vietnam once more places the independence and the unity of his country above any other 
consideration, and that the national government of Vietnam would prefer this provisional UN 
control over a truly independent and united Vietnam to its maintenance in power in a country 
dismembered and condemned to slavery.116 
 
This statement, which is almost unintelligible except in the context of the history of partition, 
was the basis of its reasoning for not signing the final agreement. The US took a similar stance; 
in a press conference a State Department official said the following when asked whether the US 
could accept a temporary partition: 
 
Even that I would hesitate to subscribe to because once you draw [a] line, divide [the] country and 
provide what you might call [a] demilitarized zone in between, you have in effect partitioned 
it…what we witnessed in Korea is not in any way encouraging to [the] thought that there could be 
[a] reasonably prompt, political formula which would resolve it and prevent it from being 
dismembered or partitioned.117 
 
Instead, a cease-fire to be implemented before attempting a political solution appeared better 
at this point. In response, a press agent noted, ‘that in itself will involve some sort of de facto 
                                                             
114 ‘Seventh Restricted Session on Indochina’, Geneva, 27 May, 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 16, 946. 
115 In 1954, Austria appeared to be following the same pattern, being split into Soviet, American, British, 
and French occupation zones. Following the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, Allied troops left Austria that 
year. Nonetheless, the mentioning of Austria along with Germany and Korea illustrates the perceived 
strength of this pattern of temporary partition becoming permanent against prior intentions. 
116 Proposal by State of Vietnam, quoted in US Delegation at Geneva to Department of State, 19 July, 1954, 
FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 16, 1464-1465. 
117 US Delegation at Geneva to Department of State, 2 June, 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 16, 1006. 
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revision of forces which could be [the] beginning of partition, even unintentionally. Most of our 
partitions started off that way in other countries’. The State Department was satisfied that 
withdrawing troops into a series of enclaves and disarming ‘irregulars’ in between would not 
lead to a general partition of the country. But it is clear from this exchange that the examples of 
Korea and Germany loomed large, and that a clear-cut line of division was thought almost 
destined to become permanent. Partition did become the basis for the agreement that was 
reached at Geneva, with China and the Soviet Union pressuring the Viet Minh into accepting it, 
arguing that once elections were held all of Vietnam would certainly be under Viet Minh control, 
as most observers agreed that any elections held would be won by the Viet Minh. But the State 
of Vietnam refused to sign the agreement and did not hold the elections stipulated by it, laying 
the groundwork for the Second Indochina War. It may have been unlikely that the State of 
Vietnam would have signed any agreement promising its own demise through elections, but the 
obvious parallel with Germany and Korea clearly created a strong impression that partition could 
not be truly temporary. 
 
Beginning with WWII, then, a new chapter had unfolded in the history of partition. Unlike 
previous partitions, those in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam involved neither territorial acquisition 
by imperial powers nor justification based on separate identities. Instead, all three of them had 
evolved from military zones which were intended to be temporary but became permanent 
political divisions within the logic of the Cold War. While some links were forged with previous 
partitions, such as between Germany and Ireland, partitions that had a Cold War logic set them 
apart as a new paradigm, for many observers, and they tended to be the key cases of comparison 
for each other. Yet this does not mean the legacies of partition, such as imperialism and national 
catastrophe, no longer had meaning. From the desire to punish Germany through partition to 
the Vietnamese fear of ending up divided like Korea, policymakers drew on and learned from a 
history which may have led explicitly through Korea and Germany but also led implicitly back to 
the partitions of Africa and Poland. 
 
More importantly, however, the relative distinction of the Cold War partitions from other 
partitions, as they were imagined at the time, does not detract from the point that territorial 
partition along linear borders enables comparison, connection, and the learning of certain 
historical lessons due to its seemingly universal applicability. Despite any inherent differences 
between the logic of the Cold War and the logic of divide-and-quit, in both groups of partitions, 
comparisons constantly lay in the background of decision-making and frequently came to the 
foreground, in very similar ways. With partition in India and Palestine following closely together 
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temporally from the late 1930s through the late 1940s, and partition in Germany, Korea, and 
Vietnam occurring almost in lockstep with each other from 1945 to 1954, it was almost inevitable 
that conceptual linkages between circumstances would be made, if not actually enable the 
transplantation of partition from one place to the next. Made possible by the abstract precision 
of linear borders, Cold War partition became a political technology that could operate 
independently of local conditions, in any country that both the US and its enemies could not 
afford to lose. The repeating pattern of partition, in a sense, became a defining feature of the 
Cold War independently of any particular partition. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The discourse of partition as one broad, coherent pattern of history, which is made possible 
through the linearization of borders, persists today, but only to a certain extent. Tellingly, for 
example, the UK’s plans to leave the European Union have rarely been referred to as a 
‘partition’.118 Those who have seen ‘partition’ as a relevant concept in the context of Brexit 
tend to do so from the position of knowledge or experience of a particular historical partition, 
such as Joya Chatterji, a prominent scholar of Indian partition.119 With the end of the Cold 
War, and with formal territorial acquisition now a rarity, partition in two of the three senses 
explored in this chapter are now difficult to see as anything other than historical. 
 
In terms of scholarly literature, in one respect, the global homogenization of territory has 
enabled an equally homogenizing discourse of ‘partition theory’ in international relations.120 
For most of the time examined in this chapter, the historical particularity of each individual 
partition, and the historical particularity of each type of partition within temporally specific 
global political circumstances, whether cooperative territorial expansion, divide and federate, 
or Cold War partition. In much recent IR literature, however, partition becomes generalized 
as a scientifically demonstrable solution to a generic problem of ethnic civil war. In a context 
of state breakdown, the argument goes, the already ahistorical idea of the security dilemma 
                                                             
118 Some would object to calling Brexit a partition, which is sometimes held to mean demarcating an 
entirely new border. This intuitive distinction, however, did not prevent observers from referring, for 
example, to the ‘partition’ of Germany, which was conducted along already existing boundaries of states 
within Germany. 
119  Thomas Hunt, ‘Brexit compared to the violent partition of India in astonishing BBC Newsnight 
outburst’, Express, 16 August, 2017. 
120 Kaufmann, ‘When all else fails’; Carter Johnson, ‘Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and 
Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security 32:4 (Spring 2008), 140-170. 
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begins to apply to ethnic groups within, rather than merely between, states, and the 
intermixing of ethnic groups intensifies this security dilemma to the point where war can 
become practically inevitable until the groups are separated.121 While the wars occurring in 
the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse spurred this turn in the debate, the applicability of its 
insights to any ethnic conflict in the world, unlike many of the debates examined in this 
chapter, is not a major topic of discussion and is largely assumed. Quantitative indexes of 
variables such as ethnic homogeneity, and statistical methods, moreover, make comparison 
particularly unremarkable and seemingly natural. It was this incarnation of partition theory, 
along with practitioners having gained experience in the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which formed the basis of then-US Senator Joe Biden’s attempt to ‘soft partition’ Iraq into 
three autonomous regions in the 2000s.122 
 
At the same time, however, the universalizing perspective on partition that is prevalent in the 
partition literature stands in contrast to the approach here, which is to examine the changing 
meaning of partition since the eighteenth century. Seen in this broader perspective, partition 
as a solution to ethnic conflict appears as only a very particular usage of practices of partition, 
with cooperation around territorial expansion, or the political and ideological bipolarity of the 
Cold War being other prominent historical usages. The broader historical perspective taken 
here is important not just because it reveals the connectedness of these different discourses 
and practices, but also because it sheds new light on the origins of what is now known as 
‘ethnic’ partition. Rather than a potential solution to a universal condition of a humanity 
divided into clearly identifiable ethnic groups, which is likely to become a violent problem 
wherever groups are intermixed and state authority is weak, partition along communal lines 
became a modular practice through imperial federalism as a historically specific set of ideas. 
The aim, contrary not only to the results of actual practice, but also to the stated aims of 
today’s partition theory, was to strengthen the British Empire by giving it a new federal form. 
‘Soft partition’, then, may just be a reformulation of ideas tracing their lineage to the decline 
of Western imperialism. It was, after all, ‘unity through autonomy’ which Joe Biden advocated 
for in Iraq, a paradox which advocates of federalism in India or of ‘Home rule all round’ for 
the UK would have had little trouble in grasping.
                                                             
121 Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival 35:1 (Spring 1993), 27-47. 
122 Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb, ‘Unity through autonomy in Iraq’, New York Times, 1 May, 2006; Edward 
Joseph and Michael O’Hanlon, ‘The Case for Soft Partition in Iraq’, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 
The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper No. 12, June 2007. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has been an inquiry into the origins and consequences of ideas and practices of 
bordering territory which are historically specific and emergent, but nevertheless global and 
globalizing. From our standard maps and atlases to boundary monuments and the professionals 
who build and maintain them, modern international politics has been conditioned by the 
hegemonic idea, and the widespread practice as if territory is always, regardless of context, 
bounded by precise lines connecting a series of points on the earth’s spherical surface. I qualified 
this impression by characterizing borders, rather than statically linear in the way they appear on 
maps, as instead historically subject to an uneven process of linearization which began centuries 
ago, crystallized globally around the late nineteenth century, and is in some ways continuing. I 
defined survey rationality as a perspective from which the linearization of borders is rational and 
is valued as an end. With the help of historical investigation, I concluded that survey rationality 
has been relatively weak as a political motive on its own, and that the most fruitful way of 
theorising its role in global modernity would be to see it as something which has achieved 
importance through articulation with other rationalities.  
 
I left open the possibility of many different rationalities here, but focused on two in particular: 
capitalism and ‘civilization’. Capitalism in itself, whether as a mode of production, a relation of 
production, or as the ‘spirit of capitalism’ in Weber’s sense, does not necessitate survey 
rationality in any pure logical sense, and has existed without any particular affinity for linear 
borders. Capitalist private property did, however, historically become articulated with survey 
rationality in certain times and places, because surveys and precise borders have the potential, 
depending on the context, to solidify or extend claims to land. In order to illustrate this argument 
I used the example of the North American colonies, where the surveying of property boundaries 
necessitated a similar approach to political boundaries. It was there that linear borders first 
became systematically surveyed and demarcated, as an outcome of that articulation of survey 
rationality and agrarian capitalism. The idea of ‘civilization’ is another such rationality. During 
the nineteenth century in particular, ‘civilization’ became associated with linearly defined 
territory, and increasingly dramatic boundary surveys enabled a performance of mastery over 
both nature and colonized peoples. I used the example of West Africa in the late nineteenth 
century to demonstrate this point, where an older spatial order of colonial treaties broke down 
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as it was unable to satisfy the perceived need for a more rational system of land-appropriation 
which would prevent a major war. While imperial officials were reluctant to draw linear borders, 
it became the only imaginable alternative, over the course of the later decades of the century. 
 
The impact of this division of global space into discretely drawn territories is not reducible to a 
combination of the ways in which modern international politics are shaped by sovereignty, 
nationalism, or the nation-state. I demonstrated this in two ways. First, the linearization of 
borders has a distinct effect on the politics of geographical knowledge production because 
assuming borders to be linear limits the kinds of knowledge that appear useful or important. 
When borders are linear, opportunities are created for experts such as Thomas Holdich to make 
a case for being taken seriously in the negotiation and drawing of borders. Second, the 
linearization of borders accelerates a global proliferation of partitions. Ruling out other forms of 
geographical ordering makes it possible to imagine any area or territorialized community being 
partitioned via any combination of connected geometrical points, regardless of specific 
characteristics. Partition can thus become an imperial repertoire of power, with the 
circumstances of its usage in one context conditioning the possibilities imaginable in the next.  
 
 
The Contributions of the Thesis 
 
In conceiving of borders as being subject to a global historical process of linearization, with 
distinct conditions of possibility and effects, the thesis has offered a perspective on the 
international politics of space which differs in important respects from established IR theories.  
Conventional IR theories such as realism, liberalism, and Wendtian constructivism tend to see 
territory, throughout history, as a constant which serves as a basis for, or measure of state 
power and legitimate authority claims, and as a container of people, natural resources, and 
other geostrategic features. More historically-minded IR theorists have also considered the 
extent to which a polity is ‘territorial’ to be important as a marker of modernity, and many have 
sought to explain the transition from ‘non-territorial’ polities to ‘territorial’ states. Yet 
territoriality, without specifying beyond Robert Sack’s useful and widely accepted definition as 
rule over some particular geographical area, regardless of the particular way in which it is 
defined, provides only a partial understanding of what is particular to modern territoriality, let 
alone of the particular spatial arrangement of the current international system. Territoriality in 
general has existed in many times and many places, but the assumption and practice of linear 
borders has never been more widespread globally than in recent times. In response, this thesis 
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has argued that in order to understand how global modernity has historically been constituted, 
we should understand the history of borders as separate but related to territoriality. 
 
In doing so, the thesis has revealed the global linearization of borders as a process heavily tied 
up in imperial relations from the beginning, rather than as a phenomenon internal to Europe 
subsequently imposed outside Europe. On one hand, colonies in North America began serious 
efforts to survey and demarcate linear borders well before such practices were common in 
European states. On the other hand, the avoidance of linear borders in West African colonies 
until the late nineteenth century shows that the linearization of borders has to be understood 
through the dynamics of colonialism, rather than by assuming linear borders followed 
Europeans wherever they went. It was only in the late nineteenth century, as a result in the 
changing nature of colonialism, that linear borders came to be seen as a necessary component 
of territoriality, regardless of local context and conditions. 
 
Furthermore, while IR theorists have occasionally acknowledged that the manner in which 
territory is delimited is historically changing, they have typically suggested that it is not 
necessary to understand such dynamics in order to understand international relations. 1 
Conventional IR theories mainly see territory in terms of the movement of territories from one 
state’s control to another’s, and the acquisition of territory either as an end in itself or a means 
to other types of gains. This thesis, in contrast, has shown how concerns typical of IR, such as 
territorial partitions and peace settlements, are affected by the way in which territory is 
demarcated. The post-WWI peace settlement, in particular, was decided in large part by the 
distribution of power between the participants, but the capabilities possessed by the 
participants were not only defined in terms of national populations and absolute amounts of 
territory occupied but also in terms of an ability to manipulate a particular, scientific kind of 
geographic knowledge that linear borders make possible. Territorial partitions, similarly, should 
not be conceived of entirely apart from the kind of delineation used, if the linearization of 
borders is itself part of the conditions of possibility for the particular pattern of modern 
partitions we can observe globally. 
 
 
  
                                                             
1 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 211. 
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Further Research: Rationalities and Effects of Linear Borders Beyond This Thesis 
 
The thesis has not been intended as a total history of linear borders, nor as exhaustive of the 
different factors leading to the origins of linear borders, or of their political consequences. The 
main argument of the thesis is that the linearization of borders is a historical process which is an 
articulated part of global modernity. The chapters on capitalism, ‘civilization’, geographical 
expertise, and partition are intended as key illustrations of this overall argument. This leaves 
open the possibility of further research investigating other origins and other consequences. 
 
 
Linearization in Western Europe: Bureaucratic Rationality 
 
To find, as part of the origins story, an alternative rationality other than the two I have explored 
here, we could investigate the conditions of possibility for Emerich de Vattel’s contention in 
1758 that 
 
It is necessary to mark clearly and with precision the boundaries of territories in order to avoid the 
slightest usurpation of another’s territory, which is an injustice, and in order to avoid all subjects 
of discord and occasions for quarrels.2 
 
This was one of the first instances of a kind of survey rationality being written into an 
international law text, and it was at this point in the eighteenth century that interstate borders 
in Western Europe were first being demarcated, for example in France with the traités de 
limites.3 How can we characterize the rationality that was being articulated in this particular 
context with survey rationality? To some extent, capitalist private property and ‘civilization’ 
likely come into play here, especially when we consider that the boundaries Vattel had in mind 
as not being precise enough were in North America. The Seven Years’ war between Britain and 
France, which ended in the collapse of New France, Vattel argued, had been set in motion by a 
failure to specify colonial boundaries clearly. The traités de limites in France may have been 
motivated, as in the border surveys of the Thirteen Colonies, in part by a desire to end property 
disputes among boundary inhabitants. As historian Peter Sahlins notes, 
                                                             
2 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991), 93. 
3 Peter Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century’, The 
American Historical Review, 95:5 (Dec., 1990), 1423-1451; George Clark, The Seventeenth Century (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1947), 143. 
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[T]he point was to "determine the boundaries in a manner most clear and most evident for the 
respective subjects, and in the most permanent way possible, so as to destroy all objects of dispute 
among frontier inhabitants.” Indeed, many of the delimitation treaties were drawn up in attempts 
to resolve specific disputes—not just between customs guards or soldiers of neighboring states but 
among inhabitants on opposite sides of the boundary. Pastures, waters, and usufruct rights on 
opposing mountain watersheds and riverbeds themselves were the objects of local quarrels: the 
state believed that its failure to define its exact territorial extension led to an escalation of local 
conflicts.4 
 
But aside from this, there may also have been a separate logic at work at the same time, not 
explored thus far in the thesis, which we might call bureaucratic rationality. In the sixteenth 
century, the government affairs of France had been assigned not based on a distinction between 
foreign and domestic, but according to different, and varying geographical divisions.5 Around 
1567, for example, Nicolas de Neufville, seigneur de Villeroy, was placed in charge of the 
kingdom’s business in Spain, Portugal, Flanders, Picardy, Guyenne, la Rochelle, and some central 
provinces, while Claude de l’Aubespine was given the Holy Roman Empire, Champagne, 
Burgundy, and Metz, and so on. Jurisdictions we might now be tempted in retrospect to call 
‘domestic’ were thrown in with the putatively ‘foreign’ ones without much differentiation. One 
of Cardinal Richelieu’s policies, then, in the following century, was to ensure the ministerial unity 
of foreign affairs, and its separation from other affairs. This paved the way for further 
specialization in the eighteenth century within a centralized bureaucracy.  
 
That century saw a move away from ad hoc dealings over territory with neighbouring polities 
towards officials specifically taking on the task of boundary negotiations. The question arose of 
whose responsibility it was to know or find out which localities were part of France or not, and 
the lack of a clear answer became unsatisfying. In 1746 a fund was established for this work on 
boundaries, and by 1773 one sieur de Comarieu was given special authority to conduct boundary 
negotiations ‘sovereign to sovereign’. The bureaucratization of government, then, created an 
environment where work on very specific tasks over a period of time was increasingly sought 
after. The practice of the treaty of limits entered the state’s repertoire and could be repeated in 
                                                             
4 Sahlins, ‘Natural Frontiers’, 1439-1440. See also Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 182. 
5 Daniel Nordman, Frontières de France: De l'espace au territoire : XVIe–XIXe siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 
1999), 295-302. 
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various places on all sides of the kingdom. In this sense, the extension of survey rationality along 
many of France’s borders may have resulted from a kind of bureaucratic rationality. 
 
 
Linearization Continues: Within and Beyond Land-Space 
 
There are also consequences of the linearization of borders which were left out of the main 
remit of the thesis. Analysing the consequences here is particularly important because without 
doing so, there is a risk that based on the material examined in the thesis so far, the linearization 
of borders might be mistaken for a purely historical process which has waning relevance for IR 
scholars interested in the present. This section, by way of concluding, addresses this by focusing 
briefly on one more consequence which has clear relevance in today’s world. 
 
It is important to remember that the linearization of borders is an ongoing, never-completed 
process. That is why in 2007 the African Union set up a Border Programme oriented primarily 
towards delimiting and demarcating borders whose locations still had not been quite made 
completely certain.6 In 2011 it had set 2017 as a deadline for finishing all African boundaries, but 
in 2016 the deadline was extended to 2022. Even the borders examined early on in the thesis, 
between the United States, are still not in a completely settled state. As mentioned above, the 
disputes in the Maryland-Pennsylvania-Delaware area, which were already old by the 1760s, 
when the Mason-Dixon Line was commissioned to solve them, were still being worked out until 
1921. Yet the litigation around these colonial borders had to be dug up yet again in the twenty-
first century when the oil company BP sought to build a liquefied natural gas unloading terminal 
extending from New Jersey’s shore into the Delaware River.7 When Delaware refused to allow 
the pipeline, New Jersey filed a Supreme Court suit against Delaware, arguing it had jurisdiction 
to regulate improvements extending from its shore. The court decided in favour of Delaware, 
however, because a 1934 decision had confirmed Delaware’s sovereignty all the way up to the 
low-water mark on the New Jersey side. That decision, an exception to the norm of river 
boundaries following a course through the middle or deepest channel of the river, upheld 
Delaware’s territorial claim which it traced to a 1682 deed of feoffment and lease from the Duke 
of York to William Penn.8 The 1934 decision had appeared to establish a clear borderline which 
                                                             
6 African Union, ‘Meeting of Ministers on African Border Issues concludes with the adoption of the Addis 
Ababa Declaration on AUBP’, Press Release, Addis Ababa, 7 October 2016 
(http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/pr-aubp-meeting-of-ministers-3-to-5-oct-2016.pdf). 
7 U.S. Supreme Court, New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597 (2008). 
8 U.S. Supreme Court, New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934). 
237 
 
would solve any further dispute. Yet in the absence of total knowledge of the world, such a final 
decision is impossible. Linearizing borders always involves a continual process of mediating 
between legal-political judgement and the unexpected which can never be ultimately resolved. 
 
The linearization of borders is perhaps most noticeable, in media reports today, outside the 
realm of land borders. Since the mid-twentieth century, the increasingly common practice of 
drawing boundaries not only on dry land but also in the sea has opened up a vast new realm of 
spatial uncertainty which it is now thought possible to resolve. Ocean space has, of course, long 
been regulated in a number of ways, in various places. Efforts to organize the law of the sea into 
a coherent, universal system of positive law, however, began in the late nineteenth century, 
intensified after the foundation of the UN, and culminated with the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982.  
 
One practice that has been made possible by the attempt to introduce scientific precision into 
the regulation of ocean areas is the freedom of navigation operation, exemplified by the US 
Navy. The US Navy’s Freedom of Navigation (FON) programme, formally initiated by President 
Jimmy Carter in 1979, is distinct from previous efforts simply to justify free navigation on the 
high seas.9 Unlike previous practices, it is crucial for the FON programme to precisely specify 
maritime claims that are being protested as illegal, to apply a consistent interpretation of 
international law to each sovereign state in doing so, and to violate only those illegal claims. 
FON is based theoretically on a conception of customary international law presupposing that if 
a state does not continually use its rights, this can potentially be taken to indicate that the state 
consents to the lapse of that right, and conversely, rights can be maintained through their use. 
Thus a consistent usage of rights is essential.  
 
This was the reason given in 1982 when the FON programme planned for the Black Sea was 
expanded to include a transgression of not just Bulgarian claims but also Soviet claims. 
Challenging excessive Bulgarian claims without challenging Soviet claims, according to this view, 
would actually reinforce the latter, and would therefore be counterproductive. In 1988, then, 
an incident ensued in which Soviet ships deliberately collided with two US ships asserting a right 
of innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters. The collisions took place 10.5 and 10.6 
nautical miles respectively from the Crimean coast, just within the territorial waters, which were 
claimed up to 12 miles from the coast. While the introduction of linear boundaries into the Black 
                                                             
9 William Aceves, ‘Diplomacy at Sea: U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea’, Naval War 
College Review, 46:2 (Spring 1993), 59-79. 
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Sea did not cause the collision, it did make the precise location of ships within the Black Sea into 
a crucial factor in the Soviet decision to strike the US ships. 
 
FON operations today equally rely on navigational precision because of the precision of maritime 
claims, particularly in the South China Sea, where FON operations are one of the main US 
responses to China’s militarization of the area. The US currently conducts regular FON 
operations in the South China Sea, and has been met with defiance by the Chinese military, up 
to the point where a Chinese ship nearly collided with a US ship near the Spratly Islands in 
October 2018.10 The possibility of crafting complicated routes, in conformance with the various 
zones generated or not generated by maritime features under the US interpretation of 
international law, bolsters the law-abiding image that the US Navy seeks to create.  
 
To take for example the operation undertaken by the USS Decatur in the Paracel Islands on 21 
October, 2016, the specific aim was to challenge the drawing of illegal straight baselines.11 China 
measures maritime claims outwards from lines drawn between the Paracel Islands, as if it had 
been declared an archipelagic state by the UN, like the Philippines or the Bahamas. These 
baselines, if legal, would mean that only innocent passage would be a protected right, and 
challenging their legality would require conducting a non-innocent passage. The Decatur did this 
by entering the internal waters within the baselines, then loitering and conducting manoeuvring 
drills. At the same time, it carefully avoided going within 12 nautical miles of any features, 
demonstrating an acceptance that the features generate territorial seas, regardless of whether 
the Paracels are Chinese, Taiwanese, or Vietnamese. 
 
These operations are meant to be carefully constructed to give precise signals. In the latter 
example, the US could have conducted innocent passage without notification all the way into 
the territorial waters of the individual Paracel Islands, but this was not the objective of that 
particular operation, which was instead to challenge illegal baselines. Moreover, it could have 
challenged China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel Islands at all, as Taiwan and Vietnam 
also claim the Paracels. The consistency of the signal and its correspondence to the US 
interpretation of international law was considered integral to the action’s effectiveness in 
                                                             
10 Brad Lendon, ‘Photos show how close Chinese warship came to colliding with US destroyer’, CNN, 4 
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delegitimizing Chinese claims. In contrast, when the USS Lassen conducted an innocent passage 
transit by an artificial island constructed by China on Subi Reef on 27 October, 2015, analysts 
and scholars widely criticized the manoeuvre. By following the rules of innocent passage, it 
appeared to treat the area as territorial waters even though artificial islands do not generate 
territorial waters in international law, drawing accusations that although the operation 
challenged China’s right to restrict innocent passage, it unintentionally affirmed China’s ability 
to expand its territorial sea by building artificial islands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image, a map showing the route taken by the USS Decatur around the territorial sea of, but 
between, the Paracel Islands, has been removed as the copyright is owned by another 
organisation] 
 
Figure 15: FON in the Paracel Islands, 21 October, 201612 
It is the precision and linearity of maritime claims which allows navies to construct these signals 
in the first place. Clear and measurable definitions of maritime zones give navies a way of 
determining precisely which zones have been entered into or violated. The unambiguous 
transgression or respecting of these lines goes hand in hand with the perceived all-importance 
of delivering a clear message to the international community about adherence to international 
law. Naval officials are at pains to stress that FON operations are not a kind of bullying or 
performance of escalating tensions but rather a means of reinforcing the limits of established 
international law by carrying out actions, consistently over time, that are exactly at the limit of 
legality. ‘We conduct routine and regular freedom of navigation operations, as we have done in 
the past and will continue to do in the future,’ as one Navy spokesperson said after a US FON 
operation in Russian-claimed waters, which came less than two weeks after Russia seized three 
                                                             
12 Freund, ‘Freedom of Navigation’, 38. 
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Ukrainian vessels trying to pass through the strait of Kerch.13 Freedom of navigation operations 
‘are not about any one country, nor are they about current events. All freedom-of-navigation 
assertions are grounded in principle and the rule of law.’ The strictness with which the US Navy 
follows the law is what gives FON operations their legitimacy and perceived effectiveness, and 
linear boundaries make this possible. 
 
FON operations, and the possibility of enacting a performatively strict adherence to law, are just 
one example of how linear maritime boundaries reshape ocean politics, but the implications of 
these new boundaries are arguably much broader. As Ken Booth has argued, ‘Some great 
paintings or pieces of literature encourage us to look at or think about the world in a different 
way. UNCLOS III has had such an impact on the way nations think about the sea’.14 The impact 
that linear zones have is not necessarily confined to the meanings intended by the authors of a 
treaty or agreed upon by the signatories. One example of this would be a CIA attempt in the 
1970s to project what the world would look like with maritime space entirely divided up into 
national territories.15 The proliferation and increasing international legislation of zones in the 
sea appeared, at that time, to be a process with an uncertain end and unclear consequences, 
where agreeing to one kind of state jurisdictional expansion could easily lead to more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image, a map of the world with all the ocean space divided up among states, has been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation] 
 
 
Figure 16: 'World Lake Concept: A Theoretical Division of the Seabed’, CIA, 197116 
 
 
                                                             
13 Christian Lopez, ‘US destroyer conducts freedom-of-navigation operation near Russia amid heightened 
tensions’, Stars and Stripes, 7 December, 2018 (https://www.stripes.com/news/us-destroyer-conducts-
freedom-of-navigation-operation-near-russia-amid-heightened-tensions-1.559618). 
14 Ken Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 376. 
15 Philip Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
175. 
16 Ibid., 174. 
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Another example would be the ‘security’ dimensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 
EEZ was a completely new kind of jurisdiction created by UNCLOS stretching 200 miles from the 
coast, far more than the territorial sea, which UNCLOS set at 12 miles. The reason that the 
maritime powers could agree to its creation, after repudiating many states’ earlier claims of 
territorial seas of up to 200 miles, was because jurisdiction in the EEZ was strictly limited to 
economic and scientific activities, and navigational and other rights of other states were 
guaranteed. Yet many states, in various ways, effectively treat the EEZ as a territorial sea, and 
since the signing of UNCLOS, such an interpretation has potentially been gaining ground in state 
practice.17 This gives states reason to invest in their mechanisms of legal argumentation, with 
China in particular adopting ‘legal warfare’, along with ‘media’ and ‘psychological warfare’ as 
part of its ‘three warfares’ strategy for achieving international influence.18 Of course, the fact 
that the US conducts FON operations in other states’ EEZs raises the question of who is 
responsible after all for the militarization of the EEZ. 
 
Moreover, while a given line in the ocean might have a technically defined meaning according 
to a particular interpretation of international law, simply drawing a line at all might also have 
meanings which cannot be understood through the language of law. As Booth argues, there is a 
‘psycho-legal’ or affective quality to drawing maritime boundaries which makes them 
instruments of peacetime naval operations. Regardless of the technical details, having the 
warship of another state enter a zone designated as pertaining to one’s own state is potentially 
threatening. ‘The new boundaries, and the feelings they engender, will therefore increase the 
scope for naval strategists to manipulate military power in order to show displeasure or to 
demonstrate support.’19 
 
During the First World War, Vladimir Lenin wrote that the ‘characteristic feature’ of the 
contemporary period was ‘the final partition of the earth…in the sense that the colonial policy 
of the capitalist countries has completed the seizure of unoccupied land on our planet. For the 
first time, the world is now divided up, so that in the future only re-divisions are possible; i.e., a 
transfer from one “owner” to another, and not of unowned territory to an “owner.”’20 While 
this may have captured something important about that moment in history, that moment 
                                                             
17 James Kraska, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 5. 
18 Kraska, Maritime Power, 320. 
19 Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, 388. 
20 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1934), 70. 
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certainly was not an endpoint for the expansion of linear borders. Lenin might have brushed off 
the African Union Border Programme, had he lived to see it begun in 2007, as a series of minor 
adjustments, although the African Union may deem it to promise major political implications. 
But ocean space, let alone air space or outer space, represents a vast area where political 
borders are only beginning to be subjected to the technical logic of points and lines. As long as 
states continue to look for ways to make their borders more precise, it is likely that they will 
continue to find them. 
 
**************** 
 
The central aim of the thesis in pursuing these arguments concerning the origins and 
consequences of linear borders, whether in terms of enclosure or partition, whether on land, on 
the sea, or beyond, has been greater than the sum of these particular arguments and historical 
narratives. It has been to theorize linear borders, as a bundle of ideas and practices, and the 
linearization of borders as the historical process to which these ideas and practices contribute, 
as a distinct component of global modernity. Conceptualizations of the international in IR and 
historical sociology have tended to understand the origins and consequences of modern borders 
through the lens of sovereignty, the state, national identity, or other structures. This thesis, by 
contrast, disassembled the connections between linear borders and modernity, and 
reassembled them through an analysis of historical processes. 
 
Rather than seeing the establishment of precise borders as a logical outcome of modernity as 
progress, development, and civilization, along with Friedrich Ratzel, Lord Curzon, and many who 
were influenced by their writings, the thesis has argued that linear borders only came to be a 
part of global modernity through specific historical events and processes. Linear borders did not 
emerge first within Europe, to be exported later via imperialism. Instead, Western imperialism, 
in terms of the forms of settler agrarian capitalism it made possible, and in terms of the 
dichotomy between civilized and uncivilized societies it constructed, was always integral to the 
linearization of borders. 
 
The importance of the particular character of modern borders is easy to overlook. What could 
be simpler than a series of straight lines? What is more interesting, it might seem, is the more 
varied reality which is obscured by an understanding of borders as lines, or new forms of political 
geography which might at some future point make borders irrelevant. But just because some 
scholars have attained a critical awareness to the contingency and non-linearity of borders does 
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not make linear borders disappear; ‘Analysis does not make it go away’.21 As this thesis aimed 
to show, there is much to be gained from investigating the history of the basic spatial form that 
in many ways conceptually holds the international together. Far from a topic that should be 
delegated to an increasingly quantified political science, the account of the geographical lines 
constituted by borders unfolded in this thesis is indicative of the breadth and depth of the 
ground that historical IR has yet to cover. 
  
                                                             
21 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 28. 
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